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Send all change of address notices, undeliverable copies, subscription orders and other mail to *Editorial and Circulation Offices:* 1811 Q Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20009.

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THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR

Volume 41 *Spring, 1972* Number 2

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The Despairing Optimist . . . . . .

RENÉ DUBOS

Every week I shuttle by motorcar between home in mid-Manhattan and two college campuses—the Purchase campus of the State University of New York in Westchester County and the Richmond campus of the City University on Staten Island. During the seminars on human ecology that I conduct on both campuses, the most popular topics among faculty and students are crowding, poverty, aggressiveness, violence, anomie, racial conflicts, social injustice, drug addiction, environmental pollution, depletion of resources, in brief, the thousand devils of the urban crisis. There seems to be a consensus among the seminar participants that life in the large American cities is rapidly becoming impossible, and that New York, in particular, is in the process of dying.

I have countless opportunities to experience the horrors of the urban environment every day of my Manhattan life, and I am always painfully aware of them on my way home from the seminars. But what I also notice as I drive back to the city is the magnificence of the Westchester parkways and the ethereal quality of the Verrazano Bridge over the Narrows and of the Brooklyn Bridge over the East River. From the bridges and from East River Drive, furthermore, I have the breathtaking spectacle of the new skyscrapers soaring higher and higher downtown and uptown. The boldness of the buildings is matched by the vigor and zest of the people going about their occupations in private automobiles or at the wheels of monstrous delivery trucks. The effervescence of the human enterprise helps me to tolerate the mechanical brutality of the traffic. With the tempo of life around the buildings and on the highways so accelerated, I find it difficult to believe that New York is dying. In fact, I wonder whether anyone has really tried to define the meaning of this fashionable stock phrase. If it is really true that New York is dying, then it is dying with a flourish.

Like everyone else, I am appalled by social misery, racial conflicts, environmental pollution and traffic jams. If I do not despair of New York's fate, it is not because I am blind or insensitive to the obvious problems of modern urban life, but because I know that, throughout history, most of the world's cities have repeatedly experienced horrendous conditions, yet have managed to survive because they have been able to evolve. Responding to environmental challenges and evolving as a result of these responses is as characteristic of cities as it is of other living organisms.

Misery and pollution were far worse in most urban areas a century ago than they are now, as anyone will realize who has read Dickens, Engels, Zola, Dostoevski or Gorki. But within a few decades after public conscience had been awakened and political forces had been mobilized, European and American cities discovered ways to deal with the worst human and environmental problems generated by the first phase of the Industrial Revolution. The urban problems of today are different from those characteristic of the factories, offices and

✪ RENÉ DUBOS, author of, *Man, Medicine and Environment, Reason Awake: Science for Man* and other books, succeeded the late Joseph Wood Krutch as a regular columnist for the SCHOLAR.

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tenements in the mushrooming cities of the late nineteenth century—but they are not worse or necessarily more difficult. But they are different, and they will therefore demand new solutions.

I have lived in New York long enough to have witnessed many painful aspects of urban life. I remember vividly the hostile and contemptuous feelings against people of Jewish, Irish and Italian origins during the 1920s; the gloom and hopelessness generated by the economic depression in the 1930s; the behavioral extravagances that followed the First and Second World Wars; the rejection of the established order by young people any time society became too gross or self-satisfied. There have been many bohemians and lost generations before the present forms of countercultures.

For more than forty years, I have had to cope with the inconveniences of living in mid-Manhattan, first as a penniless young scientist and now as a retired professor. From this long and diversified experience, I have come to the conclusion that New York City remains true to its genius when it accommodates simultaneously the most extreme manifestations of squalor and splendor, of perverse exhibitionism and abstract intellectualism. New York is exhausting because it is so diverse and never stable. But this is its virtue: far from dying it is rapidly evolving because it is the experimental city par excellence.

During my youth in Europe, the word America symbolized the land of unlimited opportunities, an atmosphere of social and political freedom. As an emigrant who elected to move to the United States from France and Italy at the age of twenty-four, without funds or friends, I have had many occasions to verify that there was much truth in this idealized picture. Despite painful evidence to the contrary, I believe there is still truth in the picture even now. The early conditioning that resulted from my euphoric imaginings of America, and from the rewarding experiences of my American life, probably makes it difficult for me to judge objectively the drabness and dangers of the present American scene. This conditioning may explain also why I tend to be somewhat amused and at times annoyed by the displays of pessimism that are so common today in the United States. I had therefore good reason to be both amused and irritated when I was invited in the fall of 1971 to participate in a conference organized by Portland State University in Oregon under the provocative title "Is America Possible?" The other two main speakers at the conference were Harvey Wheeler of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, and Tom Wicker of the *New York Times*.

In the *New York Times* column that Tom Wicker devoted on October 31, 1971, to the Portland discussions, he pointed out that no one ever defined what was meant by America in the question "Is America Possible?" But it was clear from the three main speeches, and from the responses of the audience, that the word America now calls to mind not unlimited opportunities and freedom but social unrest, the fear of a creeping degradation of the human and physical environments, and, worst of all, a sense of powerlessness among the citizenry in general and the young in particular. Drug addiction is but one of the many symptoms of the social rejection resulting from the loss of faith in the future.

The pessimistic view of the present society in the United States takes such extreme forms among many Americans that I am inclined to construe it as a perverted expression of national conceit. If the United States can no longer be regarded as the best among nations, then declaring it to be the worst is one way of giving it uniqueness and therefore a special quality. The less glamorous truth, however, is that there is nothing peculiar to the present American situation. Social unrest and the degradation of life are now ubiquitous in all highly technicized countries and wherever ethnic groups have not yet been fully assimilated. Social problems are more acute in the United States to the extent that the need for ethnic assimilation is more massive and that technological civilization has been more pervasive and has reached higher levels of development—in quantity if not

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always in quality. The French social critic J.-F. Revel is probably justified when he asserts in his book *Without Marx or Jesus* that the next social revolution will occur first in the United States, for the reason that the more violent the challenge, the more likely it is to elicit corrective responses from the social order.

The very successes of the American ways of life may be responsible in part for generating levels of irritation that exceed the threshold of social resistance. One of the most common failures of civilizations is to overdevelop, up to the point of absurdity, the skills and characteristics that accounted for their initial successes and for their subsequent power. The architects of the thirteenth century, for example, had such confidence in their skills that they built higher and higher cathedrals, with more and more flamboyant ogives, as if they had become intoxicated with their technical proficiency. In Notre Dame de Paris the vault of the nave was built to a height of 110 feet in 1163; this record was broken by Chartres in 1194 with 114 feet, then by Rheims in 1212 with 125 feet, then by Amiens in 1221 with 140 feet. When the citizens of Beauvais tried to outdo Amiens in 1227 by raising the vault of their own cathedral to 153 feet, its choir collapsed. The Beauvais choir was soon rebuilt but once more it fell. Finally, it was brought to a height of 154 feet on a third trial. The cathedral was completed in 1552 with a lantern tower raised over the transept cross to a height of five hundred feet. But the tower collapsed in 1573, bringing down with it large sections of the transept and the choir. This disaster ended the great period of Gothic architecture.

Like architectural styles, social trends have often been continued and developed to the point of absurdity. The Roman Empire was eventually destroyed by its own administrative genius, which enabled it to grow beyond manageable size and which made it highly vulnerable through its dependence on the populations and the natural resources of the countries it had conquered. The centralization of political power in the French monarchy contributed to the greatness and wealth of France, but Louis XIV's absurd formula *"L'État c'est Moi"* created a social atmosphere that led to the Revolution.

Technological societies in general, and American society in particular, are similarly threatened by the exaggerated developments of characteristics that once were highly desirable. Thus, the laudable desire to escape from physical drudgery has degenerated into contempt for physical work; the struggle for equality of rights has led to the belief that there is equality of talents; the use of the automobile for greater freedom of movement has turned into a lazy compulsion; economic growth, which originally produced more goods for more people, is now largely pursued for its own sake, even if it means ecological degradation; efficiency has become an end unto itself, destructive of diversity and of the quality of life.

One form of the growth myth is the affirmation endlessly repeated from a myriad of official platforms that our survival and the quality of our lives depend upon the production of more and more electric power. Whereas our population increases by less than one percent a year, it is claimed that the production of electricity must continue to increase at an annual rate of some six percent. For many years, admittedly, there was no truer slogan than "Better life through electricity." But the continued increase in electric consumption shows how a good thing can be overdeveloped to an absurd point. In urban areas, a very large percentage of electricity is used for obnoxious and absurd advertising, for raising high-speed elevators to absurd heights, and for absurd practices of air conditioning. Windows that could be opened to provide cross ventilation would greatly decrease the need for air conditioning. This, in turn, would decrease the amount of heat generated at the site of the power plant where electricity is produced, and in the city where heat is released by the air conditioner. What is needed is not so much more electricity for air conditioning, as saner architectural design. The problem of air conditioning symbolizes how social needs can be satisfied by

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techniques other than more and more electric power, provided we escape from the obsession that everything in life depends on such power.

In a recent issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* a professor of nuclear engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology advocates the rapid development of fast breeder reactors because, in his words, "An abundant supply of electricity . . . is essential to civilized society." The obvious truth, of course, is that there have been many great civilizations before the electric era. Furthermore, even though the consumption of electric power per capita in the United States was very much smaller in 1940 than it is now, there is no evidence that the present American society is more civilized or happier than it was then. Nor are European people less civilized than American people because they consume only half as much electricity per capita. What the M.I.T. professor really meant is that an ever-increasing supply of electricity is essential for a kind of civilized society that measures civilization by power and therefore by the amount of electricity it consumes—a circuitous argument. Whether this is the most desirable kind of society is far from obvious and in fact is doubted by increasing numbers of persons—including many professors of engineering.

We have been brainwashed into the belief that progress means doing everything we know how to do, such as pouring an endless variety of useless additives into our foods, putting ever larger numbers of more powerful automobiles on the road, building higher and higher skyscrapers serviced by faster and faster elevators, consuming more and more electric energy to achieve a more artificial life. These accomplishments may have been entertaining in the past but they are now boring and furthermore they will inevitably generate dangerous technological and social problems.

If the question raised in Portland, "Is America Possible?" refers only to present trends, the answer is NO. Present trends will inevitably lead to disasters and to the destruction of our social and technological enterprise. But the future is not likely to be an extrapolation of present trends, because there exist growth-limiting factors inherent in the technological enterprise and in human nature.

The complexity of present-day technological societies makes them increasingly vulnerable to accidents and sabotage, as well as to shortages of raw materials. Other types of limiting factors will soon arise from the various forms of environmental pollution, of which the public is becoming increasingly aware and intolerant. New technological developments will unquestionably facilitate the control of pollution and the recovery of metals from low-grade ores, but this will require enormous amounts of electric power, precisely at a time when the production of this power is itself becoming a limiting factor. Thus we shall soon have to alter profoundly our technological way of life, not because we decide to make a politico-social revolution, but because we shall be compelled by events having their origin in natural laws.

Human nature, also, will be a powerful agent of change. Technological civilization has obviously raised the living standards for large numbers of people but, paradoxically, it has also decreased the quality of life in many situations. Living standards refer to manifestations of economic affluence that are fairly objective—whereas the quality of life is admittedly a subjective value. The loss of this quality, however, is perceived by most people. In human societies, the development of an unsatisfactory state tends to generate forces for change. Time and time again in the course of history, countercultures have emerged and helped to interrupt destructive trends, as if they constituted a form of protective response by society.

Countercultures can take many different forms. The most obvious is the withdrawal from society of certain of its members—a warning that processed foodstuffs, electronic gadgets, and plastic knicknacks do not compensate for wastelands, murky skies, and mechanization of life. The influence of countercultures can also reach into other levels of society. It is unlikely that the

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French Revolution could have succeeded, for example, if certain members of the nobility, clergy, and prosperous bourgeoisie had not lost faith during the eighteenth century in the institutions of *l'ancien régime*. In our own times, a good-sized anthology could be composed from the statements made by leaders of technology and finance who have publicly expressed their opinion that industrial society cannot continue much longer in its present form. The most effective expression of the counterculture may well be, not withdrawal, but the widespread belief in certain parts of the Establishment that the time has come to challenge the rationality of endless growth and to develop a new social philosophy.

Since some of our fundamental social premises are being questioned by many distinguished members of the Establishment, I found it easy in Portland to believe Harvey Wheeler when he stated that American society is "in a pre-revolutionary state." Harvey Wheeler did not reject, however, that the change might be nonviolent, evolutionary rather than revolutionary. In fact, he saw reasons for hope in the simultaneous emergence of a new scientific culture, and of a counterculture seeking, for example, new community forms; he even believed that the Constitution should and could be rewritten to fit the present conditions.

Looking at the American predicament from a political point of view, Tom Wicker made a case for the possibility of what he called "a radical leadership." As he stated in his *New York Times* column, this did not imply his acceptance of the "great man theory of history." What he believed rather was that because Americans now feel that their familiar institutions and processes are floundering or frozen, they would welcome a leadership that could disenthrall itself from outmoded ideas and attitudes. The need, in his judgment, was not so much for the revolutionary activist, the skilled political manager, or the administrator of great enterprises, as for a leader who would act as teacher and example.

Shortly after writing these pages, a walk that I took in Central Park on a Sunday afternoon turned my thoughts to the role that people—the average citizens—would play in the sociotechnological changes that Harvey Wheeler, Tom Wicker and I had postulated in Portland.

This particular Sunday was in late November, with a soft gray sky and a gentle temperature—almost a feeling of no temperature at all. Such weather is not typical for New York in the fall. It had neither the exhilarating quality of a high, brilliant dry sky, nor the gloomy effect associated with a pervasive rain. The atmosphere was just one of relaxation after the excitement of the summer season and of harvest time.

Central Park was crowded, but did not appear so. More exactly it was alive with people of all ages and all colors, who were enjoying a world temporarily free of motor cars. The great creative innovation in New York during recent years has been, not adding to the city, but rather eliminating automobile traffic from certain areas on certain days, in particular from the parks on the weekends. Children and dogs ran around freely, chasing each other around trees and up the huge boulders. Couples, young and old, were affectionately holding hands, as in a private plaisance. All sorts of people in all kinds of colorful and pleasantly ridiculous accoutrements talked, laughed, and especially smiled—with the kind of smile New Yorkers have when they swarm on Fifth Avenue on the days when it is free from motor cars. The bicycle riders moved silently everywhere, some mildly intoxicated by the physical effort, others going slowly with an expression of beatitude on their faces. New York can be wonderfully human when free of motor cars; it evokes then the sense of relief one experiences after awakening from a nightmare.

While walking in Central Park among all these happy and pleasant people, I kept wondering what they would have answered if asked, "Is America Possible?" "Is New York Dying?" Most likely they would have judged the questions meaningless, and the questioner out of his mind. Many of them certainly knew of young people who had removed themselves from orthodox society, and also of earnest adults who questioned the assumptions and values of the

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Establishment. But in their healthy skepticism of countercultures they probably believed that life goes on despite all difficulties, just as Rome has survived for twenty-five hundred years by evolving in response to changing conditions. The collapse of the Roman Empire is a cerebral invention of historians.

Yet I am inclined to believe that many of the strollers in Central Park were unknowingly part of a counterculture that will eventually be far more effective than scientific, social and political theoreticians in changing the course of American life. Their behavior reflected a subconscious awareness of the truth that higher standards of living do not necessarily make for a better quality of life. Their simple healthy enjoyment of the car-less and careless atmosphere, and the gentle physical pleasure they derived from riding their bicycles, seemed to me the expressions of a biological wisdom rediscovering satisfactions now being threatened by the absurdities of the Faustian world.

By their sounds ye shall know them

WILLIAM F. CLAIRE

The wild rooster in San Juan,
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the caw caw caw of the crow
in Ireland, the memory of Sean O'Casey,
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the bobwhite waking us from the dead sleep
of love in a strange bed in a country inn
all birds sanctifying love in the early morning
and all other sounds, golden and perverse,
that separate us from the silence
to inquire . . . what was that noise?

✪ WILLIAM F. CLAIRE's essays and poems have appeared in recent issues of the *Nation,* the *New Republic, Antioch Review* and the *New York Quarterly,* among other periodicals. He is the founding editor and publisher of *Voyages,* a national literary magazine published in Washington, D.C.

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

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

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

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Technology and Culture in Evolution

J. BRONOWSKI

THERE IS NO BLUEPRINT of the future: there is not even a modern bible of the future, of the kind that Karl Marx wrote—a compound of history and exhortation that might be read as a map to the promised land. Since the heyday of H. G. Wells, almost no one has written seriously about the future except the prophets of gloom, such as Aldous Huxley and George Orwell. Their books were made popular by their moralizing tone, but in fact they lack moral as well as scientific imagination: the tragic air about them derives from a complacent assurance that literary England in the first half of the century was the arbiter and expression of ethical wisdom forever. Meanwhile, the writers with a more inventive turn of mind have backed away into science fiction, where their timid and trivial adventures in whimsy do not aspire to genuine imagination and humanity, and so do not rank even as minor prophecy.

Perhaps it has become too painful to think about the future, whose melancholy course just ahead of us is constantly predictable, and yet which we constantly fail to steer away from patently disastrous policies. Whatever the reason, we are intellectually in the middle of a grand withdrawal from history, of which the withdrawal from the future is the less visible but the more ominous half. It is as if we were trying to close our eyes to all that has made us human, by way of biological and cultural evolution, and want instead to play at being happy foundlings in a hole in time.

The truth is, however, that the special gifts of man and his achievements are inseparable from his evolutionary history as the only substantially self-made animal. A multitude of animal species

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run, fly, swim, and burrow around us, shaped by and locked into their environment; and among all the species, only man has achieved enough command to have largely influenced his own biological evolution. In the past, man has molded himself for the most part unconsciously, by changing the environment so that its selective pressure on him changed. Now we are able to command at least our immediate future with a much larger understanding of the implications of what we do; and it would be ironic if we chose this new moment to bring history to a standstill.

The contemporary crisis of withdrawal from past and future together has been brought home to me by reading again Desmond Bernal's small classic of prophecy *The World, the Flesh & the Devil,* which has been reprinted after a biblical lapse of forty years. My first reading of the book in 1929 is still bright in my mind, not because it was memorable, but because in a heightened form it was natural and native to Cambridge then: an active, uninhibited, bubbling society of young men who were forever speculating about everything. I was a fairly inquisitive undergraduate, but Desmond Bernal as a junior research don in crystallography outdid us all in curiosity, argument, and irritating candor. His great range of interests makes Bernal's first book an epitome of the intellectual tone of Cambridge then, and (by the way) is expressed in its arch title: *the World* is man's physical environment, *the Flesh* is his biological frame, and *the Devil* is his psychological makeup.

Bernal was thinking on an evolutionary scale of time, and trying to guess the future toward which man is heading, in part by the elaboration of his species-specific talents, and in part by the short-term choices that he makes, half consciously, to direct his long-term fate. Naturally he foresaw that man would more and more crowd and despoil the earth: in the long run, therefore, he would have to make new earths and put them into solar orbit. Since a man-made earth would necessarily be small, say ten miles across, it would have no gravity to speak of and would therefore best be made hollow, with the population moving and working freely inside as a three-dimensional, self-contained city culture. Chemical and energy exchanges would have to take place through the shell,

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which would thus have to serve both as mother quarry and as cell wall; and the inhabitants would occasionally send off from the shell new copies of their earth, like the twinning of living cells. In time the solar system would presumably be whirling with little earths by the hundred thousand, each isolated from the others and set on its own evolutionary path.

If this seems a fantastic way to reshape the world, Bernal's way with the flesh is even more unorthodox. His thought here begins from the observation that Boswell quotes from Benjamin Franklin, that man is a tool-making animal. We now know that this is indeed how man has extended the reach of his organs into his unique ability to shape the environment to himself. Sooner or later, therefore, Bernal holds, the more sophisticated tools will be made into normal extensions of the body, and built into us for life. (Evidently this is already happening to our eyes, as we first eke them out with spectacles and then replace those by contact lenses.) The result would be a human being as an integrated tool kit, part flesh and part apparatus, all run directly by the central nervous system.

Oddly, Bernal is both most original and least specific in casting out the devil, that is, the psychological limitations of people in their everyday behavior. What is original is that he tackles the subject at all; for this is a field of prophecy that the professional forecasters always shirk—as can be seen in the otherwise sturdy work of two recent panels to assess new technology, one run by the National Academy of Sciences and the other by the Institute for the Future. What the panels guess about changes in physical and even in biological habits is as always bold and stimulating; but what they say about the effect of such changes on personal and social psychology is as always meager, old-womanish, and painfully vague. Bernal marches up to the devil boldly, though he comes away fairly vague himself. His main hope is to liberate the originality that is hidden in every human mind, and his recipe for that is to cast out fear, particularly the fear of startling innovations. There is also a nice plea for a union of the cultures, by race, geography, and disciplines, which was indeed prophetic in 1929 but, by a special irony, sounds almost nostalgic at this moment, when

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the literary Jeremiahs are in full wail again, and the two cultures are farther apart than ever.

I am deliberately thrusting these speculations at the reader because it seems to me timely to remind ourselves that man is an evolved being whose evolution is still going on. We are creatures like others in course of change, and we are unlike the others mainly in our rate and range of change. Very recent studies of the protein chemistry of primates suggest that we and the chimpanzee were one stock no longer than ten or twenty million years ago, so that our evolution has gone prodigiously fast (particularly in the growth of our brain in the last half million years). By contrast, such social insects as the ants have remained quite unchanged for at least fifty million years, locked in their rigid hierarchies of function by structure. We have to face the logic of life, which is that species reach a steady state, and stop evolving, only when the individuals fall into uniform and indeed identical types. By contrast, evolution goes on if there is a pool of viable mutations, which can express themselves in structures and in behavior different from the normal: so that it is reasonable to prophesy that the more variable the members of a species are, the more freely and unexpectedly will it evolve. If we value variety in human beings, we cannot be squeamish in admitting that, as a consequence, man will go on evolving quite strangely.

Therefore when we say aloud (and rightly) that we need to *safeguard* the environment of life, we must beware of secretly thinking that we must *stabilize* the environment—with the hidden assumption that the fullness of human life is to be equated with man as he is now. Of course, it is unwelcome and unsettling to be told that we are not the peak of nature, a museum piece for eternity; but no doubt Neanderthal man (whose line has become extinct) felt the same way before us. The quality of life is not god-given; on the contrary, since the evolutionary rise of man it has been man-made, and it must not be fixed to mean what happens to be agreeable to the kind of men that we are now—conservatives who like to pose as conservationists. It does not make sense to talk of the quality of life unless we have in mind a choice

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among the possible satisfactions that human life can provide, and particularly a choice among different modes of intellectual satisfaction.

Again I am deliberately invoking a long perspective in order to make the reader look hard at the Wordsworthian catchwords that are traded in the health food stores. If the basis for our disgust with the commuter city and the power state is the belief that they are unnatural to man (as surely they are) then we need to say what is natural—and we need a better ground for saying it than the authority of gut and guru. Moreover, what is natural to man must be specific to him, which is why the general accounts of animal behavior that derive from Konrad Lorenz will not do. Of course man is a poor creature if he blinds himself to the power and the satisfactions of his animal heritage; but he is even poorer, poorer than any animal, if he does not explore those satisfactions that are unique to his species. Hence the scientific search by ethologists for universals in animal behavior is distorted from its purpose, and becomes a silly piece of journalistic sensation, if it is used as a prescription for what is "natural" in human conduct. Magazine readers seem to like to be told that they share a universal beastliness with animals—perhaps because it absolves them of the responsibility to feel human; but that is *not* what has made our species man rather than any other animal.

What has made us men has been deeply documented now by the fossil finds in Africa in the last fifty years, which have traced the biological and cultural specialization of modern man back to its origins, and by the newer work in primate ethology. More than a million, perhaps two million years ago, the hominids went on from using rudimentary tools (which the chimpanzee does) to making them and keeping them for future use. That discovery, that simple lunge into technological foresight, released the brake on evolution which the environment imposes on other animals, and sent man off breakneck at a speed unmatched in the three billion years that life has existed on earth. For without that discovery, evolution is necessarily held down to the pace of biological adaptation. But from the time of the basic human *discovery of the future,* the environment ceases to set the pace, which instead is

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then set by the capacity to store knowledge and to form plans from it.

This is a remarkable finding, for it implies that the evolution of man has always been culture-driven, and that the driving component was technology. A culture cannot be inherited in the genes, of course; what the hominids passed from one generation to the next was greater dexterity of hand and more farsighted planning in the brain, which became able to manipulate symbols as artifacts. We assume that the choice of mates with these gifts, and the higher reproduction and survival rates of those who possessed them, produced a unique form of natural selection, namely, a self-selection for these culturally useful attributes. (The same selection is still at work: to this day, the correlation of intelligence quotients between bride and bridegroom is higher than between parents and children.) Thus human evolution owes its speed to the gift of technology by which we have shaped the environment; we have never fitted very well into any ecological niche, and instead have carved our own niches with our hands and brain. But even this metaphor is too formal: what has happened is that we have exploited a genetic accident which has made us able progressively to store and organize experience so that we can profit from almost any terrestrial environment.

On this grand scale of history, therefore, to quarrel with technology is to quarrel with the nature of man—just as if we were to quarrel with his upright gait, his symbolic imagination, his faculty for speech, or his unusual sexual posture and appetite. Of course that is no reason why those who choose should not dislike technology; now that it has helped indirectly to give them a brain two to three times larger than the chimpanzee's, they are surely free to use it to prefer the life or even the brain of the chimpanzee. But they cannot then take as their ground the claim that they want to return to nature, meaning the nature of man. For the nature of man is expressed in the same few universals in every culture, from the pigmy and the aborigine to Western man, and from the prohibition of incest to language; and one of these universals is technology.

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By the same token, it is a flat denial of history to assert that cultures in which technology has flourished have stifled the development of more personal and sensitive expressions of human nature. On the contrary, the works of high culture that we admire come from the most advanced technological societies of their day: classical Greece, the Arab civilization, the Italian city states, Elizabethan and Restoration England—as soon as one looks at the monuments of art and architecture and literature that express the peaks of the human imagination for us, one sees that they match the peaks of technological sophistication in history. (We do not even take our religions from technologically backward civilizations: Buddha, Confucius, Christ and Mohammed were not the desert prophets of backward peoples, but grew up in great intellectual civilizations.) I shall not labor this historical analysis as I have done the biological one, because the facts here are open to everyone to inspect, and are self-evident as soon as we attend to them. The only way to get around them is to dismiss them: that is, to say that Sophocles and Michelangelo and Marlowe and Christopher Wren are fossils whose record is irrelevant to the cultural mishaps of city life in the twentieth century—the profound human problems that many citizens of America believe have been vouchsafed to them for the first time.

There is a good deal of talk now about a counterculture, and on the face of it what is being countered is only technology as a social culture. That, for example, is what the words say on the pages of Theodore Roszak's book with that phrase in the title: technology is soulless, get rid of it and let your soul breathe out. But what is important is what the words do *not* say—all the invisible sludge of rejection on which such thoughts float. The words do not say anything about the great concepts of science, of course, about the achievements of the rational intellect, or about the imaginative creation in this century of a world picture unbelievably richer and more harmonious than anything you can get from drugs. That was to be expected; the counterculture is against science. What was not expected is the heavy silence about music and painting and literature as lasting and living expressions of all that has made our

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culture, and has alone made it worthwhile. Some perfunctory parade of literary commonplaces and a little mantra-chanting are, it seems, all the equipment that the soul needs on its soaring flight into the acid blue of being human. There is a hidden, plangent hatred of everything except private experience: the counterculture is against culture.

The fact, the dreadful fact, is that the assertion by those who speak for a counterculture that technology distorts human nature is not only false, as biology and as history. It is a deliberate act of mischief, for it is a recapitulation in modern dress of the anti-intellectual, irrational and illiberal prejudices that have always been endemic in America. In the past this homespun obscurantism has been a defensive faith for the old; now it is being sold to the young as a respectable brand of snake oil that will dull the itch of ignorance without personal effort. No quack commercial on television can equal this unholy piece of legerdemain. The ethic of the Chamber of Commerce, do-it-yourself, my-way-is-as-good-as-yours, who-are-you-anyway-to-prefer-brains-to-what-I-have, is artlessly turned into a hippie slogan; and we are supposed not to recognize in the rejuvenation the traditional truculence of those who have always claimed that know-nothing can do duty for know-better.

An armory of old and scaly prejudices is being foisted on the young in the disguise of a gospel of nature. For years the senior citizens and crackpots have been writing to the papers from their California refuge to warn of the peril (and the impiety) of adding fluoride to drinking water. Now the junior citizens are taking over from them, warning of the peril (and the outrage) of using chemical manure—as if the use of dung had been revealed by Shiva, and was not a technology but a magic. Solemnly they tell me that home baked is better than the bread in the supermarket (as of course it is), not for the sensible reason that personal care went to make it, but because the home oven was invented by Adam and the factory oven by science. My grandfather used to talk like that, always recalling a golden age of simplicity when technology was—was what? was old-fashioned, neither more nor less. Bernal has a nice remark about such "very sane reactionaries

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at all periods warning us to remain in the natural and primitive state of humanity, which is usually the last stage but one in their cultural history." That always turned out to be, in my grandfather's stories, when he was twenty; but when was it for the teenagers who now talk like him?

The danger in this phony naturalism, this antirational vision of man as a kind of holy cow (with Zen Buddhism as an optional extra), is that it points the young away from the true ills of the state, to those lesser targets that the Chamber of Commerce can shoot at too. It is wonderful, for example, to see how happily all parties have joined in crying out against smog and oil slicks. Why not? they are indeed dangerous to life—and who is to blame a politician if he does not go out of his way to correct the impression that they are more dangerous than the competitive stockpiling of nuclear weapons. So in the register of instant clichés *pollution* now ranks with *communism* as a symbol for universal abuse which will mask all differences; and instead of *the American way of life* we all agree to preserve and hold sacred *the environment.*

There used to be a time, not many years ago, when ecologists spoke proudly of their work as *The Subversive Science* (it is the title of an early book of essays on the subject), and when it was enough to protest against the violence done to fauna and flora and to point to the threat that it carried. But all that has become a commonplace of political oratory, which most of the time merely wants to sell a new technological gimmick in place of the old. No protest has any intellectual weight now if it is not directed toward a sensible (and not a nihilistic) mode of social change, and begins with a communal and human and not a technical diagnosis.

Why has pollution become visible and threatening today as it was not forty years ago? Surely not because technology is less efficient in controlling its own side effects: quite the contrary. Nor will it do to say simply that there are now more people in more and denser cities—for there is no smog in Calcutta, for instance. If there is smog in Los Angeles, and if it is right to feel that as a universal anguish, it is because we now find it natural to concede that one man has as much business to own a motorcar as another.

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Pollution is not the cost of technology in itself, nor even of the abuse of technology: it is the result of a shift in technology from the privilege of a few to the right of all.

What we have done, and should be proud to own, is to make the benefits of technology (in the sense of a high standard of health, convenience, privacy and information) as much a human right as life and liberty. In the space of a hundred years we have transformed working- and middle-class life so that it now commands as a matter of course what used to be the luxuries of upper-class privilege—running and hot water, an indoor toilet that flushes, health care and medicines, gas heating and electric light, door-to-door travel, news brought into the house, reading and letter writing, telephone conversation, and all the other norms of daily life that someone born into the working class (D. H. Lawrence, say) once could reach only by endless struggles. Of course, the proliferation of the apparatus to do these things, the water mains and the sewers, the apartment houses, the roads and the telephone wires, the tin cans and the gift wrappings, for a time has turned the landscape cockeyed. But that distortion is not the price of technology—it is the price of revolution anywhere, at any time, like the guillotine springing up in the Place de la Concorde.

With the step from privilege to everyday use, technology has become a moral and not a material demand; it is a visible expression of the drive for social justice—just as we now recognize *Das Kapital* as a work of moral rather than material indignation. What seemed self-evident to Marx, namely, that the basis of all value is work, is exactly what was not self-evident to his precursors —to whom, on the contrary, it seemed plain that the basic values were land and leisure. And the change came about as a change in the esteem of one man for another—as we see, for example, in the bitter fight in America for the abolition of slavery just at the time Marx was writing. Now the sense that all men are entitled to the same standard has spread to the standard of living, which means (everywhere in the world) the use of new techniques to wrest a modest plenty from the starveling grasp of nature.

Technology, then, is no longer a prerogative of status. It is not a weapon of national or commercial or social rivalry (as it was,

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say, at the time of the Franco–Prussian war), because the spread of scientific knowledge has abolished any lasting monopoly. Now the Viet Cong guerrilla and the Negro infantryman who faces him are armed with the same exquisite and supernational masterpieces of twentieth-century craftsmanship for which Cesare Borgia would once have given his fortune: the automatic rifle, the radar scope, the infra-red glasses and the homing rocket. And what makes that technical cornucopia shameful to us is that both sides pour it out only to kill. It is a charity that stops at home, for there the sniper and the man from the ghetto equally have nothing: no decent toilet, no services, no health care, no modern education. That men should be denied in life the artifacts that we can lavish on them for death—that is now the moral affront to our humanity. Our society has acknowledged that every man is entitled to the best that technology can make to help him; but in practice, he only gets it to help him make war.

Every civilization has been grounded on technology: what makes ours unique is that for the first time we believe that every man is entitled to all its benefits. That gives a special moral force to the protest, a sense of revulsion in the face of abuse, when young men see it used as I have just described it, in war. Paul Goodman in an essay in the *New York Review of Books* not long ago (November 20, 1969) "Can Technology Be Humane?" likened this ethical aspiration to "a new protestant Reformation." The analogy is exact because the Reformation was a popular movement of protest to take the interpretation of the Scriptures (and their social lessons) out of the hands of privileged groups and put it into the consciousness of every man as an equal. The same claim to an equal share in all human goods, and an equal access to nature and to knowledge, gives its special quality to the technical civilization that we are trying to make. There is no other policy and no panacea ahead of the protesters: the Reformation is a fundamental search for a practical ethic of equality.

But it is logically and morally untenable to think that equality can be stabilized by training just enough scientists to keep the rest of the population supplied with a sort of minimum pabulum of comfort. Such parasitic solutions are inspired by the ethic of

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famine that blows from the past, and that pretends that scarcity makes men equal—a dogma that flies in the face of history. It really is too late to credit that all comfort corrupts, all industry despoils, and running water and the electric blanket inevitably bring in their train social rivalries and nuclear warheads. The whole economic outlook of nations coveting one another's mines and landscapes as sources of wealth is as dead as mercantilism—the examples of Switzerland, Denmark and California show that. On the contrary, we have wealth running out of our ears, in every kind of technique for mass production—and an egalitarian mass which, though its values are still improvised from television commercials, is waiting to share it. What makes equal is plenty; so that we have to add to the Reformation the one concept that Luther's puritanical mind feared (for instance, in the Anabaptist revolt): an ethic of plenty.

An ethic of plenty is different in kind from the traditional codes, which as a matter of historical necessity have been inspired by the need to be frugal with natural resources and diligently to build up reserves against famine. For once it comes home to people that their material needs can all be satisfied, then frugality, diligence and thrift cease to be virtues—or can only be preserved by diverting the surplus to other false, archaic virtues, such as nationalism and war. But the way to sap the lingering superstition that virtues must be ascetic is certainly not to propose in their place another bout of puritanism, which is what the Zen Buddhists and the nature faddists preach. On the contrary, we need to learn to live with plenty: we have to discover, after all these centuries of famine, how to make our minds grasp that.

The basis of puritanism was submission to a divine or natural ordinance that people could not all have (or be) what they wanted. It came to be assumed that what they wanted was also bad: but of course this truism derives from the need to deny it to them, and not the other way about. Thus the crucial thesis in the old Protestant faith was, necessarily, that it is wrong for men to seek fulfilment (or salvation) in the satisfaction of their personal talents. But a new Protestant Reformation, if it is not to be merely ob-

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scurantist, must resolutely put that thesis in reverse. The progress of cultures has always depended on the satisfaction that active men have derived from using their talents; and now that we have it in our reach to offer that to everybody, we have to complete what Freud and Henry Ford began: to make personal satisfaction one of the acknowledged norms of conduct.

The duty that now falls on intellectuals is a great and quite novel educational task: to show people that personal satisfaction does *not* lie in aping the satisfaction of others. In the presence of plenty, there is no conflict between private desire and public stringency (what used to be called, public good)—either between individual and individual, or between individual and state. What gives satisfaction then has to do so *in the long run:* not in the day-to-day of appetite, which (as the Manson family demonstrated) will not do as a goal, but in a policy to live by—to be a person by.

The question on which morality turns in an age of potential plenty is, What shall *I* be? It is indeed the question on the lips of every protester in the new Reformation. But it has to be a question cast all the way into the future: What shall *I* become, by virtue of what I do now, *to myself.* It is in this sense that all nature becomes one, and that we cannot afford to dishonor any part of the creation: because a separation there, a shrugging of the shoulders at greed or cruelty or vulgarity, is a permanent mark on one's own personality. The Germans discovered that when they closed their eyes to the concentration camps, and it faces us in every littered landscape: the man who is coarsened by my indifference, the butcher, is *me.* The human values exist in me, and when I let them idle for a turn or two, the machinery that rusts is my future self.

Such an ethic for contemporary life, a doctrine of equal respect for all human potential, cannot ignore the values of science. As Paul Goodman insists, "There is only one culture," and within it science is not value-neutral. It would be idle for me to try to expound the scientific values in a page, when I have spent much of my life in elucidating their place in the totality of values, first in *Science and Human Values* and more recently in *The Identity*

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of Man. Yet there are some crucial things to be said briefly that are pertinent to our present discontents.

For this is a time when, as I began by saying, many intellectuals have abandoned their own history and have retreated into the counterculture of the shaman, the mystic and the witch doctor. In doing this, they have also abandoned the historical responsibility of the intellectual, which is to be the guardian of the values and the conscience of society. Whether they are scientists or scholars, literary critics or philosophers, intellectuals are not merely the vessels in which traditional knowledge reposes and the vehicles by which it is transported. Intellectuals have these functions because they *prize* knowledge, either as the expression of intellectual truth or as the experience of emotional truth. Without this dedication to truth as a universal end, intellectuals would be only a memory bank; with it, they are the goads of civilization. It is therefore critical that scientists stand fast to maintain at least their share of the ethical responsibility of intellectuals, namely, those values on which the practice of science depends and which its example teaches.

First, there is a special integrity in knowledge which makes it what I have just described, something more than a memory bank. Knowledge in this sense has as its aim the truth about the nature of things, and so it imposes an obligation to be true to the nature of things—inanimate as well as living nature. It is a human obligation, because knowledge is human, and it is the final sanction to which technology has to conform.

Second, there is an absolute bar to pretense, and specifically to the pretense that the second best will do just as well as the best. We are surrounded by this pretense, in the goods, the information and the policies that are offered to us, in the men who offer them, and in their loyalty to their self-appointed goals. The fire that must drive the new Reformation is a rage against this creeping, pervading hypocrisy, the lie of the second best.

And third, science has been uncommonly successful as a strategy to command the future because it admits no distinction between ends and means. There are no higher ends in science than truthful knowledge, and there are no other means allowed on the way than

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truthful knowledge. In an age in which ideologies claim, not so much arrogantly as insolently, that they are justified in using men as means, this central value in the ethic of science has a right to be put at the center of the Reformation.

There is no blueprint of the future in these affirmations, nor do they alone make up a bible for the Reformation. But in a time when a deep sense of moral discontent is in danger of being diverted to surface ills, it is right to look to the roots of culture. The roots lie in the evolutionary history of man, which made technology the most formative of his species-specific talents; and as Bernal's prophetic vision reminds us, we are not at the end of its reach to change man and his environment together. Those who rail at this prospect in alarm have in their minds a picture of technology as an instrument to give monopoly power to a class or nation. But that phase is over; we are now in a phase of popular technology, when it has become the means and expression of a moral aspiration for justice in equality. In this Reformation setting, it is important to analyze the normative values that have made science and technology successful as practical ethics. The values of science are an important part of human nature, though only a part. And if we want to maintain any hold on the future, then their social importance is paramount: for science is the only method that we have found so far for turning human knowledge into rational action.

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Who Will Save the Scholarly Book?

CURTIS G. BENJAMIN

ONE OF THE MOST FASHIONABLE OF ALL TOPICS for discussion in the intellectual world today is "Is the book doomed?" Or, stated more fatally, "Is the book dying?" Put either way, the question is a surefire activator for a cocktail or dinner conversation, for a speech or an article, for even a symposium, seminar or colloquium. Almost everywhere I go, at home or abroad, I am asked —twittingly by the young, anxiously by the no-longer-young— whether it is true that the years of the book are numbered. In some instances, the question is put more elegantly: "Is it true that the new communications technology is rapidly making the book an obsolescent form of information transfer?" Or, less elegantly, "Won't you Gutenberg-era boys soon fold under the impact of the computer and the new electron-optical gadgets?"

No matter how such questions are put, or how much they may vary in their innocence or sophistication, they add up to an aroused intellectual interest in the fate of the book. The extent of this interest was manifested by an astonishing symposium entitled "Doom of the Book?" which attracted some three hundred European and American intellectuals to Zurich in February, 1971, as guests of the Duttweiler Institute, a private foundation dedicated to public societal interests. This is but one of the many, many manifestations of the lively ferment that one now encounters everywhere among book-minded people.

I am sure that most publishers have by now developed, as I have, a stock response to questions on the subject. Mine starts with the thesis that there is no such thing as "the book," either alive or dying. Rather, there are in fact many kinds of books, and

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each kind must be considered separately. When thus considered, certain kinds appear to be vitally threatened by the new technology; other kinds are not, and probably will not be so threatened in the foreseeable future. Which, then, are the threatened kinds? Well, my set piece holds that two kinds appear at present to be in mortal danger. Their cases should be examined separately, the one summarily, the other at some length for the purpose of this article.

The first kind includes all scientific and technical handbooks and the myriad volumes of numerical, functional and statistical data that can easily be stored and used in computer-based systems. Hundreds upon hundreds of such works are now published with profit in all the major countries of the world. (Certain intellectuals like to call them "nonbooks," but their producers and users look upon them less cavalierly.) To me it seems certain that many, if not most, of these works will in time disappear in print form. They will, instead, be "published" in mechanized form, and probably they will continue to be so much in demand in high-priced markets that their present publishers will be able to continue their production in the new mode. Since we are not here particularly concerned with this kind of "doomed" book, we can pass it by without so much as a sigh.

The second kind in my "doomed" category is the scholarly book—the kind that represents about ninety percent of the production of our university presses and an important fraction of the production of many commercial houses as well. Included are the many highly essential scientific and technical monographs that have been produced traditionally by the well-financed commercial firms, which can afford high-cost, long-term investments. For some years I have become increasingly convinced that markets for these books are being seriously diminished in an era of great expansion of knowledge and scholarship in general, and of science and technology in particular. It is an era when the demand should be at the flood, not the ebb.

There are, seemingly, two principal causes for this unfortunate anomaly. The first is the effect of what I have called by analogy the "twigging phenomenon" in the growth and research of knowl-

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edge. The second is the increasing use of the new non-Gutenberg technology for information transfer, and especially of photocopying, and the concurrent changes in the modes of the library uses of the kinds of books with which we are here concerned. Certainly, one must worry about the dread fate of all scholarly books under the compounded impact of the two eroding forces. In fact, I fear that, if present trends continue, the scientific and technical monographs will disappear as commercial publications before the end of the 1970s. Further, I think it likely that other classes of scholarly books, including the bread-and-butter university press books, will lose their viability before the end of the 1980s. These are dire predictions, surely, but I hope they will not be taken lightly. I think my well-tuned ear can already hear a distant sound of bells tolling their demise.

Here it should be noted parenthetically that the scholarly book, unlike the "doomed" handbooks and the other valuable quantitative works, probably will not be "published" and used in computerized form for many years to come. The necessary technology will surely be developed in good time, but it appears that the cost of input and storage, coupled with infrequent use by low-income customers (scholars, researchers and graduate students), would produce an economically unviable storage-and-retrieval system. (Anyone who thinks otherwise should read the annual report of the Council on Library Resources for 1970.) Nor is it likely that scholarly works will be satisfactorily produced and used in microform within the foreseeable future. Again the necessary technology probably will be developed in good time, but the high cost of the processes of selection and distribution will be a seriously impeding factor—a consideration that is usually brushed aside by those who already have kissed the book good-by.

Now, let us go back to the first eroding force noted above—to the "twigging phenomenon" and its effect on markets for scholarly books. It can best be described as the continual fractionation of knowledge and of scholarly research, and hence of the subject matter of scholarly books. Naturally, this endless fractionation results in hundreds of highly specialized books being written every year for groups of readers who are no larger in number today than

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they were ten or twenty or even thirty years ago—this despite the fact that our total population of research scholars has almost doubled in each of the last three decades. In short, the specialists need and write books on proliferated and refined subjects, and the publisher of scholarly books must publish all he can of them if he is to serve his mission and his clientele faithfully.

In my analogy, the subjects of such books represent the twigs on the rapidly growing tree of knowledge. Although the tree itself is perhaps four times larger than it was twenty years ago, the twigs are still the same size—and so are the markets for specialized scholarly books. Yet, as all publishers know painfully well, editorial and production costs have increased sharply, and these higher costs must be spread, sadly enough, over printings that have not increased in size. Thus the "twig" book is caught in a serious economic squeeze. To date relief has been found only in higher and ever higher prices, but this has had an understandable counter-effect on sales. Indeed, as I have said, it appears to be only a matter of time, about ten years, before commercially published monographs will be priced out of the market. I give university press monographs a somewhat longer dying space. Since they do not have to produce a profit and are often subsidized in one way or another, their agony may be prolonged for still another ten years. Much will depend, to be sure, on the acceleration of the second eroding force, at which we should now take a more careful look.

Although I cannot offer proof of the general point, I am convinced that almost uninhibited photocopying of scholarly books, plus the new modes of library use, is seriously eroding their already painfully small markets. In many library systems one book is now doing the work that two or three did ten years ago. This change is, of course, taking its toll in loss of sales. In an attempt to measure the loss, I have made a continuing study of the sales pattern of monographs (the "twig" books) published by McGraw-Hill over a twenty-year period. It shows a steady decline in the average number of copies sold per title, and the decline accelerated sharply in the second half of the period. In fact, the rate of decline in the first half of the last decade was twenty-two percent, and that in the second half was thirty percent. These figures demon-

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strate to my satisfaction that the second eroding force is having a devastating effect on the market for the "twig" books produced by at least one publisher. I see no reason to suppose that the documented McGraw-Hill case is not typical of the general experience. Indeed, I think all publishers of scholarly books are riding the same toboggan down a sharp slide.

Although the present position of the scholarly book is precarious enough, it will soon become even more precarious if certain very active and vocal educators, scholars, librarians, and research and information scientists have their way. They are clamoring zealously for the removal of copyright restrictions on photocopying and other kinds of replication of scholarly books for personal and educational uses. (And how else would such books be used?) In their fervor for education and for unrestricted availability of information of all kinds, these advocates would all but do away with copyright protection of the very books that they want and need most. Their voices have been the loudest in assaulting the principle of strict protection in the continuing debates in Washington on copyright law revision. In short, they are the ones who in their blindness or misdirection are indirectly endangering the very existence of scholarly books. Most of them profess to be attacking "literary monopoly" or "undue copyright protection." Some level their attacks more forthrightly at publishers, the greedy and opulent publishers. (Here I must note, ruefully, that publisher-baiting as a sport is enjoyed on our university campuses almost as universally as bear-baiting was once enjoyed in old Russia.) But no matter what the professed immediate target may be, the attacks are suffered in the end by the scholarly book itself.

And all the while the great host of intellectuals are standing by innocently witnessing the attacks without protest. Standing by also, but not so innocently, are a good number of other people who would gladly see copyright protection diminished or done in completely. They are, most of them, "information officers" in government agencies or professional societies who have devised beautifully rationalized plans for centralized, computer-based information systems, both national and international in scale. These officers feel certain that copyright will hinder the development of their

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gigantic, high-speed systems. Hence they approve any effort to undercut copyright protection—this even before their systems have been designed and tested, much less financed and deployed. They are little concerned about the fate of the book because in their view it is already a redundant and expendable instrument for information transfer.

Having spoken darkly and somewhat harshly in general terms, I must now document my case against the attackers of copyright protection. I could easily name names and quote statements enough to fill a book, but I shall here give only a few samples selected from my thick file of anticopyright advocacy.

I shall start with a seminal statement made some years ago by an eminent university librarian, Ralph Shaw, in his well-known academic treatise on copyright. Giving his definition of the term "copying" as used in the United States Copyright Act of 1909, Dean Shaw said, "The term 'copy' in its legal sense appears to be limited to the publication (i.e., public rather than private reproduction) of multiple copies for sale or distribution. . . . The making of a copy for personal use appears to be completely outside the scope of the statute." He nailed it down by saying further, "The making of single copies, for private use, was never in the minds of those who developed the common law or the statute, and such use of literary property is not affected by either. It violates no law at all and is a right of scholars." This questionable dictum soon became a landmark citation for a whole generation of sea lawyers of copyright. It has been quoted over and over again in Washington in recent years.

Next, let me quote another prominent librarian, Verner Clapp, who more recently echoed and affirmed the earlier dictum. Said he, "The thesis is here advanced that the verb copy, as used in Sec. 1 (a) of the Copyright Law, was never intended to refer to the making of single copies. It was intended, by contrast, to refer, as does the word print in the same sentence, to the production of multi-copy editions which makes it possible to publish the work, i.e. to disseminate it to the public. . . ."

Plainly both of these librarians-*cum*-advocates are firmly agreed that anyone—or at least anyone with scholarly intentions—is free

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to make a single copy of any copyrighted work whenever and however he chooses. This despite the fact that the law states plainly enough that the copyright owner "shall have the exclusive right: (a) To print, reprint, copy, and vend the copyrighted work."

Dr. Lois V. Edinger, professor of education at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, testifying as president of the National Education Association before a Senate subcommittee for the copyright revision bill, had this to say: "Further, we believe that, as a matter of public policy, education should be authorized to use and make limited copies of copyrighted materials without clearance or royalties." Thus the *obiter dictum* on personal exemption would be expanded to a blanket educational exemption.

This view was reiterated more forcefully by Dr. Harold E. Wigren, chairman of the N.E.A.-sponsored Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law Revision: "We think there should be a special recognition in the law for education. We make a distinction between commercial use and nonprofit use. . . . Why should we have to pay for materials usage that is in the public interest?" This seems to suggest that educators should feel free to help themselves to anything that is needed for use in the schools—certainly a strange view of proprietary rights.

An even more extreme position was taken by another well-placed librarian. Robert T. Jordan, a staff member of the Council on Library Resources, who filed a statement with the House subcommittee on copyright revision. "Most important of all," he said, "there is a failure to provide a simple and specific mechanism or exemption to promote creative and imaginative copying, whether it be by the individual in his home, the educator or the student in the school, or the librarian or library patron in the library." So the law should not only *permit* unrestricted personal, schoolroom and library copying, it should also *promote* copying done in a creative way. Regrettably, the deponent did not stipulate just how one goes about making a "creative" copy of a poem, a short story, a musical score or a map.

Dr. Robert A. Harte, executive officer of the American Society of Biological Chemists, had this to say in an international context: "The commercial-for-profit publisher in the United States, who

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regards his copyright as an actual or potential source of income, cannot expect this view to dominate at the level of an international conference where other strongly contrasting viewpoints will be advanced. The already available technologies have so facilitated the flow of scientific information that it is counterproductive to assume that the old-fashioned attitude that copyrights are valuable commercial properties in the field of scientific communication will persist." This can be read as a clear call to sacrifice copyright on the altar of the new technology for scientific communication.

Turning now to better-qualified comment on the law, let me quote a professor of law who is also a librarian, Julius J. Marke, the very sagacious director of the law library at New York University. Summing up his view of the diminishing value of copyright, he said: "It would appear, therefore, that the technological breakthrough will change the concept of author protection, and that copyright protection will be of little significance to the author of scholarly works. Rather than depend on royalties, he will seek other avenues of compensation. The market for traditional publication of his work will be so limited, that unless his product is of extraordinary merit and importance, he would sell it directly to the information-system operator."

Finally, let me quote statements by two professors at the Harvard Law School. Again, the one states a basal seminal position, the other echoes and extends the more authoritative senior statement.

In an off-campus lecture at Columbia, the senior Harvard professor, Benjamin Kaplan, said: "Copyright is likely to recede, to lose relevance, in respect to most kinds of uses of a great amount of scholarly production which now sees light in a *mélange* of learned journals and in the output of university presses. In the future little of this will ever be published in conventional book or journal form." Then he added this sinker: "I am suggesting that copyright or the larger part of its controls will appear unneeded, merely obstructive, as applied to *certain sectors of production* and that here copyright law will lapse into disuse and may disappear."

It is more difficult to quote concisely the junior professor at Harvard, Stephen Breyer, because he has much more to say against

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copyright protection, and all of it is said in shocking innocence of the basic operational economy of the book industry. Hence it is necessary to provide some critical interpretation of several excerpts from his long article, which appeared recently in the *Harvard Law Review:*

"Removing copyright protection should induce competition in the production and sale of relatively high-volume titles." By "high-volume titles" Professor Breyer means "best sellers." He would have several, or many, publishers issue a best seller at the same time, not realizing that under such a scheme most best sellers would never appear at all.

"Much current xeroxing is of texts and other scientific, professional, or technical books and articles. The widespread dissemination of these kinds of works has various spillover benefits similar to those provided by the original distribution of the works copied; to discourage them from being copied is therefore particularly undesirable." This means that the more widely useful a work is, the less its value as a publication should be protected. Would it not follow, conversely, that the less useful a work is, the better protected it should be?

"Since a strict permissions requirement is not now often enforced against xeroxing copiers, the major harms that the law currently creates in this area flow from the uncertainty and unease of those who fear that they are violating the law." This asks one to believe that moral uncertainty is more harmful than economic damage; that first consideration is due the hurting conscience of the person who thinks he may be breaking the law but goes ahead anyhow—an odd position, certainly, for a lawyer to take.

"The preceding analysis suggests that the case for copyright in textbooks and scholarly works is weaker than that for copyright in trade books." This assertion is based on the author's naïve assumption that copyright protection restricts competition among publishers of educational and scholarly works—that without the monopolistic influence of copyright, more publishers would enter the field and thus more books would be published at lower prices.

"The preceding analysis also indicates that the case for copyright in books considered as a whole is weak. It suggests that to

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abolish protection would not produce a very large or a very harmful decline in most kinds of book production. And abolition should benefit some readers by producing lower prices, eliminating the cost of securing permission to copy, and increasing the circulation of the vast majority of books that would continue to be produced." Here we have the ultimate economic fantasy: a rationalized pie-in-the-sky order of things that has no resemblance to reality, that would surely destroy incentives for authors and publishers, and that would deny the public most of the books that are published today under copyright protection.

Now, it must be noted, ironically, that almost all the foregoing degradation of the value of copyright protection has come from our university campuses, the homelands of the scholarly book. I suppose we should not be greatly surprised at this kind of intellection in academic communities where ideas rather than practical considerations serve as the basic currency of life. But we are entitled to some surprise, I think, in noting that even the directors and editors of our university presses—the very people who publish most of our scholarly books—have suffered the assaults in silence. Very few of them have made any effort at all to correct the uninformed or misguided statements of their academic colleagues who would undermine the economic viability of their presses. This is strange because the university publishers are neither confused nor uncertain about the issues involved. Moreover, they are the ones who can speak with the most authority on campus; their voices would be heard with great respect, not only locally but nationally as well.

Yes, it is passing strange that the host of academic writers and publishers and users of scholarly books are standing by apathetically while a few of their members myopically batter the principle of copyright, the *sine qua non* of the book industry. For if this host does not move to save the scholarly book, who will?

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Variations on a Theme

Arnold Kenseth

I

I want for love a lady of heaven
Naked as truth and on a meadow
By me, in me being graven
More than promise, more than shadow.

I want the lady green-gowned and raven,
Summer her shoulders as a season
With me, in me interwoven
More than fashion, more than reason.

I want this lady gay and not craven,
Open as air and as a valley
To me, in a passion driven
More to murmur, more to dally.

I want for love my lady sweet shriven,
Joyful her motion as a guerdon
For me, in our ways forgiven,
More to cherish, more to pardon.

II

A lady of heaven more than promise,
Green-gowned and raven more than fashion,
Gay and not craven more to murmur,
My lady sweet shriven more to cherish.

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III

On a meadow more than shadow,
As a season more than reason,
As a valley more to dally,
As a guerdon more to pardon.

IV

Naked as truth in me being graven,
Summer her shoulders in me interwoven,
Open as air in a passion driven,
Joyful her motion in our ways forgiven.

V

A lady of heaven
Green-gowned and raven,
Gay and not craven,
My lady sweet shriven.
Naked as truth,
Summer her shoulders,
Open as air,
Joyful her motion,
More than shadow,
More than reason,
More to dally,
More to pardon.

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Women and Freud's Imagination

PAUL SCHWABER

THE GOETHE PRIZE of the City of Frankfurt annually cited "a personality of established achievement whose creative work is worthy of an honour dedicated to Goethe's memory." In 1930 it was awarded to Sigmund Freud, then seventy-four and ill for seven years of the cancer that within another decade would kill him. The award surprised and pleased him. Public commendations rarely came his way, and he quickly dismissed the hopes of friends that Frankfurt would prove but a step to Stockholm. In 1909 the psychologist G. Stanley Hall, then president of Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, had invited him to the United States to lecture on psychoanalysis and to receive an honorary degree; it proved to be the only honorary degree he ever received. Freud knew that he had disturbed the world's sleep, that having placed his trust in the truth of his discoveries, he could not indulge expectations of popularity or endearment. Before the Great War, as an example, he received an inquiry from the Austrian government about his taxes: everyone knew that Dr. Freud's reputation extended far beyond the frontier; how then could his income be so small? He replied with characteristically assertive wit: "Professor Freud is very honored at receiving a communication from the Government. It is the first time the Government has taken any notice of him and he acknowledges it. There is one point in which he cannot agree with the communication: that his reputation extends far beyond the frontier of Austria. It begins at the frontier."

He wasn't pugnacious. Only rarely did he engage in scientific polemics—as, for instance, when he argued openly with Adler and Jung, whose influential defections threatened to destroy exactly the recognition of inner sexual forces that he struggled mightily

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to bring to public attention. He much preferred to continue his work and to report the results—like Darwin, to answer critics by verifying, correcting and developing his theories. To strident accusations of being a pornographer, a despoiler of the morals of the young, he never replied, although on occasion he pointed to the psychological resistances such attitudes typified. Sober and scrupulous in scientific manner, and certainly an upstanding citizen, Freud must nonetheless have been goaded to discovery by some argumentative derivative of his own development—some product of the same foundry that steeled his courage. The knowledge of being his mother's first-born and favorite contributed crucially to his self-reliance, he acknowledged, and it was not the least winning thing about her, or him, that as a very old lady she would refer among friends to the founder of psychoanalysis as *"mein goldener Sigi."* He believed that being a Jew helped him to stand alone in the world and to cast a critical eye upon it, and had quixotically intimated as much years earlier when he opened his first office for private practice in overwhelmingly Catholic Vienna on Easter Sunday. But there had to be something demonic too, something Mephistophelian about a man who could write to a colleague: "Your analysis suffers from the hereditary weakness of virtue . . . . [P]sychoanalytical matters need a full exposition to make them comprehensible, just as an actual analysis can proceed only when one descends to the small details from the abstractions that cover them. Discretion is thus incompatible with a good presentation of psychoanalysis. One has to become a bad fellow, transcend the rules, sacrifice oneself, betray, and behave like the artist who buys paints with his wife's household money, or burns the furniture to warm the room for his model. Without some such criminality there is no real achievement." The author of *Faust* would have liked that.

It was especially gratifying to be associated with Goethe, whose poetry speckled the pages of Freud's masterful prose as no other's did. To be cited for creative work, moveover, aligned him with cultural figures he deeply admired: not Goethe alone but also Shakespeare, Leonardo, Michelangelo, Dostoevski, even Moses—whom Freud thought of as an artist, as the creator and tyrant of the Jewish people. Artists and writers had nourished his sensibility from boyhood. Their work complicated without refuting the phys-

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icalist and causal lessons of Helmholtzian medicine in which he had been trained and to which he adhered. They mattered to him —and he envied them not a little ("An abstinent artist is hardly conceivable; but an abstinent young *savant* is certainly no rarity"). Imaginative writers knew all about the unconscious. Everything he could uncover by patient scrutiny, sympathy and reflection, they knew intuitively. Sophocles' great drama, for example, encapsulated the central story of each person's psychic growth. The name Oedipus suggests entrapment, doom, ironies of life and malevolent tricks of time; but it resonates also with dignity, with possibilities of courageous self-scrutiny, of self-realization. We are all tragic heroes, Freud implies, the centers of our universes, kingly, deserving respect and wonder despite all flaws and regardless of how massively stultifying the society in which we live. Perhaps that exaggerates. Heroism fits us awkwardly. But how do we really *feel* about ourselves, as opposed to what we consciously know? That is Freud's abiding question, and his Sophoclean metaphor suggests not merely helpless fools of fate, but kings. We sentimentalize if we credit him with implying similar status for women. His writings tend to present men as representatively human—not women, or, what would have been most appropriate, both. That bias helps to locate the present charges against him; it places him in time and points to what is soberly hopeful and what reactionary in his psychology. That and his greatness move Kate Millett to call him "beyond question the strongest individual counter-revolutionary force in the ideology of sexual politics" in this century.

In discussing Freud's notions of women, I will not defend some of his more outrageous statements: that women are more secretive and mysterious, less ethically and intellectually capable than men. He didn't consistently say things like that, but he said them enough and certainly didn't argue for them cogently. Freudian analysts now doubt that masochism and penis envy play anywhere nearly so important or predictable a role in a woman's development as Freud claimed in those recently well-known essays: "Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes" (1925), "Female Sexuality" (1931) and "Femininity" (1932). My opening remarks will have implied,

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however, that we misread him by narrowing to ideology alone. He did better by women than will be supposed by reading him that way. Not that an ideological approach does not support effective political action, nor that such scrutiny is entirely unfair to him; but it is unfair to us, because it dismisses someone who has much to teach us if we are to improve the lot of women and of men—and all because he does not yield to present wishes. With such demands we deny both his imagination and ours; and by extension we deny everything informing and directing that we have—and need—from past creative achievements that also alert us to realities of the self, society and the universe but may not please politically: *The Iliad,* for example, or *Antony and Cleopatra,* or the novels of Balzac; or for that matter the political and historical writings of Marx, or John Stuart Mill. Who, after all, measures up directly to relevance?

The issue is Freud's imagination and ours—and what both have to do with an imagination like Goethe's. Keats, we know, relished the poetical character that gives itself over: "It enjoys light and shade; it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated—It has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher, delights the camelion Poet." Not restrained by probity, it is avid for experience. In another passage he wrote similarly, although this time more responsive to the unease that often accompanies such play: "At once it struck me, what quality went to form a Man of Achievement especially in Literature & which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean *Negative Capability,* that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason." Imagination is patient, open, both amoral and serious, an agility of soul that enriches life and thus informs intelligence; it is what Coleridge described as "the willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith." Teachers of literature (like myself) love to trot out these statements—perquisites of an eloquent profession. But the qualities of mind being spoken of do not belong exclusively to poets, nor are they found dependably only in fiction, verse or drama. Any theory or presentation—political, historical, sexual or what have you—has to connect with felt life; if it doesn't, it

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isn't important. Anyone generous enough to perceive and feel otherness and to credit it as true—what she feels, what he believes, what that group has together and suffers, even the woodenness of trees—lives imaginatively. If he responds to something different, if what is outside calls up inner responses but is more than projected, and if he brings that quality consistently to bear in his relations with other persons, he has moral imagination. The boundaries between aesthetics and ethics, between personality, character, history and tradition, are not nearly so clear as we assume for simplicity's and departmentalizing's sakes. Freud eminently possessed this kind of imagination; and looking back on the emergence of his ideas one perceives not a misogynist but a man who took women very seriously, who listened to and credited their words as no one had before.

When he began his practice in Vienna, he, like any neurologist of the day, saw a good many women who suffered from aches, anaesthesias, unaccountable exhaustion, dizziness, paralysis of limbs, a host of other symptoms—none of which had a clear cause. Just as the ancients did, nineteenth-century medical science judged hysteria to be a woman's affair; by definition it had something to do with the womb. Hysterics were thought to be shamming. Nothing really was wrong with them, but they could be treated with baths and local massages, or more recently with electrotherapy. Strong-smelling valerian was still used to drive the wandering womb back where it belonged; and, frequently enough, one extirpated the clitoris. So there was need for somebody to start listening hard. But we know that retrospectively, because part of Freud's originality was to listen well.

Some progress had been made already. In France the respected neurologist Jean Charcot had decided that hysteria was a disease of the nervous system; he thus made it appropriate for medical study, even if he traced it to congenital degeneration of the brain. Freud studied with Charcot in Paris for several months in the mid-1880s. He learned to diagnose various forms of the malady, agreed that males had it too, and watched as Charcot reproduced symptoms in patients by hypnotic suggestion. A little earlier Freud's friend and older colleague Josef Breuer had treated a particularly

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bedeviled young woman who in autohypnotic states talked about her agonies and thereby managed to relieve them. Now known as "Anna O.," from the first case study in Breuer's and Freud's *Studies on Hysteria* of 1895, she once astonished Breuer by recounting in detail the first appearance of a symptom, whereupon it promptly disappeared. He supplemented the treatment with induced hypnoses to keep her talking, and in that way he and "Anna O." devised a cathartic method of psychotherapy. Distinct erotic signs flashed from patient to doctor, however, and the frightened Breuer steered away from hysteria thereafter, collaborating with Freud a decade later only half-heartedly and at the latter's repeated urging. Breuer's work had undoubted significance. He had discovered that the mind had access to forgotten traumatic material and that that material, when recalled, eased symptoms or eliminated them. Freud would go considerably farther very rapidly in the 1890s, back into the person's history and into the divagations of the mind, charting the way toward the essential works of psychoanalysis, *The Interpretation of Dreams* at the end of the century and *Three Essays on Sexuality* five years later. Already in *Studies on Hysteria,* however, much that is characteristic of Freud appears: the inevitability of pain: "Much will be gained if we succeed in transforming . . . hysterical misery into common unhappiness"; the fact that he liked his patients, found them too engaging to think of them as degenerates: "We had learnt from observations on Frau Cäcilie M. that hysteria of the severest type can exist in conjunction with gifts of the richest and most original kind." Aware already of psychical trauma, repression, the sexual origin of neuroses, the therapeutic value of recovering one's past ("Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences"), he was moving gradually toward the technique of free association. Hypnotism had proved often unworkable, so he asked his patients to concentrate on one symptom at a time and say anything that came to mind, all the while urging and questioning, even pressing on their foreheads with his hand to ease resistance. The breakthrough came when Fräulein Elisabeth von R. reproached him for interrupting her flow of thought with his questions. He understood and had his method. "Everything possible to be believ'd is an image of truth," Blake said, and Freud at his best exemplified it. By really hearing,

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by respecting his patients—most of whom were women—and by refusing to separate them from humanity, he learned about them and concurrently about all human beings. Small wonder that his scientific pages glow with calm warmth and clarity, that his case studies of 1895, as he notes half-apologetically, read like fiction:

> I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other neuro-pathologists, I was trained to employ local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science. I must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my own. The fact is that local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead nowhere in the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental processes such as we are accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few psychological formulas, to obtain at least some kind of insight into the course of that affection.

Having perceived living persons, he communicated their vibrant complication.

Successive discoveries came readily thereafter, as his method, imaginative sympathy and speculative capacity coordinated to new understanding. First he had to correct his own credulity. So many women's memories led back to infantile seductions by their fathers that he finally comprehended the function of fantasies; these particular ones sprang from buried wishes of tremendous psychic power. It was an important conception, tied to the analysis he had begun on himself—in part to insure against projecting his own problems onto his patients. One earns imagination too. In the last five years of the nineteenth century, Freud learned to interpret dreams as veiling and ventilating wishes. Concomitantly he pondered the Oedipus complex in himself and others, and developed the theory of stages of infantile sexuality. So the cunning arts of mind revealed their secrets: condensation, symbolization, displacement, modes of disguise, defense and self-assertion apparent in dreams and neurotic symptoms as well as in healthy functioning and all creative achievement. His dynamic and historical psychology stressed dualisms that charged it with intensity: primary and secondary processes—the operations of mind we are born with and

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those we learn; latent and manifest contents—our conscious and unconscious motives; the erotic and ego instincts—the sources of desire and self-protection; the pleasure principle and the reality principle—the latter frustrating pleasure but also making it actual. After consolidating these gains by continued observation, reporting and amplification, he began after World War I, and as old age approached, to push forward again: to take more account of masochism, death and destruction, to ponder the burden of civilization. He formulated the theory of instincts around eros and death. He looked at group psychology. And he redrew the topography of the mind, postulating three metaphoric entities—an endlessly desirous unconscious id and an only partly conscious ego and super-ego. To the ego's acumen for honesty and its ability to negotiate among conflicting pressures he relegated all hopes for the goals he commended: that we may love and work with satisfaction, daily, without yearning for perfection or fearing death, because death is only the result of life, the direction of our biological and psychic processes since birth. A moderate program, very difficult to bring about.

His most generally applicable psychological notions, and his all-important technique of free association and random discovery, arose in no small way from his imaginative response to women. In his early analytic work, neither medical tradition nor masculine or cultural predilections led him to consider women other than seriously. It *is* a compliment, after all, neither to be condescended to nor elevated into myth but to be acknowledged as real and significant. It may not sound all that wonderful, but such regard is crucial for love and for the working alliance that sustains therapy. It guided Freud's historic work and in itself is something most people have trouble achieving.

The last major study he wrote of women before the late essays was the first of his long case studies. It appeared in 1905, although he wrote it four years earlier after treating the woman he called "Dora" for three months in 1900. He had withheld it for reasons of discretion, but the eventual appearance of *An Analysis of A Case of Hysteria* nevertheless called forth howls of protest from the medical profession. To some its illicit material seemed a matter for the police. The study of "Dora" reveals a characteristically honest Freud, recording what they learned together and where

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they failed. It concerns a superbly bright girl whose *taedium vitae,* fainting spells, crying, and nervous cough all bore upon her involvement with two unhappily married couples—her parents and their friends the K.'s. Her mother retired into a *Hausfrau* neurosis; her father established a liaison with Frau K. And she, although nobody said so openly, became the price of peace with Herr K., who ironically enough loved her. It was all terribly complicated. In the course of analysis Dora's sexual fears, her love for Herr K. and suspicion of him as a philanderer, her regressive and vengeful love for her father, even a more deeply hidden homosexual attachment to Frau K. came to the surface. Melodramatic stuff, but Freud's narrative delivers it believably, suggesting something of the lived experience of analytic discovery. We don't get Dora's associations and reveries, but the case study reads novelistically and thus provides the ground for belief. Indeed, it reads like a modern novel, charting vistas of inner continuity and lived time in the absence of trusted social and familial patterns. A long exposition of characters and circumstances precedes two lengthy dream analyses, the first of which establishes her love for and sexual excitement about Herr K., the second full of revenge and defloration, of hatred for the two men in her life and secret love for the woman. In the Postscript as in the Preface, Freud faces up to his failures. Dora broke off the treatment; she acted out her vengefulness in part because he had not solved the riddle of transference. Moreover, he hadn't plumbed her unintended attachment to Frau K. Across this long stretch of time, one might question Freud's own countertransference, why he did not attend to her impression of being used, and why he had not doubted that an alliance with a man her father's age and the husband of his mistress would have been right for her. For all the signs of work in progress, however, of frank limitation and of theory and practice still developing, the illusion of reality is there. Dora comes alive. Freud knows her, however briefly and imperfectly. And in doing so he illustrates the cogency of dream interpretation for analysis, and the psychosexual dimensions of mental processes.

So Freud was not in all ways a patriarchal beast. By imaginatively acknowledging women he discovered human truths that no

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one had conceptualized before. How then could he be so ungenerous about specifically feminine psychology, make so much depend on a woman's *not* having a penis? What of all that stuff about a woman's vanity and shame, her being psychologically out of phase with a man's love, her weaker social interests, lesser capacity for sublimation, minimal sense of justice, her unwillingness to submit to the necessities of life, her greater psychological rigidity by thirty, her few contributions to the history of civilization other than plaiting and weaving? Could all this reflect merely the class of women he treated in Vienna?

As his psychology of women has been much discussed recently, I will sketch it only briefly. A little girl has a harder time growing up than a boy does, because she has to give up her mother, her first love object, whereas he retains her. After puberty too, the girl's sexual sensitivity shifts somewhat from the clitoris (the anatomical homologue of the penis) to include the vagina. Freud thought girls less instinctually aggressive, more pliant and intelligent than boys at the early stages; but essentially all life is masculine until the phallic period. Then, between three and five years of age, a girl becomes aware of not having a penis comparable to that of boys. From analyses Freud learned that she blames her mother for this lack, suffers a severe blow to her narcissism, repudiates the clitoris and gives over much of her former activity. Despite the difficulty of feeling anger at the woman whose care has been her first knowledge, she begins to turn away from her mother —becomes her rival for the father. When she realizes that not she alone but all women lack the penis, she unconsciously shares the contempt that men feel for her entire sex. First hoping for a penis like that of her father's she gradually substitutes a wish for a baby from the father. So whereas in a boy the Oedipus complex is dissipated or repressed with the advent of castration fears, a girl's is brought on by those fears and resolved much more slowly. For that reason she need not develop so early a rigorous super-ego (the heir to the Oedipus complex) or patterns of sublimation. Jealousy, inhibitions, and desires to compete with men become part of her lot; and if the expected wave of repression at puberty does not prove strong enough to insure sufficiently passive femininity, penis envy may continue to control her life.

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"The repudiation of femininity," he wrote, "can be nothing else than a biological fact, a part of the great riddle of sex." The statement occurs near the end of "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937), during a discussion of the two most difficult tasks an analyst faces: convincing a woman to give up her wish for the penis, and convincing a man that he need not fear all experiences of passivity; that some—like getting along with the boss—make life more enjoyable. Now Freud had a remarkable way of noting that the customary equivalents of masculine-active as opposed to feminine-passive carried no scientific weight. He found them unsatisfactory. But then he'd go on, as here, to draw conclusions anyway: "The repudiation of femininity can be nothing else than a biological fact." Surprisingly—because he usually recognized a problem like this and pursued it vigorously—he did not worry the issue, never wondered whether active and passive tendencies may *not* be meaningfully grounded in gender (or if so, to what extent) especially in light of the bisexual nature we all have. Years earlier he had taken over his friend Fliess's notion of constitutional bisexuality. Once Freud wonderfully remarked: "I am getting used to regarding every sexual act as one between four individuals." He never swerved from that suggestive notion—suggestive both of the range of sexual differences and the capacities men and women therefore have to understand one another. But he did not bring it richly to bear on the psychology of women he expounded in those late anatomical-sexual essays. There he seemed to be isolating women from much that he had earlier seen—from common humanity; to be denying what was so apparent in the case studies.

He isolated them too from cultural factors, despite brief mention to the contrary. Yet in 1908 he had published a brilliant first critique of the antagonism between civilization and the instinctual life that had not done so. Entitled " 'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness," it emphasized that the original purpose of sexual instinct is pleasure, not reproduction, and it indicted the institution of marriage as practiced in his day: the double standard by which women were not granted the same permission that the behavior of men indicated one needs because monogamy is too hard for us; the expectation of sexual inexperience so in-

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culcated in women that far from being prepared for marriage they had been encouraged to nourish crippling loyalties to parents. Finally the whole notion of what such an upbringing signified for a woman's intellectual development:

> The sexual behavior of a human being often *lays down the pattern* for all his other modes of reacting to life. If a man is energetic in winning the object of his love, we are confident that he will pursue his other aims with an equally unswerving energy; but if, for all sorts of reasons, he refrains from satisfying his strong sexual instincts, his behaviour will be conciliatory and resigned rather than vigorous in other spheres of life as well. A special application of this proposition that sexual life lays down the pattern for the exercise of other functions can easily be recognized in the female sex as a whole. Their upbringing forbids their concerning themselves intellectually with sexual problems, though they nevertheless feel extremely curious about them, and frightens them by condemning such curiosity as unwomanly and a sign of a sinful disposition. In this way they are scared away from *any* form of thinking, and knowledge loses its value for them. The prohibition of thought extends beyond the sexual field, partly through unavoidable association, partly automatically. . . . I think that the undoubted intellectual inferiority of so many women can . . . be traced back to the inhibition of thought necessitated by sexual suppression. (Freud's italics)

The historical and class boundaries of his observation are clear here, distinguishable from ours, and part of why the issue of sexuality is convincing. " 'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness" thus predicted important working assumptions of present Freudian psychoanalysis, which has developed his later emphasis on the resourcefulness of the ego, enmeshed in culture and time, to rechannel energies of the id and super-ego. Another example: in the late essays on women he made much of the masochism he believed to be inherent in their development. But he did not relate it to what he knew about its cultural sources: "The turning back of sadism against the self regularly occurs when a *cultural suppression of the instincts* holds back a large part of the subject's destructive instinctual components from being exercised in life" (Freud's italics). Destructiveness turned back upon the self feeds the ego's masochism as well as the super-ego's flagellating rage. Put another way: women encouraged not to think and to work only in the house can get depressed.

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The views of women he articulated in the essays of the 1920s and 30s, in short, prove strangely incomplete, incompatible with what he knew and with his own standard of imaginative thought. They reveal forcefully what had theretofore been only implied about the male bias of his work. Philip Rieff explains that Freud saw women as erotic hoarders in the male economy of culture, that they incarnated for him the sexuality men had to overcome to be civilized. That contention seems unarguably true only for the two decades after World War I, the final ones of his life. When Freud postulated the death instinct and pondered the survival of civilization, women appear to have taken on a symbolic aspect for him. *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) shows it clearly, and in relation to the more conservative meaning he had given the poles of his dialectical concern with individual liberation and the needs of society. Ernest Jones during the course of his three-volume biography suggests several times that Freud had not resolved all aspects of his own Oedipus complex. Doubtless that bears on the origins of his psychology of women. But considering the markedly uneven responses to women we have observed in his career, it would be very difficult to establish. The matter is surely not so simple as suggested in the biographical part of Richard Gilman's otherwise admirable argument, "The FemLib Case Against Sigmund Freud" (*New York Times Magazine,* January 31, 1971). When Freud courted his wife, he made it clear that he was to be the only professional in the family. But that was as a young and very troubled man, before his self-analysis. From all I've read, the marriage was a good one; it produced six children, none of whom seems to have been broken by the imposing father. Gilman neglects how fond Freud was of intellectual women, for all that he had little use for feminists. In the lonely years of his early psychoanalytic discoveries, his sister-in-law, Minna Bernays, and, from afar, Wilhelm Fliess proved his only intellectual companions. The profession Freud founded was always open to talented women, many of whom studied with him: his daughter Anna, of course, Helene Deutsch, Beatrice Hinkle, Lou Andreas-Salomé, Dorothy Burlingham, Ruth Brunswick, Joan Riviere, Jeanne Lampl de Groot, Marie Bonaparte. Women analysts largely developed the crucial field of child analysis. So we'd best not draw

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biographical target on him. The problem he presents is in his work. What shall we do with it?

One thing to do is to ponder the inconsistencies of greatness bound by inevitable limitation. The strictures of the women's liberation movement now score heavily against him; but they provide occasion for recalling the range of his responses to women—the imaginative sympathy he alone was capable of, which enabled him to formulate a general theory of human psychology. With current urgencies we reperceive the past, thereby ask it to serve us anew—to inform, to warn, to guide.

By unfreezing his greatness, we make Freud more available for rough handling *and* to provide encouragement. We need his method of discovery, for we have much still to learn and always have to struggle to remember. Moreover, we can take over essentials we would only lose ground in surrendering—the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental processes, infantile sexuality, the theory of dreams, the limited hopefulness of an adaptive ego nourished in culture and time. The emotions are conservative, he taught. We cannot regain Eden. But if honesty and patience do not fail us—nor related political courage—we can go about substituting an adequate psychology of women for a dated ideology: we can enunciate a new and cogent theory that will be experientially true and not necessarily consoling. To do so would be to follow his lead, imaginatively. But the achievement would be ours and would be difficult: a psychology of women concerns everyone, and naturally it involves re-examining all assumptions of masculinity. So the opportunity for open and searching talk together as well as for forthright action is before us. If we can honestly accept that men and women *are* equal and different (as Freud did in the case studies and some essays), the despised phrase "Anatomy is Destiny," understood not as a pronouncement of doom but as the ground of existence, may turn into a precious political and psychological resource: each person's separate body the source and assurance of claims we must all make against an increasingly intrusive and murderous state.

All this is to say that Freud used his imagination creatively and challenges us to use ours.

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Polluting Our Language

DOUGLAS BUSH

ALONG with our overriding anxieties about the state of the world and our own country we are resentfully aware of shoddiness in cars, foods, services, in almost everything except the language we use. While an aroused public applauds the exposure of civic corruption and environmental pollution, neither the public at large nor officialdom has any concern with the corruption and pollution of language except to contribute to it. And this kind of corruption is quite as disastrous as any other, if not more so, partly because common violation of traditional usage is an ugly debasement of our great heritage, partly because sloppy English is a symptom and agent of sloppy thinking and feeling and of sloppy communication and confusion. To the famous question, "How do I know what I think till I hear what I say?" the answer might be "Do you and I know then?"

The history of this relatively modern country has created problems that have not existed in the same way or degree in the older, smaller, and much more cohesive European nations. In England the South-East Midland dialect in which Chaucer wrote became standard English, although down to our time other regional dialects have maintained an active nonstandard existence among the lower classes. But in the United States obvious historical factors have worked against such an accepted standard: the legacy of a frontier civilization, with its individualistic indifference or hostility toward cultivated speech; the relative absence of class distinctions (apart from those caused by economic and hence educational disparities); the increasing intermixture of diverse races and nationalities; and so on. Thus, according to the irate linguist

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(or the lighthearted American librettist) of *My Fair Lady,* the French don't care what you do so long as you speak correctly, while in America English hasn't been spoken for years. At any rate we can see much recent evidence of the conspicuous spread of bad English; Gresham's law operates no less in the linguistic than in the monetary sphere. And it seems plain that among many writers, editors, publishers and printers there is growing indifference to the lowly but not insignificant matters of misspelling and misprints.

Whatever may be the case in other countries, in ours efforts to establish or reestablish serious respect for the mother tongue, for the precise use of words, for clarity, simplicity, and discriminating taste, have encountered much apathy or resistance, tacit or vocal, from average unconscious practice and, in recent decades, from very conscious academic doctrine. The only "errors" familiar to the mass of people seem to be the split infinitive and the ending of a sentence with a preposition, and neither of these usages is an error. As for academic doctrine, the publication in 1961 of the third edition of Webster brought on an immediate battle in which much ink and some blood were spilled. On one side were the makers and the defenders of the dictionary's widely permissive policy and procedure: the "standard" set up was current American speech; aiming at description, not prescription, the dictionary recorded, and by implication endorsed, all words, meanings and usages actually in use; it normally avoided invidious distinctions between "right" and "wrong." On such principles the idea of "error" has no validity: any intelligible expression that any people utter becomes automatically right and acceptable, no matter how it may violate orthodox rules of diction, grammar or idiom. Such wholesale pragmatism was decidedly a challenge, at least to those who believe that tennis requires a net. Along with much silent revulsion, a considerable number of writers, while recognizing the historical process of continuous change, reacted vehemently against a Philistine view of language based on the habits of the man in the street and insisted on traditional standards of language as molded by time and taste, by old writers and speakers as well as those of the moment. To such champions of good English the linguists replied with charges of pedantic schoolmarmishness, elitism, and the like.

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That pitched battle died down, but people who have a conscience about language, who see the far-reaching consequences of linguistic corruption, have continued to express concern, because corruption continues to spread not merely in everyday speech and writing but in public utterances on war and peace, indeed in all areas and on all levels. A generation ago George Orwell emphasized the close connection between disorder in language and disorder in society (as, for instance, Roger Ascham, the Tudor humanist, and Milton had done in earlier ages). In an interview in the *New York Times* of October 19, 1971, W. H. Auden said: "As a poet—not as a citizen—there is only one political duty, and that is to defend one's language from corruption. And that is particularly serious now. It's being so quickly corrupted. When it's corrupted, people lose faith in what they hear, and this leads to violence." But such protests do not much affect the multitude, who need to be jolted out of their complacent insensitivity, a multitude that includes not only a large proportion of the upper middle class but persons of such exceptional intelligence and cultivation as writers and politicians.

To cite examples from these two elite groups, the front-page review in the *New York Times Book Review* of September 19, 1971, carried, as a boldface heading, a pronouncement on John Hawkes as "feasibly, our best writer"; a couple of months before that, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, according to a highly reliable member of his audience, fervently proclaimed that "In the early sixties we were strong, we were virulent. . . ." These are only two recent reminders of the kind of English that has become increasingly common among the educated; such blunders, and countless others, would, we may believe, have been quite impossible a hundred years ago, when educated people were literate. During the past generation or two neither early teaching (often by doubtfully literate teachers) nor reading seems to have had much effect in holding back the tide of illiteracy. Very readable authorities on English and American usage, from the canonical Fowler to William Strunk and E. B. White, Theodore Bernstein and Wilson Follett, apparently are not read by the masses of people who need them; instead, these people, both upper and lower middle classes (if such terms may be used), create, absorb

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and propagate an ever-increasing body of what are no longer merely vulgar errors but constituent elements of American English. And American English, whatever its violations of established diction and idiom, always has chauvinistic force and heat behind it; many people would rather be wrong than be tainted with English English (not that contemporary English English is of flawless purity). Correctness smacks of effete gentility, which is abhorrent to American virility (or, to echo Secretary Connally, virulence). And recent American literature has yielded a notable flowering of the native tradition of toughness.

To intermix the concrete with the general, we might observe some random examples of the illiteracy that we meet on all sides, in print and on the air. It is more or less commonly accepted that there is such a word as "pablum," an item, if my memory serves, in Mr. Agnew's copious vocabulary (I don't know how the Latin "pabulum" came to be both syncopated and domesticated); that "torturous" means "tortuous"; that "transpire" means "happen," "occur"; that "humanitarian" is the adjective corresponding to "the humanities"; that you "convince" someone to do something; that "otherwise" is an adjective (and that any noun may be converted into an adverb by the addition of "-wise"); that "reticent" means "reluctant" (for example, in a *New York Times* editorial of some years ago, "The commission's reticence to assess blame"); that "sensuous" means "sensual" and vice versa; that "fulsome" (that is, "grossly excessive") means something like "extremely good or favorable" ("The chairman gave a fulsome eulogy of the speaker"); that "connive" means "conspire"; that "hopefully" may be thrown into a sentence anywhere as a floating rib; that "media" and "data" are singular nouns; that the past tense of "fit" is "fit" (for example, *New Republic,* June 12, 1971, p. 36; August 7-14, p. 14). I might add a few examples, perhaps less common than those cited, which I have heard on the air: "The delegation's arrival was upheld by the weather"; "Two trustees escaped from prison last night"; and—on public TV—"I demure to that" (to render the commentator's pronunciation).

Wilson Follett affirmed that "affectation in an advanced culture is the chief agent of linguistic corruption." In regard to origins (or jargon, which will come up later) that may well be true, but the

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wholesale spread of corruption may surely be ascribed to mere infection, to the careless, unthinking assimilation of the floating germs that envelop us. The abolition, years ago, of "shall" (except for some freakish misuses) in favor of "will" as maid-of-all-work has wiped out the important distinction between simple futurity and determination ("I will not cease from mental fight, / Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand"). There is the ugly and almost universal use of "like" for "as" (legislative anxiety about cigarette advertising did not extend to cancerous grammar), and, in a lesser degree, the use of "as" for "like"—a reversal of accepted usage that has no warrant in ease, informality, or anything except perversity and contagion. Some indispensable words have been so thoroughly corrupted that they can no longer be used correctly without the probability of being misunderstood. A well-known American poet speaks of an artist's "flaunting of polite society"; a distinguished scholar-critic says that Milton "flaunts" botanical fact; the press secretary at the White House cannot think that the governor of Texas would "deliberately flaunt the wage-price freeze" (*New York Times,* August 20, 1971, p. 1). This misuse of "flaunt" for "flout" is of course sanctioned by Webster. Contrariwise, R. G. Martin's popular biography, *Jennie,* tells of "the flouting, fashionable beauties" of late Victorian times (vol. I, New York, 1969, p. 45). The use of "wrack" (wreck) in the sense of "rack" (torture) seems to be obliterating the right word. Bergen Evans, coauthor of *A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage,* avows himself "wracked with admiration" for Theodore Bernstein, in a pamphlet issued by the publishers of Webster. The *New Republic* misfires in both words of a compound: "dissention-wracked" (December 11, 1971, p. 7). In the long catalogue of linguistic corruptions one of the most grievous—or, in the common phrase, "nerve-wracking"—is the case of "disinterested," which is almost always used in place of the now abandoned "uninterested." It is not clear why, since the usurper is not at all easier to utter than the right word; the result is that, as I said, one can't use "disinterested" correctly without the probability of being misunderstood—and there is no real synonym to fall back on.

All this adds up, not to greater force, enrichment and refinement, or clearer communication, but to the steady coarsening and

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blunting of the expressive and discriminating power of the language. For one thing, it threatens to cut us off from the great heritage that is a large part of what we possess. We can hardly echo Wordsworth's proud boast that we "speak the tongue /That Shakespeare spake," since we may before long lose the ability to read him; indeed many young people have lost it already. Perhaps, if the counterculture or subculture does not sweep away all literature but the immediately contemporary, a favorite comedy for schools will be abridged, rewritten in the language of the street, and rechristened *Like You Like It*. The sentiments I have been expressing are of course damned as old-fogeyish by progressive thinkers. Of the compilers of the third edition of Webster and their dropping of standard authors in favor of often insignificant contemporaries, Dwight Macdonald said: "They seem imperfectly aware of the fact that the past of a language is part of its present, that tradition is as much a fact as the violation of tradition." They seem also imperfectly aware that the use of language is, on varying levels of sophistication, an art (an unawareness shared by some modern and scholarly translators of the Bible); and the practice and judgment of art are not egalitarian and quantitative—except in the world of "pop art."

It may be replied, even by those who do not believe that whatever is is right: "So what? Misused words are only grit in the porridge, and such things have been assimilated for centuries. They don't spell doom." Well, grit in porridge is not agreeable to taste or digestion, and, consumed in quantity, may be fatal; since nowadays, as we have seen, there is no effective check on the spread of illiteracy, such particles—or should one say such pockets of fog?—multiply very rapidly and nourish carelessness, crudity and confusion not merely of expression but of thought. Easy tolerance of corruption recalls, in Thomas Love Peacock's *The Misfortunes of Elphin* (1829), a satirical flick at Tory opposition to electoral reform: refusing to repair a dike that was in a dangerous state of decay, the tipsy prince insisted: "But I say, the parts that are rotten give elasticity to those that are sound: they give elasticity, elasticity, elasticity. If it were all sound, it would break by its own obstinate stiffness."

We know that language is always changing and growing (and

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also, in a much smaller degree, shrinking), but acceptance of the perpetual process does not or should not mean blind surrender to the momentum or inertia of slovenly and tasteless ignorance and insensitivity. Ideally, changes should be inaugurated from above, by the masters of language (as they often have been), not from below. Language is not a tough plant that always grows toward the sun, regardless of weeds and trampling feet. From the Greeks (notably Plato) and Romans onward, many men of good will have been concerned about the use and abuse of language, the relations between the rhetoric of persuasion and private and public ethics, and all the attendant questions; and they did what they could to curb barbarism and foster taste, discipline and integrity. One great agent of discipline, though, has lost much or most of its traditional power. In our century and our country, and perhaps somewhat less conspicuously elsewhere, classical education, with the clear-eyed concreteness of mind it nourished (not that its products were all angels of light), has greatly declined, and, whatever the great virtues of modern writing, they are not an adequate substitute for some central and instinctive qualities of the ancients. One might call many witnesses on this point, Matthew Arnold, Santayana and others, but there is special aptness in some remarks of Evelyn Waugh, a contemporary and, whatever the general merits of his novels, a stylist of repute. In *A Little Learning: An Autobiography* (Boston, 1964), he thus sums up his schooling:

> My knowledge of English literature derived chiefly from my home. Most of my hours in the form room for ten years had been spent on Latin and Greek, History and Mathematics. Today I remember no Greek. I have never read Latin for pleasure and should now be hard put to it to compose a simple epitaph. But I do not regret my superficial classical studies. I believe that the conventional defence of them is valid; that only by them can a boy fully understand that a sentence is a logical construction and that words have basic inalienable meanings, departure from which is either conscious metaphor or inexcusable vulgarity. Those who have not been so taught—most Americans and most women—unless they are guided by some rare genius, betray their deprivation. The old-fashioned test of an English sentence—will it translate?—still stands after we have lost the trick of translation. [P. 139]

A multitude of educated people (including teachers) do not seem to be deeply concerned about either language *per se* or its mani-

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fold implications. If we need illustrations of the obvious, we have evidence both rough and ready—or cloudy or slick—in the speech of many of our public men compared with that of many of their predecessors back through the seventeenth century; the urbane elegance of Adlai Stevenson was, in point of popular appeal, a heavy handicap in contrast to the amiable bumbling of General Eisenhower. It may be noted that the official proprietors of language, while they support uninhibited, uninstructed freedom in speech in opposition to what they regard as archaic rigidity, do not themselves—apart from occasional jargon—exploit the liberty they defend. That liberty, it appears, is both scientifically sound and in accord with the spirit of American democracy; it was not, however, the creed of the founding fathers and it belongs rather to the obsolete principle of *laissez faire*.

In the past, new words, new meanings, and new idioms had of necessity to undergo a period of probation; if they proved useful, they survived to enrich and refine the language. But the modern probationary period has greatly shrunk or vanished. Thanks especially to the mass media of the air, bad English can be established overnight, and not merely for the uneducated; it becomes current usage. (The same agencies, it may be added, help to inaugurate or propagate mispronunciation. We may wonder why nearly all Americans give a semi-French pronunciation to those age-old English names, Bernard and Maurice; or why the third edition of Webster, departing from the strictness of the second edition, accepts such common but quite unwarranted pronunciations as "skitsophrenia" and "par-li-a-ment.") And while on occasion opponents of "standard" English delve into the past for meanings not now approved by conservative orthodoxy, the same procedure must not be allowed to uphold the great mass of traditional words and idioms that remain or should remain standard if thought, feeling and communication are to carry their immense responsibility. Was it Churchill who said "When it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change"?

To the heterogeneous atoms of illiteracy that have been sampled might be added a different but related kind of bad English, although only a word can be said about its manifold varieties: that is, jargon. There is the simple jargon of pretentious padding,

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sometimes pseudo-technical: no one ever teaches in college but always "at the college level"; a crow is not black but basically or essentially black; nothing happens before anything else but always "prior to." No one feels pleasure or anxiety or fear; he feels a sense of pleasure, a sense of anxiety, a sense of fear. A politician doesn't say "Yes" but—if he is relatively forthright—"My answer is in the affirmative." Official and political rhetoric is not, of course, peculiar to our time or country. We remember that words are to be understood "in a Pickwickian sense"; we remember too Dickens' opinion of the parliamentary debates he reported. But it would appear that in modern times the mildew has grown much thicker. The recent death of Sir Alan Herbert recalls an example he once provided: if, he said, Nelson had lived during the Second World War, he would not have signaled to the fleet "England expects that every man will do his duty," but would have proclaimed: "England anticipates that as regards the current emergency, personnel will face up to the issues and exercise appropriately the functions allocated to their respective occupation groups." And we cannot forget that exquisite *jeu d'esprit* of an American journalist, the Gettysburg address rewritten in the style of General Eisenhower. On a less innocent level, political and official deception and downright lying may be accomplished directly (since the public is assumed to have a short memory) or through a smoke screen of evasive verbiage. Volumes could be filled with this kind of rhetoric, but the subject is too depressingly familiar to dwell upon.

A prime creator of "sophisticated" jargon has been advertising —who would not be allured by a baroque cocktail costume?—but that, like officialese, is too familiar to linger with. There are the kinds of jargon purveyed by the various tribes of scientists, social scientists and literary critics. While there are technical ideas and data that require a special language, it may be used to conceal a lack of ideas or to give thin ones impressive authority. I once had a visit from a bright and buoyant sophomore who, having received a C, wished to explain, first, that he was a Thomist in his thinking, and, secondly, that his writing, which I had termed clotted jargon, was "the English of the future"—a prophetic oracle that left me vanquished and dumb. Among parodies of psychological

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jargon a favorite of mine—because it exposes more than linguistic flatulence—is one that some readers may not have met, the opening of the Twenty-third Psalm, rendered by Alan Simpson, the president of Vassar College: "The Lord is my external, internal, integrated mechanism. I shall not be deprived of gratifications for my visceral generic hungers or my need dispositions. He motivates me to orient myself toward a nonsocial object effectiveness significance. He positions me in a nondecisional situation. He maximizes my adjustment." I read somewhere that Buster Keaton was asked by a sociologist in rotund polysyllabic language a question which, in brief, was whether his films tried to depict the plight of the little man in a bewildering world: said Keaton, after due reflection, "Well, we thought of a gag, and then we thought of another gag." For an early example of deflation we might go back to Chaucer's Franklin, who disclaimed any knowledge of "Colours of rethoryk": "For th'orisonte hath reft the sonne his lyght,—/This is as muche to seye as it was nyght!"

We have noticed only a few examples of the misuse of words and of the varieties of jargon that increasingly debase current English. We have not touched the abundance and vitality of clichés, which will not wear out "in the foreseeable future"; but this piece must "grind to a halt." For a final reminder of the illustrious past, we might recall Spenser's eulogy of "Dan Chaucer, well of English undefyled"; Mr. Auden was quoted at the outset; and there is T. S. Eliot's echo of Mallarmé, "To purify the dialect of the tribe" (*Little Gidding*). Language must be protected not only by poets but by the saving remnant of people who care—even though, as the flood rises, their role may be nearer King Canute's than Noah's.

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Creeks

MARY OLIVER

The dwindled creeks of summer,
Unremarkable except,
Down pasture, through woodlot,
They are so many
And keep such a pure sound
In each roiling thread,
Trickle past the knees of trees,
Dropped leaves, salamanders,
Each one scrubbing and cooling
The pebbles of its bed.

My back to hickory, I sit
Hours in the damp wood, listening.
It never ebbs.
Its music is the shelf for other sounds:
Birds, wind in the leaves, some tumbled stones.
After awhile
I forget things, as I have forgotten time.
Death, love, ambition—the things that drive
Like pumps in the big rivers.

My heart
Is quieted, at rest. I scarcely feel it.
Little rivers, running everywhere,
Have blunted the knife. Cool, cool,
They wash above the bones.

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A Letter

David Summers

One day the prison-keeper crumbled—
raced excitedly from cell to cell
churning his iron key, setting
all his savage prisoners free.

I am writing this in February.
The rain appropriately mars
the window, but I can see
my enemies gathering below;
their distorted umbrellas
conceal a subtle weaponry.
I brandish a newspaper at them,
and they flee.
So Don,
you see I am kept quite busy.
Oh, things are much the same,
studying advanced violence
at the local university;
breaking out and breaking in.
At night I drive around.
I can smile, can't I? The world
is crazier than I am, more
murderous, sullen, selfish,
isn't it? Isn't it, Don?

Pressed against the wall,
I listen to the ghostly lady
who haunts the next room—
she tracks across the carpet—
a rosicrucian maybe, I can tell

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a screwball when I hear one.
I hear voices sometimes
in a faucet's melancholy gargle
and in my sleep I've read
Fear and Trembling lately . . .

When I wake, I dream.

The other night I went out
to somebody's successful play.
After, in the parking lot,
I stood alone in the dark.
Suddenly the cars around me
began to explode into a roar,
all the head-lamps flicking on . . .
Why do I tell you this?
Nothing is important anymore.
I'm the luck-y, luck-y, fel-low.
I can laugh, can't I, Don?

Rapists, thieves, murderers,
with flute and tambourine
dance through a field of grass.
And following behind them
that demented gaoler,
free at last.

✪ DAVID SUMMERS' poems have appeared in *Poetry Northwest,* the *Malahat Review* and the *Chicago Review.* He lives in Victoria, British Columbia, where he is a graduate student of physics at the University of Victoria.

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Honesty as a Policy

JOHN P. SISK

DISGUST AT DUPLICITY, Benjamin DeMott has said, is "the deepest running tide anywhere at this moment." The observation leaves room for several possibilities: that there is more duplicity around now than ever before and therefore more to be disgusted at; that there appears to be more duplicity because we have learned to see more; that we see more because we need to see more; that the disgust with it is more symptomatic of the disgusted than it is indicative of moral decay. The availability of targets for disgust appears, in fact, to be a measure of civilization, although one would hardly care to argue that the more disgusting a culture is the more it is civilized. It is simply that relatively primitive peoples knit strongly into tribal groups seem not yet to have arrived at the point where they can indulge this passion. Perhaps it is best seen as a cultural luxury, like the capacity to wage atomic war. Indeed, it may be little more than a sentimental way for a people to pretend that it still has the moral fiber that it knows it needs but fears it is losing.

Nevertheless, Mr. DeMott is right: the disgust is widespread. We all agree with Iago when he says to an Othello far gone in suspicion of Desdemona: "Men should be what they seem;/ Or those that be not, would they might seem none!"

At this point in the play Iago's reputation as an honest man is still intact, although the audience knows that, his honesty being mere policy, he is only a clever imitation of Shakespeare's honest man. The latter really is what he appears to be, and above all he is loyal to his commitments. To honor them he may have to adopt a disguise, which if it is a kind of duplicity is not the kind Mr. DeMott is talking about. Shakespeare's kind of honesty assumes and

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is the expression of character, in the sense of a principled organization of energies and dispositions aimed at securing the subject's and society's best interests. It involves the conviction that the naked energies are naturally unruly, that attitudes ruled by passions are impermanent, and that the necessities for humane living are available only through disciplined effort. The fact that it is easy for us to believe that character so conceived is incompatible with honesty is one measure of the distance between us and Shakespeare.

Shakespeare and his age, however, were familiar with the opposition between character in the above sense and honesty in a sense close to one we are familiar with. Falstaff and Edmund, Gloucester's bastard son in *King Lear,* for example, anticipate a modern belief that character, understood as a predisposition determined by values held to be anterior to the individual, is hostile to an honest expression of impulse and is therefore against nature and hostile to life. Both figures are, of course, clearly enough identified as occupying heterodox positions, however attractively in Falstaff's case or as a consequence of whatever real injustice in Edmund's. In fact, a good deal of Renaissance thinking tends to be soft on honesty as it is understood by Falstaff and Edmund.

Nevertheless, the modern opposition between character and honesty comes most forcibly to our attention in Romanticism, however much it had been prepared for by Renaissance and Enlightenment optimism about human nature. The opposition is the expression of a complex of forces in which the person as we know him has to a significant degree emerged from the social units to which for so long he had tended to be subordinated. With this emergence, in part because of it, comes that valuation of the passional self that results in, and is in part made possible by, the polarization of honesty and character. It is now possible to say with Shakespeare's Edmund, and with less and less fear of being labeled heterodox, "Thou, Nature, art my goddess!"

It is apparent that in the raw passional energy he calls his goddess Nature Edmund has discovered something of the sense of liberation that goes with the cult of spontaneity—as one encounters it, for instance, in a modern romantic like John Cage when he

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urges us to "give up illusions about ideas of order, expressions of sentiment, and all the rest of our inherited claptrap." Edmund's hard-eyed and honest assessment of orthodox ideas of order as inherited claptrap also makes him an a priori caricature not only of such violators of inherited claptrap as Wordsworth, Whitman and Hemingway but of all those heroes of the New Left who have found in obscenity (with Marcuse's blessing) an honest and liberating response to the poetic diction of the establishment.

In Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms* Lieutenant Frederick Henry has a metaphoric vision of language as an accretion of empty proclamations slapped up one on top of the other. This is the way traditional character formation tends to appear in the romantic world: as a meaningless repetition of gestures that not only thwart spontaneity but keep the right future from being born. Oddly enough, however, both Wordsworth and Hemingway admired examples of traditional character formation: compare the former's Michael or Old Leach Gatherer, for instance, with the latter's Santiago or Robert Jordan. The attractive thing about all of these people is their predictability, a quality they have in common with the poetic diction that both writers profess to abhor. Because figures of this sort are organized around unshakable convictions, they are intensely and honestly open to highly valued but very limited areas of experience. Being men of character, they are conservators; they tend to slow down the universe in which they live and breathe. They are in fact expressions of Romanticism's need to counter the high potential for dangerous excess in romantic values, and particularly in the romantic commitment to becoming rather than being. In other words, at least some romantics act as if there is no incompatibility between character and honesty in the sense of a capacity to be in accord with elemental forces. Probably they would agree with a recent remark by drama critic Eric Bentley: that "like other forces of freedom, spontaneity operates within limits, i.e., within an iron ring of unfreedom, of unspontaneity."

Nevertheless, romantics as a whole, especially modern romantics, do not take kindly to the suggestions that there may be an interrelation between spontaneity and the iron ring of unfreedom, and for the same reason they are unenthusiastic about character

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formation, which is likely to strike them as a bourgeois programming for survival. This is not to say that they are themselves invariably without it any more than their poems, plays and novels are invariably without structure; it is simply to say that they are radically uneasy with the antiutopian, antispontaneous (and therefore antihonest) implications of character and structure. They may have no personal experience of life beyond the iron ring (even states of entrancement or intoxication are ultimately experienced in relation to it); still it seems to them that the good man has no alternative to thinking of it as the enemy—even though to attack that enemy effectively may require a good deal of old-fashioned character.

There is good reason for this. Character as it has generally been known is a kind of specialization that is grounded on the experience of scarcity (there is never enough of anything to go around), the threat of information (at any given moment there is far too much of it available) and the related threat of time (at any given moment it is on the verge of moving too fast). Character formation is both a matter of vital economy (a limitation and concentration of attention and energy) and the product of a technique for achieving self-definition: it secures the self as an enclave of awareness and purpose from the sheer process and welter of existence in which it would otherwise be unselfconsciously lost. To put it this way is to emphasize that character as it comes to us out of our classical, Jewish and Christian past aspires to be an ideal combination of conservative and creative forces.

This paradoxical combination makes little sense to romantics like Cage or British psychiatrist R. D. Laing, who, like Whitman, commit themselves optimistically to time and change because of a conviction that the impulse (the god) behind them is utterly benevolent. Therefore, Cage can announce as a basic principle (see the long conversation with him in the Fall 1969 *North American Review*): ". . . choose abundance rather than scarcity. Be wasteful rather than pinchpenny. Get as much as you can out of all there is to be had. Have it even if you don't use it, or even if you use it badly as a gadget." Character achieves its economies in terms of a sense of values; but for Cage we must "give up first of all a

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sense of values," for values mean privacy, divisiveness and partition, all of which are hostile to an honest openness and togetherness and the release of creative force (Esalen is the natural prep school and Laing the ideal counselor for the kind of world Cage envisages). Character is steadfastness, principled resistance to the flow; in Cage's view this is fixity, and he sees "no reason to think that it's virtuous to remain one thing throughout one's life." Cage takes his stand with R. Buckminster Fuller: if you have to choose "between fixity and flexibility choose flexibility." The conviction that these really are the alternatives one must choose between, as if the well-choosing man could end up all flexibility, is one of the peculiarities of Cage's position, and possibly one of its causes.

Cage's implied ideal man sounds much like Robert Jay Lifton's Protean Man. What characterizes the like-style of Protean Man is "an interminable series of experiments and explorations—some shallow, some profound—each of which may be readily abandoned in favor of still new psychological quests." His protean quality is a technique for survival in condition of great cultural flux. His submission to and determination by process might suggest the hero of a *Bildungsroman*. The latter, however, is a questing hero for whom a variety of experiences in strange environments is a necessary preliminary to an ultimate integration and identity that will stand against the flux. Protean Man is less a questing hero than an experience hero in whom "idea systems and ideologies can be embraced, modified, let go of and reembraced, all with a new ease that stands in sharp contrast to the inner struggle we have in the past associated with these shifts." Thus his aspiration to "experiential transcendence" by way of drugs, cars, motorcycles and superorgasms uncontaminated by personal commitment tends to result in antiheroic action and aims to secure nothing. The aspiration to secure something implies an acknowledgment of Bentley's iron ring of unfreedom and the clinging to values that so offends Cage—whom Lifton, incidentally, sees "as an extreme exponent of the protean style."

Protean Man would thus seem to have much in common with Charles Reich's Consciousness III Man, who, never having known the straitjacket of Consciousness I Man's character, is blessed with

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flexibility, honesty, wholeness and an immense capacity for social responsibility and love. Indeed, Consciousness III Man sometimes comes across as Protean Man in his ultimate ideal development released by irresistible grace to love, creativity and imagination. Certainly Consciousness III Man does not represent a position or "set" arrived at or earned by inner struggle—at least not by *his* inner struggle.

But Consciousness III Man appears in the context of prophetic and utopian vision: his existence assumes the inevitability of an entirely satisfactory (and pseudo-Marxian) end-of-process, a greening beyond which there is no fall of leaf, and in which it is hard to imagine that his creativity and liberation would have anywhere to go, any means of self-definition, and therefore any means of sensing his dispensation from the iron ring of unfreedom. Such an idyllic vision generates excitement in proportion as the satisfaction of experiencing it as an achieved reality is equated with the satisfaction of trying to make it such. Considered as a final state, it has the static quality and high potential for boredom that characterize all utopias. It would need, and would no doubt quickly get, an honest Iago to stir up the right kind of trouble.

This is no less true of R. Buckminster Fuller's "Planetary Planning," a long prophetic essay published in THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR at about the time that Reich's book appeared. Fuller's vision is less parochial than Reich's: it foresees the greening not only of America but of Spaceship Earth. Fuller may, in fact, help one to see the extent to which Reich's book has implicit in it a parochial American dream of Manifest Destiny: the greening of America is the necessary and inevitable preliminary to the greening of the world. In keeping with his grander objective, Fuller's prophecy is worked out in terms of twelve periods or phases of consciousness. However, it is no less dependent than Reich's on the spontaneity and honesty of youth, whose rejection of specialization will be a rejection of the characterizing and genius-frustrating prison of the past. Before Fuller's period ten (the present age) has run its course it will prove an Eden for Protean Man: it will be a flux ranging between *becoming* and *became;* it will no longer need nouns, only verbs; it will "give every individual the free-

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dom to reemploy his original unblemished childhood's faculty of thought and experimental curiosity drives in whatever way each finds to be most constructive."

But in the end Fuller, like Reich, is more celebrational than informational. If we really want to learn something about an important phenomenon in contemporary society we need to return to Lifton, whose optimism about Protean Man is significantly qualified. The latter suffers, Lifton warns, from a strong ideological hunger and "is starved for ideas and feelings that can give substance to his world"; he has a profound inner sense of absurdity; he is painfully ambivalent about technology and change—that is, he is as likely to commit himself to projects that promise restoration as to those that promise transformation. In fact, a Reichean enthusiast might argue that Lifton's Protean Man is simply Consciousness III Man in the act of being painfully born—if, that is, one could reconcile the notion of painful birth with Consciousness III.

It may be more to the point, however, to see both as extensions of the romantic ideal of the artist as sensitive reed, as the medium through which course, undistorted by characterological "preformations," those energies that are the radical stuff of experience. This ideal—implicit in much contemporary talk about honesty as well as in much social criticism and psychology—expresses an aspiration to a total openness to experience, to a generous and even heroic submission to the flux. Its inspiration is Edmund's goddess Nature: before anything else it is a commitment to experience. This is the goddess who, Edmund assures us, stands not "in the plague of custom," and has no awe "of honest madam's issue," but produces instead bastards "of fierce quality" against whom legitimate offspring engendered within a "dull, stale, tired bed" will never prevail.

Edmund's honest nature, as we have come to see, is Dionysian, even orgiastic in its implications; in time it will produce in one direction that brutally honest man, the Marquis de Sade, and in another that ecstatically honest man, Norman O. Brown. In whichever direction one goes he is lured by the promise of an ultimate unity and wholeness, for Edmund's goddess is a great promiser of

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unity and wholeness. Indeed, she is the impelling deity behind not only the electronic global village, as simultaneously prefigured and caricatured by Woodstock, but also Brown's heaven-on-earth, in which, to quote from *Love's Body,* "The antinomy between mind and body, word and deed, speech and silence [is] overcome. Everything is only a metaphor; there is only poetry." It is hard to take a stand against such vatic utterance, which assumes the irrelevance of the definitions and distinctions of the time-bound and prose-dependent world. One can no more argue with Brown than with the Cumean Sibyl. One can only wonder whether in a world where language has been reduced to metaphor (reversing the direction of Orwell's "Newspeak" world), it might not be hard to distinguish Brown's kind of transcendence from Sade's. Indeed, if one takes his stand with Peter Michelson's *Aesthetics of Pornography,* it is not too important to distinguish between them, since they are both trying to liberate the human spirit from the Establishment prison house.

In any event, in Brown, Cage, Reich and Fuller we see the sensitive reed expressing its fear of specialization. Specialization, like traditional character formation, is at its best a principled selection among options and therefore a reduction of them in the interest of an economy of energy and action. In the view of the sensitive reed, this reduction is dishonest, not simply as lies and hypocrisies are dishonest but as a refusal to submit oneself generously to one's full potential for life is. This view obtains despite the fact that our literature and drama, if not our prophetic scriptures, continually demonstrate how likely it is that such submission will be destructive and that its hero-victims will have to find their transcendence in confusion and suffering, or in rage directed against familiar scapegoats. The very excessiveness of this rage may suggest that beneath its apparent cause there are factors of which the individual is aware only in an inchoate way if at all, and in fact dare not become fully aware lest he be demoralized. There is, for instance, the enraging suspicion, for most of us grounded in the painfully repeated experience of the unclosable gap between aspiration and achievement, that the effect of too many options is more likely to be restricting than liberating.

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Midge Decter has shown this irony at work in her *Commentary* essay, "The Liberated Woman." Here the young "heroine" is largely emancipated from the traditional biases and has been led to believe "by those around her that there would be no let or hindrance to her achievement." What those around her have not told her is that the availability of a variety of options is meaningful only in terms of the principled economy of the personality that chooses which among them it will pursue. In this circumstance, bewildered and frustrated, she is attracted to the more extreme forms of the feminine liberation movement, the rages of which substitute for the organizing work once accomplished by character formation.

Rage as a major substitute for character formation is probably inevitable in a permissive, sensate and impulse-releasing culture. Such a culture has a low tolerance for frustration; indeed, it is likely to identify intolerance of frustration as a clear sign of honesty. Honesty and frustration thus feed on one another to make life more disgusting and unbearable; at the same time, they make it increasingly difficult to see the extent to which, as Bruno Bettelheim has pointed out, it is unbearable "because we have not learned to manage frustration." But to a neo-romantic, "manage" in this context can imply a crippling skepticism about Laing's "politics of experience"—that is, a lack of trust in the natural forces that are trying to manage one. So far as experience is concerned, Bettelheim and Laing belong to quite different political parties. The advantage in belonging to Bettelheim's party is that membership prepares one for the familiar contemporary sequence: intense and short-term commitment to a cause, rapid escalation into violence, hardly less rapid descent into disillusion and apathy as the disproportion between effort and effect becomes painfully clear. Thus one of the most important human experiences, anger at corruption or injustice as a preliminary to determined corrective action, is in the end simply another honest experience: the sensitive reed turns out to be simply one more leaf in the wind.

It is not hard to believe that Lifton's Protean Man is dangerously rage-prone for the same reason that he suffers from ideological hunger and tends to embrace technical achievement—that is,

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in order "to combat inner tendencies toward diffusion." The inability to manage one's impulses, the sense of oneself as helpless against interior forces, is itself enraging for many personalities, although the likely thing is that they will locate the enraging cause outside themselves—perhaps in parents or teachers who, by having failed to help them learn how to manage themselves, have in effect left them naked to adversity. Ideological hunger is ultimately hunger for management, an appetite that fascism has a great capacity to feed. Consciousness III Man, then, may be nothing more than Protean Man wistfully and tenderly observed, with all the latter's susceptibility to the charismatic managers who are so eager to "characterize" him.

This is no less a possibility for Fuller's Period Ten Man, especially since he lives in an age destined ultimately "to emancipate all humanity from physical drudgery." For by now we have learned to expect that Utopian Man will turn out to be Managed Man who will have had imposed upon him the character formation necessary to the utopian enterprise. It is this irony that makes Ken Kesey's dream of controlling electronically a world turned on with "Electric Kool-Aid" such a revealing caricature of the utopian impulse. Indeed, unless one approaches him in the spirit of a true believer, the Kesey of Tom Wolfe's saga can appear to be a cartoon version of the Leonardo-type so crucial to Fuller as he builds his twelve steps to the Heavenly City. It is worth noting also that the new consciousness we see in Fuller and Wolfe's Kesey operates like a charisma, especially on the young. In the world of the new consciousness, charisma, particularly in its capacity as an irresistible personality-organizing force, ranks with rage as a substitute for character.

Romanticism is so widely understood as a glorification of the honest private person that it is easy to miss in it a sinister anti-personal impulse. This impulse is expressed in the metaphor of the sensitive reed as well as in the image of the female dancer with the utterly inexpressive inward-looking face, an image that in its pathological phase, Frank Kermode points out, becomes the *femme fatale*. In both images can be seen the aspiration of the person to be annihilated as he becomes pure medium for experience, pure

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metaphor, the vessel for that holy madness of which, according to Norman O. Brown, Nietzsche is the prophet. Nietzsche is of course the grand champion of all efforts to leap beyond the iron ring of unfreedom, and it is Brown who makes clear how hostile to the private person is this dream of Dionysian transcendence. The great romantics knew this dream and feared it even as they were compelled by it, and the fear is part of their romanticism. The fear helps to explain the conservatism of Coleridge and the maturing Wordsworth, as well as the discovery by the Byron of *Don Juan* how to use style to manage the dangerous discordancies of his personality; it is also a reason why Keats in his letters has so many "unromantic" things to say about character, philosophy and the kind of mental discipline to which he gives the name "negative capability."

The irony that an honest submission to experience, ostensibly in the interest of an intenser and ampler life, can end in the destruction of the person—either by leaving him defenseless to the forces in himself or in his environment or by reducing him to experiential means—is underlined by the fate of such pop art celebrities as the late Jimi Hendrix and Janis Joplin. The media clearly did not care to approve of the kind of excess that apparently figured in these deaths; nevertheless, they found it hard to keep a note of awe out of their reports. *Life,* for instance, referred to these young entertainers as "victims to an assault on the frontier of ever newer experience," as if they had put their bodies fearlessly and heroically on the line for us. There may be good reason to believe that the assault on this particular frontier is more likely to result in an impoverishment of experience than an enrichment; nevertheless, for much of the counterculture world such figures are message in the act of being medium. As an admirer has said of Andy Warhol, what they suffer as persons is irrelevant, perhaps even to themselves. Thus they are brought into line with, and at the same time caricature, what Lionel Trilling has identified as one of the major themes of modern literature: "the idea of losing oneself up to the point of self-destruction, of surrendering oneself to experience without regard to self-interest or conventional morality, of escaping wholly from the societal bond."

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The reasons for the immense appeal of a figure like Che Guevara are not hard to see. He moves uncompromisingly against what his admirers believe to be a fundamentally corrupt and life-denying middle class and therefore sanctifies their rage against it, and at the same time he has great appeal as a superior kind of experience hero (although this is a trivializing interpretation to a true *Guevarista*). But at least as important is the fact that he represents in an acceptable modern context an old-fashioned kind of salvation for Protean Man. For Guevara, as is made abundantly clear in his *Diary,* was the Hero as Man of Character, the economy of whose life was determined by clearly defined principles and by an ascetic capacity for a disciplined denial of impulse. As a true revolutionary he could offer no homage to Edmund's goddess and little comfort to John Cage or Charles Reich. There is irony then in the acceptability of his legend to the impulse-releasing, permissive young, for whom figures like Allen Ginsberg and Timothy Leary are the logical heroes.

No doubt some of the young (perhaps bemused with Leary's reported determination to stay high and fight the revolution) conceive of a revolution as a Dionysian activity and therefore are able to imagine a triumphant Guevara as king of an eternal Woodstock. But surely many others have learned from Che, whether or not they can put the message into words, that the honesty of the contemporary world can be bad policy, since by insisting that the person submit himself to experience it ends up by incapacitating him to do anything about the social and political consequences of such submission. In a world in which because of technology the rate of change accelerates frighteningly, so that change itself often seems to be the only constant, Guevara demonstrates an activist's technique for salvation. This is the hero's single-minded and impulse-denying concentration on a high-priority objective that has the effect of drastically reducing the options and thereby slowing down the rate of change. To follow Che, unless one has great powers of self-deception, is to follow what for Cage, Reich, Brown and Fuller is a reactionary leader.

Che's kind of revolution, like Lenin's or Cromwell's or Robespierre's, is a puritanic state of affairs; it assumes a character set

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with a high degree of specialization and predictability, for instead of submitting honestly to nature in order that the best possible future may be discovered in experience, it aspires to force the future and determine experience. Neither Bacon nor Nietzsche is its philosopher. Morally and philosophically it is absolutist rather than relativist. Despite the comfort and inspiration it may derive from existential thinkers, its temper is authoritarian and essentialist. It may propose a general affluence and liberation of impulse as an ultimate objective, but its living fact, as Orwell suggests in *1984,* is more likely to be planned and spartan scarcity aimed at the concentration and conservation of power and energy and the de-acceleration of the rate of change in the interest of efficient management. Such a revolution would have to oppose the main drift of our romantic and sensate world. The "two, three or many Vietnams" that Che hoped for could hardly be achieved with a policy of honesty—not, at any rate, if it is our impulse-releasing kind.

Character then, as usual, offers to rescue us, but at great price. This is our predicament: on the one hand an honest, open and flexible commitment to experience with its tendency to make change an absolute and therefore to speed up time, but with correlative tendencies either to transcend time and personhood in forms often violent and destructive or to succumb to the uncomplicated blandishments of the charismatic man of character; on the other hand, an inflexible, aprioristic, value-oriented, time- and experience-structuring organization of personality that so restricts options in the face of the increasing richness of living potential that it generates unbearable tensions and thus plays into the hands of charismatic and too often nihilistic experience heroes. In the end, the human condition and the human person appear to be too complicated for the simplistic policies either of character or honesty with which we are familiar. Each has a disturbing tendency to become the other through trying to exclude too much of the other, just as excessive specialization prepares for an impossible ideal of protean unspecialization in which distinctions vital to civilized life are lost.

This predicament is as old as the Renaissance, however it may appear to us to be peculiar to modern technological culture. Cer-

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tainly it was recognized by the man who created Iago and Edmund. His continuing power over us has a good deal to do with his capacity to imagine fictions in which characters are tested against the conviction that to survive effectively in situations of adversity one must, in imitation of the playwright himself, be able to combine principled commitment with flexibility. Perhaps for us the comedies are more heuristic than the tragedies in this respect, not only because in the former the paradoxical interrelationship of freedom and the iron ring of unfreedom is dramatized with a clarity impossible in tragedy but because the organizational success of the play as a whole is more likely to be repeated in particular figures. This is especially true of the heroines. Figures like Portia in *The Merchant of Venice,* Viola in *Twelfth Night* and Rosalind in *As You Like It* manage themselves so successfully and humanely in crisis situations that one wonders why feminine liberation publicists haven't made more of them.

Against such adversaries the mere flexibility of an Iago or the egotistic honesty of an Edmund is simply not enough. These wonderful women model an ideal personality type: they have character, but in them character is sufficiently flexible and adaptable so that they can honor their commitments without ceasing to be their own persons, for in honoring their commitments they honor themselves. In action, therefore, they demonstrate a strategy for the dilemma we know only too well: that in which sudden and drastic change of context makes it difficult to determine whether the best policy is an unwavering constancy to previously accepted principles or a complete and honest abandonment of them as so much inherited claptrap. The bias in contemporary literature against dramatic actions in which it is possible for such characters to make a convincing appearance is itself a clear sign of our bemusement by Edmund's goddess.

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Science Without Conscience

JEAN MAYER

SCIENCE WITHOUT CONSCIENCE, said Rabelais, "is but ruination of the soul." This sentence appears in a letter of Gargantua to his son Pantagruel—after Gargantua has commanded Pantagruel to master as many secrets of natural science as were taught in his time. This precept is as timely today as it was then. In this century, we have seen the unleashing of chemical warfare by the Germans in World War I, the human "experiments" conducted by the Nazis in World War II, the welcome given by both the West and the Russians to the technological mercenaries whose skills had devised the V-1s and V-2s, the stockpiling of horrors for biological warfare, crop destruction in Vietnam. At least some scientists spoke up about these abominations as they occurred. In an age in which the volume of voices—including those of scientists—has been raised by at least one order of magnitude, little thought seems to have been given to the conditions under which a scientist can or must speak *while remaining a scientist* as compared to those occasions in which he speaks as a citizen (who may have acquired distinction or fame as a result of his scientific work).

First, let us agree that greater knowledge brings greater responsibility. Whenever the knowledge of a scientist is of direct relevance to the solution of an important social problem that is not being adequately handled, we may agree that it is legitimate for the scientist to speak up. The Periclean dictum, "In Athens, we think that silent men are useless," still applies in a twentieth-century democracy based on science and technology. There are many areas such as hunger and malnutrition in America, pollution, the maldistribution of health facilities, where the information was

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available to professionals a long time before they (or others) spoke up.

The prolonged silence of scientists has often led to accusations of "moral neutrality" and, I believe, is directly responsible for the turning away from science by so many gifted young people, which is a tragedy, for, while science alone will not solve the problems of society, these will not be solved without science.

One general area on which scientists ought to speak up is that of measurement and evaluation of programs. In every area of public activity—health, food, education, defense—we are maintaining or launching enormous programs without any built-in evaluation method that would enable us to determine whether the programs are working at all, whether they show a rapidly diminishing return as more money is expended, or whether an alternative is not more profitable. Such a watchdog role can only be filled by intervention of specialists (to choose and define the yardstick) and by the general support of scientists (who, unlike politicians and the general public, are or should be perpetually open to the idea that the best and often the only way to study a phenomenon is through a series of measurements).

Second, let us agree that scientists ought not to speak *as scientists* in areas that bear no relevance to their scientific qualifications. They can, obviously, express their views as citizens, but they should be careful not to let an irrelevant scientific prestige obscure the debate. Although this writer happened to sympathize with many of the opponents of the A.B.M., the S.S.T. and the Amchitka explosion, it was extremely irritating for him as a concerned citizen to be unable to distinguish in the mass of statements by non-competent scientists, the voices of those who could, with authority, discuss the pertinent issues.

Third, let us all be careful not to let our enthusiasm for important causes carry us beyond the limits of our competence; let us at least clearly signal when we cross the border and henceforth speak as laymen. Recent debates on agriculture and the environment are cases in point. They often assume the character of dialogues of the deaf where each side pursues its *idée fixe* without any recognition of the validity of other viewpoints. We obviously can-

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not feed the world without fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals. The use of pesticides has been of inestimable value in mosquito control inside human habitations and in judicious applications outside; on the other hand, the application of chemicals to the environment has its ecological cost; when the application is massive, as in cotton-growing areas, the cost can be high, and secondary D.D.T. resistance has complicated problems of malaria control.

We must guard against exaggerations even when committed for a good cause. Because our Western culture has never come to terms with nature, it is often expedient to exaggerate the perils to man of ecologically dangerous agents. In the Scriptures, the only sympathetic reference to animals of no economic value to man was in the story of Noah's ark and the Covenant. The Neoplatonic inspiration of the Church Fathers, the Manichean influence of Augustine, the Thomist "Natural Law" unrelated to nature, the anthropomorphism of the Reformation, of the American, French and Russian revolutions all influenced us to believe that ethics is concerned only with relations between man and man, man and society or man and a personal God. The isolated voices of Francis of Assisi and of Schweitzer had no social impact. We were unwilling or unable to learn from a Hinduism committed to metempsychosis, from African cultures committed to animism or from our own native Indian philosophy of oneness with nature and accountability of animal life. Our "conservation movement" was sponsored by a president who spent his leisure shooting animals all over the world. In the absence of a general acceptance that animal and plant species have a right to existence because, like us, they are here, and thus that nature should be defended for nature's sake, ecologists appear to be constantly tempted to exaggerate the toxicological dangers *to man* of any factor that modifies the environment through its toxicity for other species; the result is a steady erosion of the credibility of science.

Finally, the academic scientific community must come to terms with the existence, in industry, of a great many scientists who have not abjured their ethics either as scientists or as citizens because they have left universities. Most practical problems will not be

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solved without their active cooperation. For example, in the field of environmental protection, industrial scientists are often the only ones who have the analytical methods that can permit the study of the dispersion of chemical agents in the environment or who know the distribution of suspected additives in foods. The practical problem is to encourage them to publish and to speak up according to their consciences by giving them the encouragement and support that physicians find in their medical associations and teachers in their unions or in the American Association of University Professors. Such a set of practices would work out to the long-term advantage of industry by answering in advance (as needs to be done now for food additives and drugs) many of the questions necessary for the clearance of new compounds and by decreasing the likelihood of ruinous negligence and environmental lawsuits. Such a new practical ethics would surely be preferable, from the viewpoint of the national community, to the alternative: the encouragement of secret communications to consumer advocates by industry scientists afraid to speak up openly. The moment seems opportune to have a national organization, like the American Association for the Advancement of Science, form a committee to examine the role of the industrial scientist in regulatory processes and environmental protection.

If we, as scientists, want to restore John Winthrop's vision of America as "a City upon the Hill," we must learn to exercise our consciences as citizens without losing our ethical values as scientists.

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Mortimer Adler as Philosopher: A Criticism and an Appreciation

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

In the career of Robert Maynard Hutchins as administrator and writer, two things stand out—wit and courageous, adventurous idealism. No matter how funny (or irritating) Hutchins' remarks might be, no one has ever doubted his seriousness and his will to improve education, including adult education, in the light of the highest ideals available. The background is protestant piety, and I recall a fine example of how this could combine with the wit: once, in a lavatory at the University of Chicago where Hutchins was then chancellor, a scientific friend of mine, who knew something about the theological subject matter of some of my writings, asked me, "Hartshorne, are you still working on God?" Before I could think of an answer, the deep voice of Hutchins, who happened to be standing close by, answered for me, "He ought to let God work on him."

Among those who have been closely associated with Dr. Hutchins, Mortimer Adler is one of those who have been there early and late and all along. Moreover, Adler represents or parallels the serious side of Hutchins, I incline to think, more adequately than anyone else. And whereas Hutchins has always seen the importance of philosophy, and has had more than casual acquaintance with the subject, Adler has all along been a philosopher, and a distinguished one. Then too, he has grown intellectually, and more than just intellectually, to a degree that I find indeed admirable. And I take the best of all his books to be the most recent one, *The Common Sense of Politics.*

In this article I shall be able to do but scant justice to all that this man has accomplished. For instance, I do not own and have scarcely used *Great Books of the Western World* or *The Great Ideas* (the *Syntopicon*). When the plan of the latter was announced and my opinion asked, I replied, half jokingly: "It seems to me an excellent instrument for the perpetuation of ancient errors." What I meant, so far as I really meant what I said, was that by going through all the centuries for the opinions of men of genius, omitting those still living, one is likely to give ways of thinking that have been made more or less irrelevant by intellectual progress greater prominence than they deserve. There was also the objection that in all this work only the Occident, not the Orient, was represented. Nevertheless, these are great achievements.

As director of the Institute for Philosophical Study, Adler has used substantial sums of money for a research team to investigate philosophical issues. The first of the resulting books, and the only one I have studied with care, is *The Idea of Freedom,* Volume I.

I find this an excellent introduction to the entire history of thought about this topic. Three basic procedures are distin-

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guished and various versions of each set forth: (1) One may seek to provide for freedom by taking human volition to be an *exception* to the general principle of causal determinism otherwise obtaining in nature. (2) One may insist that strict *determinism* is universally valid, even in application to human behavior, but argue that this does not contradict freedom in the meaningful sense of unconstrained voluntary action. (3) One may hold that unqualified classical determinism, as in Laplace, is nowhere literally true, and that human freedom is merely a high level, intensive case of the general principle that causal regularity is never absolute, in application to individual or singular and concrete events or actions, but is always only *approximate* (or statistical).

I am cited, rightly, as holding this third view, along with Whitehead, Peirce, and others. I do not know how to estimate whether the money spent in producing this work (and several others like it—on Justice, Happiness and Love) was well spent or not. Most books, including most great books, resulted from more modest outlays. But surely the method of team work in research needed to be tried in philosophy, and for all I know the results justify the elaborate means taken to produce them.

In *The Conditions of Philosophy* Adler shows his extraordinary breadth of knowledge of the subject, both in its (Western) history and its present state. He rightly defends the view that philosophy is concerned with more than language, rather with the quite general data of experience, those not requiring special apparatus or a special locus in the world to make them accessible. This was also Charles Peirce's view.

In this book, which, like all his works, is admirable for its neat and vigorous style, Adler defends a "commonsense" realism of individual "substances," and ingeniously tries to dispose of the physicists' rejection of substance at the particle level by quoting Heisenberg on the merely potential status of particles. Whatever the success of this tactic, the concept—before Whitehead, radically avoided only by Buddhists—of substances *as the final units or singulars* of nature seems at best needless in natural science and worse than needless in philosophy. So far from events being mere adjectives of substances, the idea of substance is merely a (very important) way of expressing the natures and relationships of events. (The argument cannot be gone into here. It is set forth in my most recent work, *Creative Synthesis*.)

The acceptance of substance as the ultimate unit of reality, in Adler's case, as in the history of philosophy in general, brings with it a theory of enlightened self-interest as the basis of moral obligation. Of all those who have taken this path in ethics, from Plato and Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas and later philosophers, Adler (in *The Time of our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense*) is perhaps the most nearly satisfying. (Michael Scriven is also good.) Each man desires and should seek "a good life for himself," and his obligation to be just to others springs from the fact that a just society is necessary to his own achievement of such a life. Adler admits, however, that religious beliefs or divine grace may qualify this reduction of altruism to a form of self-interest; and also that love (which cannot be obligated, secularly speaking) may to some extent lead a person to act directly for the sake of another.

By a good life Adler means one in which, in due proportions, all real or natural, rather than merely fancied, needs or desires are fulfilled. A basic need is for the individual to grow mentally and spiritually, to learn, and to cultivate his capacities as a person. Moreover, a good life is one that is good as a whole; it is no mere succession of "good times" or pleasures, although pleasure belongs in it. Much wisdom is embodied in this description of the good life. Enlightened self-interest cannot easily be better characterized. But there is a curious paradox: No life, says Adler, is definitively good until it reaches its end, until "the job is finished." Until then the life is not good or happy, it is only becoming so. It is admitted that at no time will the man possess the goodness of his life as a whole, for, when the job is finished, the man is no

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longer there to enjoy it. The picture is complete and well painted—for whom?

In contrast, the nonsubstance philosopher will say that each moment of life is, first of all, its own end, good in itself in some degree; second, it is a contribution to the future of life—whose life? All life in a position to receive the contribution. This includes one's own personal future and human posterity, obviously; beyond that the question becomes religious. Belief in God can, and I think should, be taken to mean that the definitive contribution is to the divine life. If one's entire life should be a beautiful whole, this is finally for the value of this whole for the One who alone will survey it in its concrete details. However this may be, to value oneself simply as oneself, and not as an example of humanity, is to value subrationally. Therefore we need no further reason for valuing others than for valuing self. Love is not identity, A = A, but rather unity in contrast, and this can be our relation not only to ourselves, as at other times, but to other persons. Adler does admit that we may "identify ourselves" with another. But the rational way to do this is to universalize the principle. And then self-love is merely a special form of altruism. Always there is more than mere identity, and less than mere nonidentity. Only momentary selves are simply nonidentical, I now and you now. In a little time our future selves will inherit from each other's past selves, and there will be partial identity.

Adler may be largely right that those who reject enlightened self-interest are likely to be meddlesome do-gooders or mere sentimentalists. But this only shows that the truth can be misused. Obviously we cannot equally influence and intelligently benefit all individuals; primary obligations are to those we can most effectively influence and whose needs we can most adequately grasp. Equally obviously, one's own career is normally the one a person is in the best position to influence intelligently for good. I see no priority of self-interest beyond this. It is our animality, not our rationality, that makes it difficult to see the lives of others as of direct concern to us, so far as we can knowingly influence them. If I am mistaken in all this, then Adler's theory of morals is, for all I know, as good as any. As he suggests, it is Aristotle brought up to date and improved.

One final objection: Is it not a "natural need" of a thinking animal to see a meaning to life transcending death, a goal that, when attained, does not vanish into a soon-to-be-forgotten limbo? Also, a goal that is as universal as reason itself?

A number of technical questions about ethics and meta-ethics, about relativity and absoluteness in ethics, are excellently handled in this work. Adler shows, I think, that much that is thought to be new in current controversy is old, and that some fashionable views were refuted long ago.

In *The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes* (a fine title!) Adler tackles the question of human equality as a politico-social ideal. He thinks that if the difference between man and the lower animals is taken as merely one of degree, then the value of the distinction, for moral and political purposes, is lost. But is it? The distinctive power of man is, of course, the symbolic power—the ability to form concepts, and thereby to achieve a certain freedom from instinct in making choices. Other animals, Adler argues, have no such power. But this suggests endless and politically irrelevant controversy. Quite recently two chimpanzees have been doing what looks wonderfully like learning a primitive sort of visual language in which appear symbols that seem to function both as words and, in combination, as sentences. However, this probably only shows, at most, that the higher apes may reach the level of tiny children in concept formation. They would still be far below the level at which they could function politically as citizens or officeholders. In this book, as in a provocative speech Adler gave long ago criticizing the theory of the evolutionary origin of man, he seems to forget that human infants are only potentially "human," if that means concept-forming creatures. (We now know that the brain cells are radically deficient during the first weeks of our lives.) The gap that some have held can only be bridged by

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supernatural means is actually crossed after birth by each of us. In an infant there is no more than the potentiality of rational thinking. And, after all, the potentiality for prehuman apelike creatures eventually to evolve into human beings is just as valid an application of this term. The time gap is greater, but what of it? Words like *soul, substance* and the like add no iota to the solution of such problems. But by neglecting oriental (Buddhist) thought, and that of Whitehead, Adler has limited his insight at this point.

My distinguished contemporary can hardly deny that the difference between politically disfranchised children and politically eligible youths or adults is made more than one of degree only by arbitrary convention. Must not the same be said of Adler's other distinction between those excluded from voting or office-holding because of "pathological deficiency" to the extent that they must be hospitalized?

Having said so much, I must add that I deeply share Adler's concern that the universal rights of human beings, the only political animals on earth, should be given institutional recognition. But in order to stop mistreating fellow human beings we need not waste energy on irrelevant quibbles. A sufficiently great difference of degree can, for some purposes, "make all the difference." Any reasonably adult, not drastically subnormal human being, able to employ language and other symbols sufficiently to express preferences on issues and candidates, has the capacity to function politically, and it should be our ideal that he or she should have some opportunity so to function. Capacities are to be used. Those have rights for whom there is such a thing as the concept of right. It is a very abnormal adult of whom this is not true.

Adler discusses, without reaching a final conclusion, the question, might not robots reach such a peak of development that we should have to conclude that they have concepts and hence political rights? In this interesting discussion what I miss is the following. All value, other than instrumental, consists in experience, which always has an emotional aspect or feeling tone, whether or not there is much problem-solving going on. Machines can solve, but do not *have* problems. The problems they solve are ours, not theirs. In short, to *think* in the full sense is to care about answers to questions, not just to produce answers. We know that other animals have feelings because (a) we have them, and (b) not just their behavior but their internal bodily structure resembles ours, including structures that influence emotions and sensations, rather than merely determining actions or solving problems. Most philosophical traditions throw little light on the mind-body relation so far as emotional and value aspects are concerned. No robot now planned or foreseeable is likely to have an emotional life of its own. So it will be but an instrument, with no political rights at all.

An example of the price Adler pays for his scorn for degree versions of the animal-human distinction is that it forces him to reject the third, and I believe correct, view of freedom mentioned above. Since he also rejects the second view, that favorite sophism of intellectuals that supposes that a thinking animal could fit its thinking and action into absolute and precisely predetermined causal patterns, he is left with the first or dualistic view that man is a sheer exception to the order of nature. In this he is defying the basic intuitions of scientists generally. And why does he reject the third or nondualistic solution—the view that all individuality, even of a cell or an atom, implies at least some trivial escape from any absolute routine? He rejects this because, if the atom is free in this sense, then the difference between man and atom, or man and ape, is one of degree, and he wants a difference of kind. But what has this to do with politics or morals? The freedom of an atom obviously is not moral or political freedom, according to any philosophy. And neither is the freedom of an ape. So the absolute difference asserted between man and the other animals is superfluous for the purpose Adler wants it to serve. But the intellectual repugnance many of us feel for dualism is needlessly brought into play by Adler's tactic. He has gained nothing

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essential for ethics or political philosophy but lost something for cosmology.

I have been quarreling with my fellow philosopher in a manner that, I hope, shows that I consider him one of the ablest men alive in our subject, one of those most worth taking seriously. Moreover, when it comes to Adler's most recent book, *The Common Sense of Politics,* my attitude becomes one of wholehearted admiration and deep agreement. Here Adler shows where his greatest talent or genius lies: above all, he is a political philosopher. Here I look up to him; he teaches me far more than I could possibly teach him. Any defects in the rest of his thinking seem to become insignificant in this part of it. He knows what the best students of the subject have written; he knows the most relevant aspects of the contemporary situation; he employs most happily his ability to formulate issues sharply, to marshal pertinent arguments bearing upon possible solutions, to avoid undue elaboration of secondary matters while being sufficiently explicit on the main lines of his doctrine, to be lucid and forceful while avoiding bigotry or mere rhetoric.

This book speaks to our basic needs in our perilous situation. We need to see a star to which we can hitch our wagons, to echo Emerson. Adler sees that star and will, I hope, help many to see it.

After explaining the nature of political philosophy and its relations to ethics, Adler examines and refutes the currently somewhat popular anarchistic idea that ideally we should have no government at all. He then sets forth three great "revolutions" or fundamental advances in political thought, none anything like fully realized in practice and thus all still continuing movements. The first, or Greek revolution, is the idea of political equality, or democracy, although only for the few, for an elite; the second, or American revolution, is the idea of democracy for the many or for all; the third, or Russian revolution, is the idea of economic democracy for all. It seems to me that in this simple three-step version Adler has hit on something superbly right. He argues that without a substantial measure of economic equality genuine political equality cannot be achieved. Kant said as much, but without seeing, as clearly as Adler, that this poses a perennial problem.

The ideal that sums up the three revolutions, an ideal nowhere actually embodied in any country, is that of the classless, socialist democratic republic. But, and this seems to call for a fourth revolution, in order to realize the ideal, we need genuine world peace, which means world government. That this is immensely difficult Adler concedes. (See also his *How to Think about War and Peace.*) His point is that it is inherent in our professed ideals, ideals that we cannot give up. Moreover, the technological feasibility of world government did not exist before this century, for the same reason that world wars did not exist. Thus it is too soon to say what can or cannot be done. Also, the nature of those wars shows that war itself is becoming more and more destructive of democracy. There is then only one path that can in the long run lead toward a better world, the path at the end of which is a democratic socialist world republic formed from smaller republics of the same kind.

"Socialism" as an ideal does not for Adler mean state capitalism (as in Russia), but "universal capitalism," in contrast to "mixed economies," and in sharper contrast to the oligarchic capitalism we have now in some countries. The mixed economy tends toward state capitalism, which can never be classless, even if it succeeds in providing a decent minimum of economic resources for everyone. One wishes that Adler had given an additional lecture or chapter on possible ways to work out the concept of universal capitalism. Here a team of economic theorists might be helpful. Adler mentions still another form of socialism, the cooperative or syndicalist form. He allows for the possibility that neither this nor universal capitalism is feasible, in which case we must do the best we can with mixed capitalism.

If the foregoing is not in outline what we should try to find our way toward, I have no idea what is. Obviously something is wrong when one must be at least a mil-

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lionaire to run for office, while large segments of the population are economically insecure or miserably destitute. Moreover, so long as we fail to see that Russian or Chinese idealism tends to be strong just where ours is weak, we shall not have the right attitude to achieve peace with our two most populous national rivals. The mere capitalism-socialism dichotomy leads nowhere but to conflict and misunderstanding. All industry is capitalistic, but ours is obviously and rather grossly *oligarchic*. That is what we need to reflect upon if we are to bring home to ourselves the truth that we are not simply "the good guys" and the others "the bad guys." We are all somewhat bad and somewhat good. The point is not merely to preserve our good from the others' bad, but to preserve the good wherever it is found from the bad wherever it is found. And some of the bad, as our youth keep loudly telling us, is right at home.

Nowhere in Adler's book do I see chauvinism, whether national, racial, class-conscious, age-gap conscious, or whatever. Nor do I sense any merely personal, self-serving motivation. To a rare extent indeed, the voice seems really to be that of universal human reason and aspiration. Adler is no bigoted advocate of law and order against revolutionary violence; but neither is he a bigoted advocate of such violence. He is the advocate of institutional progress where it certainly is imperative, by nonviolent means to the fullest possible extent; but progress, he insists, there must be. I agree with him.

Nothing is easier than to accuse such a book of oversimplification. All human thinking simplifies, or it loses itself in indecisive and unhelpful qualifications and nebulosities. As Whitehead put it, we should seek simplicity—and mistrust it. But first we must have the simplicity, or we have nothing. Now it seems to me a superb achievement that Adler really has succeeded in presenting, with wonderful lucidity and economy, the ultimate ideals by which political thought should henceforth be guided and the most essential considerations supporting their validity. It is arguable that they are less completely and literally "feasible" and more "utopian" than he admits, but then how right he is to stress in a time of ever-changing knowledge and ever-new technological resources, the difficulty of knowing what the limits of human action may be. And even if he is mistaken in thinking that institutional political progress could reach an absolute goal, he is right in making the point that in any case individuals would always have something to strive for in teaching and learning from one another, in friendship and love, since the absolute goal is more than political or institutional but is the good life in every individual.

This book seems to me a paradigm of philosophy serving the needs of mankind.

Res ipsa loquitur
(things speaking)
put down your wings
and listen

ELLIOT ABHAU

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Rituals

DONALD J. LLOYD

Dr. Skinner, Godlike, rewards his pigeons.

First, of course, he starves them. Well, almost
starves them; then a grain of food
for each successful move brings more successful moves
and lo! a circus of faintly ridiculous,
mainly hungry pigeons works Dr. Skinner's will.
Or wills, since one
pigeon may circle gravely to the left,
another to the right, this one peck a dangler
with his beak and that one curtsy like
Scarlett O'Hara in feathers. Two play
a birdy game of ping-pong—or maybe tennis.
They wouldn't know.

Until one day Dr. Pigeon forgets his birds . . .
some unexpected summons . . . the machines pass out
the food on schedule, no matter what the birds are doing.

No matter what the birds are doing,
they take the reward as the approval of God
and so continue. Birdbrains.

On Dr. Bird's return, the fowl are doing
whatever they think they are being rewarded for:
blinking, bowing, circling, flapping, or falling down
like stones.

Hey medicine man, holy man, muezzin, minister
shaman, rabbi, patriarch, archbishop, Pope:
I know what you were doing when Galileo stared at the skies
and God went away.

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The Moral Implications of the Cuban Missile Crisis

LEWIS J. PAPER

The American Presidency is a formidable, exposed, and somewhat mysterious institution. It is formidable because it represents the point of ultimate decision in the American political system. It is exposed because decision cannot take place in a vacuum: the Presidency is the center of the play of pressure, interest, and idea in the nation; and the presidential office is the vortex into which all the elements of national decision are irresistibly drawn. And it is mysterious because the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself.

—John F. Kennedy

In October, 1962, the Soviet Union and the United States came dangerously close to an armed confrontation because of the Soviet installation of offensive missiles in Cuba. The nuclear sword of Damocles, which had been a preoccupation of both nations' foreign policies for more than a decade and which had fostered a stabilizing "balance of terror," appeared to hang by the slenderest of threads—with the fate of these two nations, if not mankind itself, hanging in the balance. Yet the dreaded nuclear holocaust was avoided, and the impending confrontation dissipated without a single military exchange between the two cold war adversaries. But the temperance of subsequent years and the detachment of history should not obscure the fact that this near confrontation brought us to the brink of destruction. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed shortly after the situation was resolved, "We faced each other eyeball-to-eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked."

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Despite the plethora of literature that has since recounted the drama of those thirteen days in October, 1962, little attention has been given to the moral qualities of the United States' actions and, in particular, to the moral legitimacy of President John F. Kennedy's decisions in formulating and in implementing those actions. Consideration of the moral implications of the Cuban missile crisis raises two basic questions. First, are there guidelines for judging the morality of an individual nation's actions in the world arena, and, if so, did the United States' actions in this situation conform to those guidelines? And, second, are there similar guidelines for judging the morality of an individual president's actions with respect to his position in the American political system, and, if so, can John Kennedy's decisions be justified within that framework?

Any moral judgment, whether that of nations or of individuals, presupposes two conditions: a standard by which to evaluate the behavior, and the availability of choice to the actor. The standard for behavior normally reflects values shared by most people, and the choice offers the actor the freedom to govern his behavior by those values. If men or nations are to be held responsible for their actions, they initially

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must be held accountable for those standards and consciously choose whether or not to be guided by those standards in adopting a particular course of action. That some men or nations can violate any agreed standards with impunity may imply not so much the absence of precepts as the particular system's inability to inflict the proper punishment. In short, one should not confuse the system's efficacy with its existence—although at some point the two qualities do interact.

In the international arena, there is no structured and detailed standard by which nations may guide their behavior. There is no single authority to which a national government, in formulating its policies and implementing its decisions, can turn for counsel or moral approval. In fact, the absence of such an authority has frequently enabled individuals and their governments to evade responsibility for the horrors inflicted by wars and revolutions. Perhaps the classic example of this evasion was reported by Barbara Tuchman in *The Guns of August:* when in 1914 a former German chancellor asked how the European conflict began, his successor replied, "Ah, if only one knew."

The roots of this evasion are not obscure. For national governments are not single entities reflecting unity of thought and purpose; they are instead conglomerations of different individuals who often possess different ideas and different goals. Consequently, it is often an easy matter for individuals within any government to diffuse the responsibility for their actions as well as those of their sovereign. Once a policy is decided and implemented, however, the divergent wills upon which that policy rests should shift to the background. It is the particular action that should be judged in terms of its official justification and in terms of its consequences—not the compromises or politics upon which the policy was initially founded.

Despite the historic evasion of responsibility by many governments, it would be myopic to deny the existence of any moral standards in the sphere of world affairs. For instance, although it is a very loose-knit code, international law is still recognized by most countries as reflecting basic values shared by most peoples. The inability of international law to resolve all disputes between nations resides more in a lack of acceptable enforcement machinery than in the absence of moral underpinnings for an international legal system. Even countries belligerent in their relations with one another may meet on common ground where matters of law and morality are concerned. Between 1961 and 1964, for example, the Cuban government was represented by counsel and prevailed in an American court—even though the two nations had broken diplomatic relations several years prior to the Supreme Court's final decision *(Banco Nacional de Cuba* v. *Sabbatino,* 376 U.S. 398 [1964]).

These shared principles of international conduct for nations, furthermore, are found in innumerable institutions of which both the United States and the Soviet Union are members. The most prominent of these institutions is the United Nations. That this institution is not entirely effective as a forum for settling differences among nations usually results more from the operation of other factors than from the lack of agreement on those principles underlying the United Nations. As an example, the Union of South Africa has continually invoked the Act of State Doctrine in resisting U.N. declarations that apartheid violates principles of human behavior.

Thus, to recognize the existence of morals in the international arena is not to preclude their interaction with other principles of governmental behavior or to establish an undisputed schedule of moral priorities—even in their most limited applications, moral principles may conflict and offer no firm guide as to the proper behavior. Here it is enough to note that almost every nation feels constrained to legitimize its behavior in the international sphere by reference to a recognized principle (although doubts may naturally arise as to whether the principle is properly applicable to a particular action). Even Hitler resorted to such legitimization, as when he justified the annexation of the Sudeten-

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land in 1938 by referring to the necessity to reunite the German people.

Of these common moral principles operative in the international sphere, two are of particular relevance to the Cuban missile crisis: first, that deceit is contrary to accepted standards, and, second, that a nation may do whatever is reasonably necessary to insure its security.*

It seems indisputable that the Soviet Union violated the first principle when explaining the construction of missile sites in Cuba. Throughout the late summer and early fall of 1962, Soviet leaders insisted that the missiles being installed in Cuba were of a defensive nature when, in fact, the missiles were I.C.B.M.'s with a range of one thousand miles—offensive weapons that could penetrate the heart of the United States. The Soviet Union's duplicity was underscored to Kennedy when he met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on October 18, two days after the president received conclusive proof of the missiles' offensive nature. (Robert Kennedy, in his *Thirteen Days,* says that the president met with Gromyko on October 17, but all other accounts and newspapers show otherwise.) At that meeting, Kennedy repeated his earlier statements that the United States would not tolerate offensive missiles in Cuba. Gromyko, unaware of Kennedy's new knowledge, glibly assured the American president that the Soviet Union would not place such missiles in Cuba.

That the Soviet Union was aware of the immoral implications of its duplicity is equally clear. On October 23, the day after Kennedy had announced the quarantine of Cuba, Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the United Nations, brought the matter before the U.N. Security Council. Confronted by Stevenson, Soviet Ambassador Zorin did not at any time dismiss the moral condemnation that would attach to the Soviet Union if it were proved deceitful. Indeed, painfully aware that such duplicity would not be condoned in the world forum, Zorin made every attempt to prove that the missiles were only defensive; and when these attempts failed, Zorin simply refused to answer Stevenson's questions. In addition, in none of its correspondence with the United States nor in any public explanation of its behavior did the Soviet Union admit to the deception, even as having been necessary to its own self-interest. In effect, then, while the Soviet Union's installation of offensive missiles in Cuba could perhaps be justified by its own national interests, its deceit could not be justified in terms of the moral values shared by other nations.

In light of its consciously immoral behavior, the Soviet Union had fair warning of some form of sanction, either verbal or physical. Had there not been a fair warning, the Soviet Union probably would have been more open about its proved duplicity. Furthermore, from a legal perspective, it might be argued that since the Soviet Union shifted the *status quo,* it had the burden of proof to justify its actions, a burden that it failed to carry adequately in the United Nations.

It is initially apparent that the United States sought the approval of the world community for any sanction it considered appropriate to impose. In this respect, Kennedy was careful to identify the United States' decision to limit the shipment of certain Soviet goods to Cuba as a quarantine rather than as a blockade; under accepted international terminology, the former term refers to a sovereign's rights in peacetime, whereas the latter is an act of war. Once American policy was decided, Kennedy also hoped to have it legitimized by the Organization of American States and the U.N., the two international organizations with predominant responsibility for peace in Latin America. Thus, on October 23, Kennedy dispatched Secretary Rusk to an emergency meeting of the O.A.S. to explain the American decision and to urge the O.A.S. to adopt the quarantine as an inter-American action. Within hours of this presentation, the O.A.S. unanimously voted to approve the quarantine as its own action. On that same day, Kennedy also had Stevenson explain the

* Almost every international agreement explicitly or implicitly embodies these two principles.

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situation to the U.N. Security Council in an effort to persuade that body to sanction the American decision.

Notwithstanding these attempts to legitimize American policy, it can be persuasively argued that the United States' decision was a unilateral one that would have been implemented regardless of the reactions of the international community and that, in effect, the subsequent approval accorded by international organizations was nothing more than a rubber stamp of behavior they could not prevent. Although this argument recognizes certain indisputable balances of power, it underestimates three basic points. First, until the United States made a unilateral decision as to what its reaction should be, there was no proposed policy for these organizations to accept or reject. Second, the strength of American influence with the members of the U.N. and the O.A.S. is irrelevant to the righteousness of the position advanced by the United States. Finally, throughout the crisis, Kennedy displayed a sensitivity to the standards underlying the relevant international organizations, a sensitivity that suggests that American policy might have been altered if the United States had encountered well-founded objections from the international community.

That the United States might have altered its reaction to the Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba underscores the wide range of choice available to the United States. In realistic terms, the choices ranged between the extremes of doing nothing and initiating a nuclear exchange. From the American perspective, though, this range of choice was qualified by a belief that the Soviet Union's deceit should not be condoned, either as a means of serving their national interests or of formulating exchange proposals—a belief that led Kennedy to resist Stevenson's early suggestion that the United States enter a *quid pro quo* agreement whereby the Soviet Union would dismantle its missiles in Cuba in exchange for the dismantling of American missiles in Turkey. The range of choice available to the United States was qualified also by Kennedy's presumption against resorting to violence, a presumption that required considerable refutation before he would discard it. For President Kennedy endorsed Robert Kennedy's observation that it would be a "Pearl Harbor in reverse" if the president approved a surprise attack on a small nation and that such approval would undermine the United States' moral leadership in the world; on this basis, Kennedy rejected proposals for a mass invasion of Cuba or a surgical airstrike.

President Kennedy's actions revealed a desire to economize on violence—a conviction that if violence or force appeared to be efficacious, it was desirable to insure that it was necessary and to decrease the possibility of the violence escalating beyond what was necessary. In this sense, Kennedy's decision to impose a quarantine conformed to the precept that a nation may undertake only reasonable steps to protect its security. Since there was no overt violence or aggression by either Cuba or the Soviet Union, any immediate resort to violence by the United States would have been unwarranted and would have unnecessarily inflicted a loss of lives and risked nuclear warfare. The choice of the quarantine consequently enabled the United States to employ minimum force, with international approval, to persuade the Soviet Union that its placement of offensive missiles in Cuba jeopardized American security interests.

It is difficult to postulate the precise danger that the Soviet missiles in Cuba would have posed to the United States had they become operative. It is equally difficult to speculate intelligently about whether the Soviet influence over the United States or other nations actually would have been enhanced and, if so, whether the expansion of that influence would have so seriously undermined the United States' security as to justify the imposition of the quarantine. From a moral perspective, it is sufficient that Kennedy had substantial justification to believe the danger was real and that his interpretation was generally accepted by the international community. In this light, the quarantine was the means adopted to remove the apparent danger and secure the

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status quo ante. The quarantine was legitimized by established procedures and its execution conformed with generally accepted standards of international behavior.

To conclude that the United States' response to the construction of Soviet missiles in Cuba conformed to certain moral standards of international behavior, however, is not to assume that those who formulated that response had the right to do so. For the obligations of the respective participants as well as the established procedures for securing legitimacy for their actions change when the focus of analysis shifts from the international to the national setting. To recognize a nation's right to be secure from external aggression is not to identify the individuals who have the moral right to determine how that security can best be attained. Thus, that the United States adopted certain procedures in implementing its response to the Cuban missile crisis—procedures designed to insure the sanction of international institutions and international law—does not in any way imply that John Kennedy had the primary, let alone sole, responsibility for deciding what procedures to adopt. Only in the sense that the United States' actions on the international scene embodied some of Kennedy's decisions can the president's actions be considered in the same framework.

In announcing the quarantine and in communicating with other nations, Kennedy unquestionably was acknowledged as the spokesman for a nation, not the single voice of a limited office or one opinion among many. The underlying issue, then, is whether Kennedy's assumption of total responsibility for the United States' response conformed to the obligations and privileges accorded his office by the Constitution and the American political system.

In light of his constitutional responsibility as the commander in chief of the armed forces and as the principal force behind the nation's foreign policy, a president is normally expected by the citizenry to assume a primary responsibility in preserving the national security. Abraham Lincoln was perhaps the first president effectively to consolidate and broaden the powers of the office in times of national crisis. In the twentieth century, such consolidation has not been an unusual experience when national security or critical national interests were threatened by foreign powers. Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Dwight Eisenhower did not hesitate to invoke the full scope of their constitutional obligations to expand power and responsibility when they believed national security interests depended on it.

By the 1960s, moreover, technological advances had not only considerably decreased the communication distances between nations; they had also decreased the time necessary for nations to destroy one another physically. Consequently, in the event that nuclear exchanges were threatened, the need for the president's expertise and dispatch was underscored: with the resources of the nation at his command in times of national crisis, the president had the mobility to exhaust every means to check sudden, external aggression, and the expectation of his constituency that he would do so.

John Kennedy, therefore, had ample precedent and justification to believe that he possessed the primary responsibility to thwart any sudden initiative by the Soviet Union that threatened American security or peace in the Western Hemisphere. Here the standard for the president's behavior, although somewhat amorphous, offered indications concerning Kennedy's obligations. Had he permitted the Soviet Union to install the missiles, a nuclear war might have been avoided without creating any tensions. But if the American public interpreted the presence of the missiles as a threat, peace could not have guaranteed public support of Kennedy's position. Indeed, if the maintenance of Soviet missiles in Cuba instilled fear in the American public—as Kennedy believed it would—public confidence in his ability as the steward of the people would have been seriously undermined; cooperation with the public and with other political bodies, a critical factor in any president's power to cope with a crisis, would have been ex-

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tremely difficult, if not impossible. No doubt Kennedy's interpretation was partly confirmed by his meeting with congressmen shortly before the public announcement of the quarantine. At that meeting, many congressmen were critical of Kennedy's limited response and urged him to take stronger military action.

But the issue is not whether Kennedy's policy preserved the security of his American constituency; rather, it is whether his behavior conformed to the limits of his legitimate power. For the power to declare war is constitutionally vested in Congress. Only that body, collectively representing the popular will (in theory at least), could sanction the entry of the United States into armed conflict with another nation.

With our hindsight, it is clear that Kennedy never actually usurped the constitutional power of the Congress; but his actions in establishing the quarantine and in threatening to remove unilaterally the Soviet missiles in Cuba divested Congress of the freedom to decide whether armed conflict was necessary. In effect, Congress' power to declare war was so seriously diluted by Kennedy that it could only approve or disapprove the president's actions.

Nor is this observation affected by the joint resolution adopted by the Congress on October 3, 1962, prior to the discovery of the offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba. That resolution, adopted without initiatives or pressure from the White House, expressed only the United States' determination to prevent the development of a situation in Cuba that would threaten the security of the United States. It did not, and under our constitutional amending process could not, sanction any presidential decision that would emasculate or ignore Congress' constitutional power to declare war. Hence, while the Congress was regularly consulted about administration policy toward Cuba before the discovery of the missiles on October 16, such consultations could not replace the president's obligation to respect the Congress' constitutional war-making power in responding to a specific situation. That Congress might have agreed with the president if consulted, or that the Congress might have approved the president's course of action, does not dissipate the question. For the test of legitimacy is not the efficacy of the president's policy; the question is whether he alone could legitimately represent the American people in risking armed confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In establishing his Executive Committee, Kennedy obviously sought the benefits of consultation without the inevitable delay and probable inefficiency of most congressional debates. Thus, Kennedy invited competent men of divergent backgrounds and opinions to share his councils of war. That many viewpoints were represented at these meetings, and that they were carefully considered by Kennedy before he made any decision, can, in retrospect, assuage the troubled conscience of those who view with alarm the president's ability to assume dictatorial powers in times of national crisis.

At the moment the "crisis" was identified, however, there was no assurance that Kennedy would consult with these men or that he would consider their analyses in formulating and implementing his decisions. Furthermore, these individuals were much less qualified to represent the American people than was the president—none was elected to office in his own right, some were not even officials of the government, and all served at the grace of the president. At no point did the American people—whose destiny Kennedy may have decided—have a real opportunity to voice opposition to his decisions, to express the belief that the gains of the quarantine did not merit the risks of armed confrontation, or to modify his course of action in any way.

In the final analysis, though, Kennedy's choices were limited by his interpretation of his obligations, an interpretation challenged by few of the subsequent studies. (For those who did challenge Kennedy on this point, see Ronald Steel, "Endgame: Kennedy and the Missile Crisis," *New York Review of Books* [March 13, 1969]; Dean Acheson, "Dean Acheson's Version of Robert Kennedy's Version of the Cuban Mis-

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sile Affair," *Esquire* Magazine [February, 1969]; and I. F. Stone, *In a Time of Torment* [1966].) Kennedy believed that resorting to constitutional procedures for declaring war would be disadvantageous in two respects. First, there was no immediate necessity to declare war, and second, any deference to congressional bodies probably would have reduced needed flexibility—particularly since Congress' response was bound to be more militant than Kennedy's. On the other hand, for him to do nothing, Kennedy thought, would weaken the respect he would command from Congress and the public as the crisis evolved, or in any future test of presidential leadership. Neither wishing to risk the human cost of war, nor wanting to dilute the inherent mobility and resources of his office, Kennedy therefore felt constrained to adopt a compromise position that, he hoped, would avoid the conflict between the presidential and the congressional spheres of duty. The quarantine allowed him to meet his obligation as commander in chief without technically encroaching on Congress' obligation to assess whether the United States should engage in a war.

Yet when there is a risk of armed confrontation or perhaps a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, the president's reliance on technicalities may not suffice. This is not to suggest that Kennedy's avoidance of Congress at the crucial moment was based on fallacious reasoning; rather, it is to question the support that this avoidance may give to future presidential decisions. For the danger of Kennedy's resolution of the Cuban missile crisis is that one human being had the final responsibility to decide a matter that could have determined the fate of 185 million others. Surely this is one possibility that the Founding Fathers tried to guard against by bestowing upon Congress the authority to declare war (although undoubtedly the Founding Fathers never contemplated a nuclear holocaust).

The drama of the Cuban missile crisis thus contains the seeds of tragedy. For, like a classical Greek drama, the Cuban missile crisis reflected a tension between two forces that could not be easily reconciled: the power of the president to protect the nation's security, and the constitutional authority of Congress to determine whether a situation demands a declaration of war. While one can understand the convergence of Kennedy's obligations and fears, one can nevertheless realize what an awesome burden he assumed, a burden initially designed by the American political system to be shared by Congress and the citizenry in the crucible of leadership.

From the perspective of the American political system, the lesson of the missile crisis should be equally evident. For the contingency of inflicting mass violence on another nation—and that nation's retaliation of violence on the United States—need not rest on irrational hysteria or accident. Rather, the system's Achilles heel appears to be that another president, like Kennedy, could rationally conclude that his obligation to maintain national security required the unrestricted use of violence, but might adopt procedures for formulation and implementation that would preclude his testing the soundness of his rationale.

To hypothesize, in a situation similar to the Cuban missile crisis, there is little to guard against the possibility that President Nixon could consult with only a few advisers and subsequently conclude that the risk of war—although unfortunate—was necessary. The wheels of human destruction might then begin to grind before further analysis and debate could illuminate the source of any miscalculation. The reality of this possibility is in fact suggested by Nixon's decisions to invade Cambodia on May 1, 1970, and to attempt a rescue of American P.O.W.'s by invading North Vietnam in October, 1970. In both cases, Nixon consulted with only a few advisers before making his decision; in neither case was the public or the Congress consulted or informed before the implementation of the decision.

That the danger and immorality of a potential miscalculation received inadequate consideration by President Kennedy did not contradict the realities. The likelihood of this miscalculation was made more real by the fact that Kennedy employed similar

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unilateral decisions to escalate the American involvement in South Vietnam. Such decisions underscored an unfortunate irony in Kennedy's presidency. Eager to involve the citizenry in the crucial decisions and issues of his administration, he was unable always to provide a meaningful avenue for such participation; in these instances, he therefore found it easier to resort to vague notions of executive responsibility to justify the decisions made solely within the confines of his office. And only rarely were the people aroused to protest their exclusion. Indeed, in American society, where criticizing the president is as fashionable as it is valuable, there still remains a remarkable faith among the populace as a whole—a faith that in the ultimate tests of leadership, as in the Cuban missile crisis, the presidency will be the focus of rational processes and morality, that the folly of man's history will somehow be avoided by an individual president's decisions. The fate of the United States, as well as that of the world's peoples, may one day rest on whether that faith is well-founded or merely the product of delusion and wish fulfillment.

Say Friend

JUDITH JOHNSON SHERWIN

were it the better way
to give you what i know you prize
drown myself in your will, erase
my mind, my individual taste,
all that i am break for your eyes
voice, honesty, submerge, give place
to what you love and i half hate
though i gave all my self away
what should you find to take

oh were it now the heart of wit
and not mere prudence or a dream
to turn and offer what i am,
love still, although you're bound to hate,
trust all to your practiced grace
that you will not turn away from it
but bend and leave your accustomed ways
to love me for love's sake

✪ JUDITH JOHNSON SHERWIN'S third book, *Impossible Buildings: Poems,* is, she writes, "in New York looking for a publisher." Her second volume, *Uranium Poems,* appeared in the Yale Series of Younger Poets.

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A Conversation with René Clair

CHARLES THOMAS SAMUELS

Master of film comedy, René Clair made perfect cinematic jokes both before and after sound, although his earliest theories (gathered in *Reflections on the Cinema,* 1953) seemed to preclude the changeover. Whether because he has been so adaptable, or because his films hide their formal rigor in trifling plots, or because lucid elegance doesn't appeal to our apocalyptic tastes, René Clair is the one Old Master neglected today even by film buffs. If we look at *The Italian Straw Hat* (1928), however, or *Under the Roofs of Paris* (1930), or *A Nous La Liberté* (1931), or *Beauties of the Night* (1952), or his best film, *The Million* (1931), we learn that error can deprive us of joy.

At seventy-three, Clair is a man of such vitality that I could not believe, as he told me during a talk in Paris, that he had run out of ideas. At the very least, his talent is taking new forms: another book on cinema, published two years ago in Paris and now available in translation *(Cinema Yesterday and Today);* the adaptation of an Elizabethan play on which he was working when we met.

Our conversation, conducted in English, which he speaks with proud command of the more indecorous colloquialisms, ranged over his quarter-century career in films and many of the artistic opportunities that he was among the first to contemplate and seize. Of the two parts of our discussion, the more general is here reproduced as it will appear in my book, *Encountering Directors,* which G. P. Putnam will publish in the fall of 1972.

I began our talk by raising a question that had been on my mind ever since I had started trying to see the complete films of twelve directors. To my surprise, I discovered that even the artist didn't have access to his work.

CHARLES THOMAS SAMUELS: I've been amazed at how difficult it is to locate prints of a given director's films. How is it that a man of your stature doesn't possess copies of his work? It's as if a famous writer didn't own any copies of his books.

RENÉ CLAIR: It's very easy to keep a book; films are different. The object itself doesn't belong to you. However, although I don't own my films, I sometimes have control over their distribution.

SAMUELS: Don't producers feel, even though they own the film, that you, the creator, ought to have a copy?

CLAIR: Producers have no such feeling, but you could get a print by making it a clause in your contract. I never tried.

SAMUELS: In *Reflections on the Cinema,* you say that cinema is what can't be expressed in words, yet as your career progresses you increasingly use dialogue. Was this by choice or necessity?

CLAIR: Like all aspects of show business, a film is made in collaboration with the public. I have always maintained that if the Elizabethan public had not been gifted with genius we would have no Shakespeare or Marlowe. Theoretically, I believe that films should be expressed more by images than sound, but I don't believe that the public today would understand a completely silent picture.

✪ CHARLES THOMAS SAMUELS, a member of the department of English at Williams College, writes on films and filmmaking in each issue of the SCHOLAR.

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SAMUELS: Don't you think many directors today—Antonioni, for example—depend more on gesture than on dialogue and that avant-garde cinema is advancing by going back to silent film technique?

CLAIR: If you're right, I'm glad. But most pictures today owe more to radio than to film technique. You could black out the images and nothing would be lost.

SAMUELS: You've said that the script is the most important element in a film. What then did you mean by "script"?

CLAIR: Everything: ideas, inventions . . . everything that you must plan before you begin shooting. Of course, this mustn't keep you from having new ideas during the filming, but the basis must be firm.

SAMUELS: You've said that at the beginning of your career you improvised less than later on. Is that true?

CLAIR: No. I meant to say that I prepared my films very carefully at the beginning because I wasn't sure of myself. But now my scripts have very few technical indications. I describe what image must accompany the dialogue, but never how the shot is to be taken. I have that worked out in my mind, because, since I write my scripts myself, I always know how I want things to look.

SAMUELS: Yes, you are one of cinema's most important writers. Being so fundamentally that, why did you choose to make films rather than plays?

CLAIR: Pure accident. I was a journalist who aspired to be a writer; I would have written plays had I not happened into the motion picture world. I played a few parts in some amateur films and then was asked to act in others. You see, I am a kind of prostitute: I discovered that I could make more money in films. But since I was such a bad actor, I quickly realized that my future lay behind the camera. Bit by bit, I became fascinated with the medium. Then I began writing scripts. I don't know why they call me a director; I have never directed anything I didn't write.

SAMUELS: Isn't that the only way to be a great director?

CLAIR: No, there are great directors in Hollywood who have never written a line: John Ford, George Cukor.

SAMUELS: I don't agree. Carol Reed is a great director without writing his own scripts, but I can't think of anyone else. Even Hitchcock, although he doesn't write the dialogue, effectively creates his own scenarios.

CLAIR: Yes, I suppose that most important directors collaborate on the scripts, but direction itself is a separate thing.

SAMUELS: What are the gifts that can insure greatness for a director who doesn't work on his scripts?

CLAIR: I don't know. But let me give you an example, which I discuss in my latest book, of the difference between writing and directing. In Howard Hawks's *Scarface* there is a brilliant scene when the young scarface discovers his first machine gun. He is in a room full of billiard cues; he takes up the gun and "kills" them all in a row.

SAMUELS: We'd say "mows them down."

CLAIR: Exactly. It's a splendid image. Well now, who is its author? When I went to New York and met Ben Hecht and Charlie MacArthur, who had written the script, I asked them whose idea that was. The answer is not the man who staged the scene but the writers who placed it in the scenario.

SAMUELS: That's a problem in judging a director, isn't it? Finding out just how much of his brilliance really is his?

CLAIR: That's why it's stupid to write, as they do in Europe, a film by so and so. The English or American terminology is much better: written by—, from a play by—, adapted by—, produced by—, directed by—. Then you know—approximately—who did what. In my case, the film is really mine. And I must also admit that most of the young interesting directors in France today write as well as direct their films. But in Hollywood . . . I remember when I was at Paramount discussing scripts with a producer—a very nice man, by the way—and he presented me with a subject Paramount owned, saying, "René, would you be interested in filming this?" I replied, "Let me write it first and then I will tell you if it is suitable." He said, "René, I don't understand you: are you a director or a writer?" That typified the Hollywood mentality.

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SAMUELS: In fact, you've called the Hollywood system of filmmaking the "Irving Thalberg School." But, unlike most European directors, you don't hate Hollywood. What did you like about it?

CLAIR: The technical facilities. The great difficulty was agreeing on a subject, but once you got past that hurdle, everything was a dream because of the wonderful technicians.

SAMUELS: A friend of Antonioni's explained the failure of *Zabriskie Point* by saying that MGM gave him too much money. The facilities worked against him, almost paralyzing his imagination.

CLAIR: You can always turn money down. The greater difficulty is getting it.

SAMUELS: Although you don't hate Hollywood, you've deplored the fragmentation of control. How did you manage to make René Clair films there?

CLAIR: I never did. Everything was a compromise between what I wanted to do and what I could do. My system of self-protection, however, was very simple. I saw some of my American colleagues selling themselves body and soul until nothing was left, so I simply turned down offers. I lost money; that was the only way.

SAMUELS: Which of your American films do you think most characteristic?

CLAIR: It's difficult to say. Probably, that little picture, *I Married a Witch*.

SAMUELS: I'd say *The Flame of New Orleans*.

CLAIR: That was a terrific flop!

SAMUELS: But it has wonderful things in it, although Marlene Dietrich didn't seem right for you.

CLAIR: One American critic wrote that I had contrived to parody her. But she understood this. I didn't do it against her will. When Norman Krasna and I wrote the script, we intended that it be ironic: a romance with a sense of humor. Perhaps that's what surprised the public; they didn't know quite how to take it.

SAMUELS: Why did you go to Hollywood in the first place?

CLAIR: On account of a certain man called Hitler. I was in France preparing a picture when the country was invaded. Between Hitler and Hollywood, I decided to choose Hollywood.

SAMUELS: Was Dietrich your original choice for the part?

CLAIR: I was her choice. She was under contract to Universal, when I approached them because I wanted to make a picture with Deanna Durbin and W. C. Fields. Joe Pasternak, who was the producer, said, "Look, I'd like to work with you, but Deanna is not free now. Why don't you make a picture with Marlene Dietrich?" I said, "I don't think she's my type of actress." "Why don't you talk to the writer?" Pasternak asked, so I did. In front of Pasternak, Norman Krasna, whom I did not know at the time, began outlining the story. I nodded approval, but when I got home I called Krasna and said, "Your idea is very interesting, but it is what I call a Producer's Synopsis. You have no idea how to shoot it." Then Krasna, who was very charming, said, "Mr. Clair, I see that you're someone who understands motion pictures." He then called Pasternak and told him to hire me.

SAMUELS: I have another idea why the film failed. It breaks in the middle. It starts out as an ironic comedy about sexual opportunism and then becomes a stock Hollywood romance.

CLAIR: Probably.

SAMUELS: Was this forced on you?

CLAIR: Nothing was forced on me. Norman and I were completely free.

SAMUELS: In general, you treat sex distantly and tenderly. But in *The Flame of New Orleans* it is treated in a typically American way: with lots of leering *double-entendre*. Was this conscious on your part?

CLAIR: No, it was a result of my collaboration with Norman. It was his style and, of course, whenever I worked outside of France I relied on my collaborators. That's why I never attempted, in England or America, a naturalistic film.

SAMUELS: Because you felt that you didn't understand the mores?

CLAIR: I had seen so many foreign directors make pictures in France that I felt to be completely false that I was very careful not to do the same thing elsewhere.

SAMUELS: Perhaps that's why there are

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unconsciously insulting portrayals of blacks in both *The Flame of New Orleans* and *The Ghost Goes West.* For example, in *The Ghost,* when they have a party and the blacks come out playing calypso . . .

CLAIR: That wasn't an insult. It was intended to show the contrast between the old romantic castle and the modern millionaire who celebrates his possession of it with jazz.

SAMUELS: The maid in *The Flame of New Orleans* is a cliché.

CLAIR: Just the opposite. The professionals were shocked because in American films at that time one always showed a black maid as a fat woman. Instead, we picked a lovely young girl; everyone on the film fell in love with her. We were considered too pro-Negro.

SAMUELS: Wouldn't her subjugation to Marlene Dietrich now be thought condescending?

CLAIR: She was a maid! We had trouble with the Hays office over her character. When the old woman gives Marlene sexual advice before her wedding, the maid gives a look saying how little the advice is needed. The Hays office wanted that cut.

SAMUELS: Did you often encounter censorship troubles?

CLAIR: Once or twice.

SAMUELS: The other problem in the film is Bruce Cabot. Why did you use him?

CLAIR: That was a mistake made by me and my agent. Hollywood at that time was a machine for producing films; they wouldn't wait until someone else was available for the part. I made a test of Cabot that was rather good, but no doubt he wasn't a good choice; he lacked subtlety.

SAMUELS: Did he follow your directions?

CLAIR: Yes, but as William Wyler told Norman, "René is a great director, but there are certain things even a great director cannot do."

SAMUELS: You've said that audiences have collective genius, that when they cough they show a problem that must be corrected. This suggests that you accept the masses as arbiters, but it seems to me that some of your finest effects can be appreciated only by the connoisseur.

CLAIR: The role of art is to be accepted by the masses while being appreciated by the connoisseur. Consider the great masterpieces of the motion pictures: *The Gold Rush, Potemkin.* Many things in those films are not seen the same way by the public and by the connoisseurs, but both audiences see that the films are great.

SAMUELS: What about great films that don't have a mass appeal?

CLAIR: Von Stroheim?

SAMUELS: I was thinking of more recent works, like *Diary of a Country Priest* or *L'Avventura.* Do you think it's a shortcoming that they lack mass appeal?

CLAIR: Not a shortcoming. Probably they are too literary for the masses. If they were closer to the older style, they would be more popular.

SAMUELS: But these films do emphasize action over words. For example, remember that scene in *L'Avventura* where Ferzetti is inquiring in the hotel while Monica Vitti stands outside and is surrounded by an ogling crowd of men? This is all action, but the meaning isn't explicit. You see, I think the problem is subtlety of meaning, whereas you and Chaplin and Eisenstein worked to make things completely clear.

CLAIR: Always! I always considered film a mass art. If you included something for the connoisseur, that was fine; but first the film must be understood by the masses. In the history of films practically every cinematic landmark was also a popular success.

SAMUELS: Do you think that sound films are less suited than silent films for comedy?

CLAIR: It all depends on what you call comedy. If you mean the sophisticated genre one associates with a director like Lubitsch, then sound is all right. But the true comic art disappeared when sound came in.

SAMUELS: I'm interested in your opinion of certain recent comedies.

CLAIR: I'm no critic.

SAMUELS: You don't have to answer. What do you think of *Smiles of a Summer Night*?

CLAIR: I don't give opinions about contemporaries. Let me tell you, it's not just a matter of tact. I don't see enough pictures, and it is unfair to offer a judgment based

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on fewer films than those seen by a professional critic.

SAMUELS: Every director I meet tells me he doesn't go to the movies.

CLAIR: I don't either.

SAMUELS: Why not?

CLAIR: You ask the question at the wrong time because I saw three films last week. But usually I don't go. Before I see a film, I want to be practically certain that it will be good, because when I see a bad picture it discourages me so that I never want to make another film. But when I see a good film, I think, "For God's sake, I wouldn't have thought of that! How I wish I could do something like that." And then I want to get to work again.

SAMUELS: I hope you'll give me an opinion on one contemporary because I'm puzzled about him. All the directors I've interviewed have nothing good to say about each other, but they all say good thngs about Godard.

CLAIR: I never answer about contemporaries. They all like Godard?

SAMUELS: They hate each other, but they like Godard.

CLAIR: I don't hate anyone.

SAMUELS: In *Reflections on the Cinema,* you said that Vittorio De Sica was Chaplin's most authentic successor. What did you mean by that?

CLAIR: I was not speaking of the comic Chaplin; I was speaking of that singular emotion that you find in him and in the early De Sica. There is a good example in *Umberto D.* that I have often cited to show the difference between dialogue and visual invention. The old professor who has no money and sees a beggar in the street realizes that he could make some money in this way. Then we have a five-minute sequence in which there is no speech. We see that he is ashamed to beg, because when a man comes by he removes his outstretched hand and pretends to be searching for something in his pocket. That same quality you find in the last scene of *City Lights,* when the girl is blind.

SAMUELS: What about De Sica's latest films?

CLAIR: Ah, Vittorio makes too many pictures. They are well directed, but one does not see the genius of De Sica in them.

SAMUELS: I am interested in your condescension toward suspense films. That genre and yours are so similar in their musicality. Why do you find it unimportant?

CLAIR: Not unimportant, facile. I don't want to speak of others, so let me give you a personal example. I made a picture a few years ago called *The Grand Maneuvers,* which was very difficult to write because it's a love story. When two people are in love, if they go to bed, it's the end of the picture; if they don't, what the hell are they waiting for! So I had to find a lot of complications, and the script took me almost a year to write. My next picture was *Gate of Paris,* which I made from a novel I had bought. A gangster is hidden in the cellar with a machine gun under his jacket and two innocent people are playing cards upstairs, although they know he is down there. Four weeks to write!

SAMUELS: There's a problem in that film. Henri Vidal is so convincing in his love for Dany Carrel that I can't believe it when the plot shows he lied.

CLAIR: For me, he isn't convincing.

SAMUELS: He acts out his love so well.

CLAIR: In order to trick her.

SAMUELS: There's a difference between convincing another character of what you don't believe and convincing the audience.

CLAIR: Vidal was too practiced a lover.

SAMUELS: Did your early work as an actor teach you anything about directing them?

CLAIR: A little. First, you should never get angry, because if you do you paralyze the actor. You should always try to be as kind as possible, even when you are furious. You say, "That was very good; now let's try to do it a little better." That's about all; the rest I learned while directing. When you write, you have an ideal of what the character is going to be like, and then one day you meet the actor who will incarnate him. You should never force the actor to match that original image, because he cannot. The greatest law of directing is never to force an actor to do what he cannot; you must collaborate with his abilities.

SAMUELS: You often remind me of Hitch-

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cock when you speak of editing, of your control over shot length and sequence, as the essence of directing. Don't you think this idea differentiates those who came to cinema in the silent era from those whose background is theatrical?

CLAIR: It's possible. When I was in Hollywood, a head producer would see rushes of six or seven films a day, and the average director shot five thousand feet, whereas I only shot five hundred. The producers thought I was crazy. One day, without telling me, one of them went to my cutter and asked if I had a film, because it was considered phenomenal in those days to produce one without shooting much more than was necessary. Most Hollywood directors shot everything from every conceivable angle. As a result, the producer could put the film together as he wanted to. But I always knew exactly how much I needed and how it would be assembled. That's why I wasn't interfered with; because there was nothing left over from which they could choose. Lubitsch worked the same way.

SAMUELS: Hitchcock uses a jigsaw method of editing that keeps anyone but him from knowing how to put the film together.

CLAIR: You need something like that in Hollywood.

SAMUELS: It is well known that asynchronism—contradiction between image and sound track—is fundamental to your style. But why have you said that it should never go to the extreme we find in a commentary?

CLAIR: First, because I invented the trick, and it was a dangerous invention since it makes things too easy for a director lacking in imagination. He can have the voice-over say "And since then he fell in love," when he should find the means to show this.

SAMUELS: You told Bernard Pastor that cinema was in a period of stagnation. What would you like to see happen in the future?

CLAIR: I've discussed that in my newest book. It's amazing that an industry that has existed for seventy-five years still maintains its original methods at a time when everything else is changing. Cinema remains a machine, a light, and a white sheet. But this, which might be called a "crisis," is really a phase in the medium's evolution. As I say in my book, cinema resembles that other powerful, although more lucrative, industry: the automobile. They were born at the same time and neither has adapted to the pace of invention. After all, the automobile is still based on that stupid internal combustion machine, which has proved a disaster for mankind.

To take the simplest example: distribution. By using videotape, we can send the same film to a thousand theaters at the same time. In our stupidity, we are still carrying those cans of film from theater to theater.

SAMUELS: There's even been talk of computerized transmission. But I take it you are speaking of the industry and not of the art.

CLAIR: In the mass media, art is wholly dependent on technical possibilities. Forty years ago, we couldn't talk about television. Even now, some other invention is on the way that we cannot foresee.

SAMUELS: While we are on the subject of distribution, why haven't some of your films been distributed in the United States? I think, for example, of *Les Fêtes Galantes.*

CLAIR: *Les Fêtes Galantes* came at a time when all the distributors wanted to see was ass. In *Les Fêtes Galantes,* which is by no means my best picture, at the very beginning there is a scene where the hero takes the princess, who is disguised as a shepherdess, and lays her down on the straw. At that point, I cut away. If I had just waited three minutes longer, the picture would have been sold.

SAMUELS: There's your television! Movie producers feel they have to seduce people away from their sets, and the main difference between movies now and TV is nudity!

CLAIR: That won't be true for long.

SAMUELS: How do you feel about criticism of your films?

CLAIR: I am glad when the reviews are good. When they are bad, it is either my fault or the reviewer was in a bad mood. For the most part, I think I've been well treated by critics and historians.

SAMUELS: Your films are defined as much by what they exclude as include. There are political sentiments expressed by your char-

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acters, but no politics or contemporary problems; there are love affairs, but no graphic sex; people fight, but there are no wars, et cetera. Are these exclusions dictated by temperament or by your artistic goals?

CLAIR: That's for someone else to decide. I don't think an artist can analyze his own choices.

SAMUELS: Do you disagree with my statement?

CLAIR: Not at all.

SAMUELS: You've usually avoided location shooting except. . .

CLAIR: If I were a historian of the cinema, I would say: "M. Clair likes to invent everything"—speaking as a historian, mind you—"it was probably unconscious, but it gave all his films a certain style." Even in a naturalistic work, like *Under the Roofs of Paris,* sets provide an atmosphere that could never be obtained if I had shot in the streets. They compose reality, and that is my definition of art.

SAMUELS: Do you think that contemporary audiences can accept painted sets?

CLAIR: Anything will be accepted if it is well done.

SAMUELS: I find you very candid in self-criticism. For example, you included in your volume of four screenplays strictures against each of the films. Why is that so easy for you?

CLAIR: Probably because I am never satisfied with what I do. In fact, I don't like to see my old pictures. I always think, "Why wasn't that better done?" "My God, that's too slow." I even think I get a sort of sadistic pleasure out of criticizing my old films.

SAMUELS: Do you think that the cameraman has a crucial effect on the style of the film that he shoots for you?

CLAIR: The cameraman, the art director, all the chief collaborators influence a film. Film is a collaborative art.

SAMUELS: What are the disadvantages and advantages of working in color?

CLAIR: First of all, I don't think that black and white will completely disappear. In art, color engravings never made black and white obsolete. For some technical or economic reason, however, color may win out in films.

SAMUELS: I think producers are now forcing directors to shoot in color because they think that this novelty value is necessary to combat TV.

CLAIR: It's true that a public accustomed to color will find black and white dull. But black and white contains gradations of shading impossible in color. It is also a more artistic method because it transforms reality and requires more invention in lighting.

SAMUELS: But it's easier to do well, isn't it? I've seen very few successful color films. When I look at the colors in this room, they harmonize because my eye naturally selects among them. On the screen, colors usually seem to clash. Color is almost too powerful a genie to be contained within the movie frame.

CLAIR: That's why I try to control it very carefully. I made two color films. In *The Grand Maneuvers* we tried to obtain a general impression of gray, which is very difficult because there is no gray in the color band. Gray is a sort of equilibrium between two other colors.

SAMUELS: Did you instinctively choose gray because it is the closest to black and white?

CLAIR: No. I had thought a good deal before I started working in color. Consider that painting over there. The painter's problem was to place a certain quantity of color in a certain space, but in the movies you must think not only of space but also of time. In the painting, that pink is interesting because it works with that bit of green near the bottom of the frame. But in a film, where images follow each other, a brilliant yellow can become a problem because it is followed ten seconds later by a blue. Therefore, when I made my first color film I depended on gray to give unity and preclude shocks. But I must say neither the public nor the critics gave a damn. Maybe two or three people noticed that there had been an effort to control color in that film. In *Les Fêtes Galantes* my art director and I based our colors on the palette of Braque: brown, gray, a little yellow, oc-

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casionally a pink. That was rather well done, but nobody noticed it either.

SAMUELS: Isn't that because artists discover things long before the public or critics realize what has happened?

CLAIR: Maybe. But, you know, neither of them understands photography. If you show them a camel flying in the sky—which is an absolute cinch to produce—they say, "What a wonderful piece of photography!" But if you show them a low-lighted picture with all the details distinct—something very difficult—they aren't impressed. This isn't important though, because sets and photography shouldn't be noticed; it's the action that counts!

SAMUELS: There's a growing tendency among directors to dispense with music. Music is essential in your films. What do you think of this tendency?

CLAIR: I myself use music less and less. In a naturalistic film I never use music unless it's coming from something like characters singing. But in a work like *Beauties of the Night* music is my language.

SAMUELS: Your use of music is as significant as your asynchronism, although it has received less attention. I think, for example, of *Under the Roofs of Paris,* where the music at the beginning is the sound of the rain. You seem always to want to rationalize music.

CLAIR: You saw that little scene at the beginning where people are running in the rain and the boys approach the girl? I thought that had disappeared from all copies of the print.

SAMUELS: It's available in America.

CLAIR: In most places, the film starts with that long tracking-in to the set.

SAMUELS: But that's terrible. . .

CLAIR: You don't have to tell me! Probably it was cut somewhere and someone saw it that way and so when he sent the film on he forgot to send the first reel. This is a crazy business!

SAMUELS: Are you planning to make any more films?

CLAIR: I have no ideas and no money.

SAMUELS: I hope you get both soon.

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PASSION AND POLITICS: Student Activism in America. *By Seymour Martin Lipset and Gerald M. Schaflander. Little, Brown. $8.95.*

Reviewed by RONALD S. BERMAN

There are really two separate books involved here, put under the same cover by editorial judgment or caprice. One of them, the first part, continues Professor Lipset's work on intellectual politics. It is related to his *Politics of Unreason,* a study of extremism on the right, and has been published separately in paperback under the title *Rebellion in the University.* The other book, by Mr. Schaflander, is in part an analysis of the student style of life and an apologia for his own. It will not stand up to analysis, and perhaps the best thing is simply to note in closing what its failings are.

There are discussions in Lipset's section that should be fundamental to future research on students, their politics and, indeed, their identity as a historical and social group. I had thought I was reasonably familiar with work on what may now be called the youth industry, but simply in terms of organized information this added a great deal to what I imagined I knew. The most important discussions center on student activism in the past and the strange alliance between students and their ideological models.

Lipset's chapters on the history of college education point out something not often understood: far from being unique in what we have gone through, we share the experience of youthful rebellion with other periods in our history. Since the early part of the nineteenth century there have been occurrences of violence on campus and movements involving both political radicalism and conscious attempts to affront the governing ethic by experimental and revolutionary sexual behavior. Of particular interest, of course, is the twentieth-century phase of this history, and Lipset provides a remarkably readable gallery of exhibits. He is alive to things going well beyond the political: the effect, for example, of *Dadaism* and the youthful *weltschmerz* of the twenties. Our own feelings and responses to collegiate rebellion were anticipated by Christian Gauss who argued that "the long-distance telephone, wireless, jazz, bobbed hair, brain storm, the bootlegger, the hijacker, the airplane, the airship, antitoxins, the flapper, camouflage, propaganda, the automobile" all provided elements of experience irreducible to the student mind. It was the nature of modernity itself, Gauss suggested, to destroy our moral equipoise. In this he anticipated our own jeremiads and probably isolated at least one of the meaningful variables.

The historical content, although satisfying, is probably not as important as Lipset's attempt to formulate and theorize. His account of the troubled relationship of faculty and students offers a good deal to those who would go beyond the correlation of a single variable and certain colorful symptoms. He begins with the premise, elaborated in his previous studies of the academy, that there has accumulated in the scholarly profession a basic set of attitudes toward society and the self. The intellectual

✪ RONALD S. BERMAN was appointed Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities in December. His most recent book is *America in the Sixties: An Intellectual History.*

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

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is now defined by the nature of his opposition to things as they are. By a process of self-selection, by adherence to certain modes of behavior and ideology the intellectual has established at least to his own satisfaction the necessity for opposing established institutions. Such attitudes can often lie dormant, or be expressed by unpolitical means. The recent series of crises in American education has, however, enabled their public realization. Part of the fascination of Lipset's work resides in its tracing an attitude to the point where it becomes a program. The major points that he raises are essential to our comprehension of the academy: for example, increased emphasis on undergraduate teaching has revealed certain contradictions within our conception of the liberal life of the mind. The most socially concerned faculty turn out often to be those whose radicalism supports student ideology—but they are also those most deeply committed to research, which interferes with teaching, and to a hostile view of the university (or other institutions) simply because it represents an established social structure. They have little sympathy with the wish of the young to undertake their education within a context of traditional campus values—and rather bourgeois satisfactions. In the sixties, immediately after the wedding came the divorce: when faculty celebrated crises on the campus by praising the motives of their demonstrative charges they were in turn idolized. But when, as Lipset points out, they universally used such crises to lower teaching loads, to bargain for greater faculty power with administrations, they lost their temporary moral power. Part of the value of this discussion resides in its analysis of the new separation of interests between faculty and their students. In brief, the very set of attitudes that supported intellectual life seems now to have carried it once again away from effective political action, not to say effective relationships with undergraduates.

I wish it were possible to say of the second author that his work was equally useful and pleasurable. It is, however, simply a chaos of good intentions. There is a twenty-five-page account of Mr. Schaflander's being fired by one institution, and a collection of diatribes against others. There are some painfully innocent reflections on student politics, sex and drugs. Finally, his program for cultural and educational reform—the usual *olla podrida* of tearing down all we have and building up God only knows what—provides no guidance and ignores the Newtonian laws that operate even in the life of the mind. But it must be admitted that he has real sympathy for the student and obvious affection, which matters, for the way in which education is created.

The Poet, the Fallen Martyr, the Detective

COLLECTED WORKS OF EDGAR ALLAN POE. Volume 1, POEMS. *Edited by Thomas O. Mabbott. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. $15.*

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WHO MURDERED MARY ROGERS? *By Raymond Paul. Prentice-Hall. $6.95.*

Reviewed by WILLIAM GOLDHURST

Like almost anything else you can think of, scholarly work on Edgar Allan Poe seems headed in the direction of increased specialization, with new editions and biographical and critical volumes flowing down specific channels established some ten or twelve years ago. Since 1959 we have had three separate editions of Poe's poetry, two books on his editorial battles (three, if we include Perry Miller's more comprehensive study, *The Raven and the Whale*), and two volumes devoted to the Mary Rogers case, which Poe used as a source for his second Dupin story, "The Mystery of Marie

WILLIAM GOLDHURST, author of *F. Scott Fitzgerald and His Contemporaries* and editor of the anthology *Contours of Experience,* is associate professor of humanities at the University of Florida. He recently served as Fulbright Professor of American Literature at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina.

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

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Rogêt." Although there is still an obvious need for a good modern study of the total Poe, the recent pattern of specialization at least affords Poe buffs an opportunity to get to know certain areas in depth as never before.

The Harvard collection of Poe's poems, edited by the late T. O. Mabbott, is distinguished by its thoroughness, clarity, and ample documentation. More important perhaps is the highly readable quality of Mabbott's explanatory introductions and notes. The book was obviously designed not only to impress Poe scholars, but to help interested readers attain a better understanding of the poems by way of background material. This is enlivened by anecdotes, tableaux, dramatic scenes, facts and legends, and touches of pathos and humor. Mabbott's style gives a humane emphasis throughout to this first volume of the *Collected Works* (Harvard Press is preparing two more to complete the edition).

The section of the volume entitled "Annals" is Mabbott's painstakingly researched contribution to Poe biography; and as such (Mabbott was considered by many to be the ultimate authority) it will generate interest among students of Poe for many years to come. Generally speaking, his treatment of controversial points is full and well reasoned, while the entire account is free of the overly imaginative and jejune speculation that has tempted so many previous Poe biographers. Mabbott's use of certain sources, however, raises an interesting question—namely, can we accept as trustworthy information provided by a subject's enemies? The witnesses in this instance are Rufus Griswold and Thomas Dunn English, both of whom spread malicious lies about Poe during and after his lifetime. Mabbott's willingness to rely upon their testimony, even though he does so on occasions when it seems highly credible, will strike many informed readers as questionable procedure. On the other hand, seen in its best light this practice reflects Mabbott's objectivity and his freedom from the usual cant and prejudice.

Sidney Moss's *Poe's Major Crisis* is a study following up an earlier work by the same author, *Poe's Literary Battles* (1963). In the more recent volume, Moss has collected documents that detail the long-drawn-out exchange of insults that culminated in Poe's libel suit against the New York *Evening Mirror*. Included are editorial columns, newspaper notices, letters, legal records, and fragments of *roman à clef* novels in which Poe was savagely pilloried. Connecting links and prefaces supplied by Moss are helpful and unobtrusive. The documents themselves are artfully arranged to tell a coherent and powerful story, with an effect that is more moving and dramatic than one usually finds in collections of this sort. It is a grim narrative, showing how members of a New York literary clique ganged up on Poe and exposed all his weaknesses to public ridicule. Of course, he was by no means innocent himself, having commenced hostilities with a gratuitous, although relatively mild, assault on the Manhattan literati. But the rejoinder was merciless.

Even so, Moss exaggerates the effect of the feud on Poe's spirit and professional prospects. He would have us believe that Poe was ruined, or at least permanently disabled, by his run-in with New York columnists, that the episode as a whole was the major crisis of Poe's career and so demoralizing that it led to his death on the streets of Baltimore a few years later. Actually, Poe's life consisted of a series of such personal and professional crises, dating as far back as his break with John Allan in 1827 and continuing well into the period when his reputation was being attacked and defended after his death. In 1835 Poe was experiencing emotional difficulties so severe that his employer remarked to a friend that he would not be surprised if the young author were to attempt suicide. In 1842 Poe was in despair over his wife's physical breakdown. His own illness, as well as a lack of funds for operating expenses, forced him to close down the *Broadway Journal* soon after he had become its editor and proprietor in 1845. Yet Poe's temperament was such that he was able to emerge from periods of adversity with increased hope and confidence.

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

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Moss quotes from Poe's letters of 1846 to show how deeply he was wounded by the newspaper assaults on his character. To round out the picture, Moss might have cited from the letter of February 14, 1849, when Poe wrote to F. W. Thomas: "I have some old scores to settle. . . . I am just in the humor for a fight. You will be pleased to hear that I am in better health than I ever knew myself to be—full of energy and bent upon success." Poe's last summer in Richmond bears out the tone of this letter. He was neither defeated nor demoralized, but hopeful and ambitious, full of plans for the future and closer to realizing them than at any other time in his life.

Poe also emerges intact from a more recent encounter, this time with Raymond Paul, author of *Who Murdered Mary Rogers?* In this book Paul advances the modest claim that he has solved the Mary Rogers case and that Poe's story, "The Mystery of Marie Rogêt," is worthless as a realistic guide to what actually happened. Paul's rehash of the famous unsolved murder case of 1841 is probably the longest and most detailed account yet attempted. It is also the most inept, not excluding the detective work performed by the New York police immediately following the crime. Paul's attempts to write vivid and lively prose inevitably result in such banalities as "the inquiry continued at a snail's pace," "the magistrate had friends in high places," "one more mild flurry of excitement occurred in the Rogers case," or in cliché metaphors applied in unbelievably bad taste, as when Paul tells us at the conclusion that he will now accord the ghosts of Poe and Mary Rogers "the courtesy generally reserved for sleeping dogs."

But the quality of Paul's research is of a lower order than his writing style. For most of his information about Poe's condition, especially when it sounds damaging, Paul has drawn on Hervey Allen's *Israfel,* which more recent biographies have shown to be filled with speculation and fantasy. When Paul wishes to suggest that Poe had delusions that he was a god, he quotes from Baudelaire's description of the effects of opium. The connection? Baudelaire was "Poe's greatest admirer." When Poe mentions in a letter to Mrs. Clemm that shortly after his arrival in New York he tore his pants on a nail, Paul alters the detail to read "Edgar Allan Poe arrived in the city of New York with a hole in the seat of his breeches." But the pivotal point of the book, the *raison d'être* of *Who Murdered Mary Rogers?,* in Paul's own words, "the central piece of evidence," which was unknown to earlier investigators—this too is based on inadequate research.

Mary left home one Sunday morning in July and was found floating in the Hudson River on the afternoon of the Wednesday following. Everyone simply assumed that she had been killed and thrown in the river sometime late Sunday. Suspects were questioned accordingly as to their whereabouts on the Sunday of Mary's disappearance. But Mary's corpse was found in a condition of rigor mortis. And rigor mortis, Paul tells us triumphantly, lasts no longer than seventeen hours. Thus the suspects' alibis are worthless, since Mary must have been killed no earlier than Tuesday afternoon! Actually, under certain circumstances, all of which were possible in the case of Mary Rogers, a drowning victim or a murder victim submerged in water will remain in a state of rigor mortis for three or four days, or even longer. Mary could easily have been murdered and disposed of on Sunday.

The sort of reasoning that goes on in *Who Murdered Mary Rogers?* is equally unconvincing. Paul says that the murderer was Daniel Payne, Mary's lover and rejected sweetheart. About two months after Mary's body was discovered, Payne crossed over to New Jersey, sought out the spot where the murder took place, and committed suicide by drinking laudanum. He did this, according to Raymond Paul, so that he could indicate to the authorities that he, Daniel Payne, was the guilty party. Why didn't he go directly to the police and confess his crime? Because, says Paul, when he realized that he had committed the perfect murder, he went mad and could not bear to confess the awful secret, or to keep it either. And so on.

The fact of the matter is, Payne killed

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himself because he could not bear his grief over Mary's death. He left a suicide note that clearly indicates his motive and his state of mind. Paul reprints the note in part, truncated so as to support his thesis about Payne's guilty conscience. The full text of the note may be found in an earlier book about the case, John Walsh's *Poe the Detective* (Rutgers University Press, 1968).

In fairness to Raymond Paul we should conclude by saying that the Mary Rogers case exerts a peculiar sort of chemical action on amateur sleuths and leads them not only to spurious, but sometimes absurd, "solutions." Actually, Poe's C. Auguste Dupin comes as demonstrably close to the truth as anyone else who has ventured to explain the somber and violent death of the beautiful cigar girl.

Inside an Enigma

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA. *Edited by Thomas W. Robinson. University of California Press. $13.50.*

MAO'S REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE. *By Richard H. Solomon. University of California Press. $16.75.*

Reviewed by JAY MATHEWS

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution may have been hard on the Chinese, but it was a godsend for American graduate students. More useful information poured out of the Chinese mainland in those hectic thirty-four months than had been seen in research libraries in this country for some time. It was jumbled, contradictory, the work of young Chinese activists running around the country with tape recorders and wall-poster paint, but it offered glimpses of the inner workings of the Chinese Communist party and government that could only have been guessed at obliquely up to that time.

Mercifully, the flow of information has again slowed to a trickle. It will take years to sort out what we already have. It will take longer to rearrange cherished models of Chinese Communist behavior—pre-Cultural Revolution myths like the solidarity of the Chinese leadership and the cold-eyed pragmatism of the younger Chinese generation.

A few monographs, the first signs of scholarly assimilation of this mountain of data on China from 1966 to 1969, have appeared. *The Cultural Revolution in China* is a collection of some of these first, short pieces edited by a Rand Corporation specialist. *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture,* on the other hand, is a long, unified book on the Chinese psyche that was begun years before the Cultural Revolution but given one final, enlightening post-1969 draft.

Solomon's book, a ten-year labor of love, cannot be fairly compared to Robinson's collection of short, recent pieces. But much of the material in *The Cultural Revolution in China* nicely complements the headlines. This is particularly true of Robinson's own 130-page examination of the personality of Premier Chou En-lai. His article focuses on Chou during the Cultural Revolution, when the freewheeling Red Guard newspapers gave us the clearest picture yet of how Chinese leaders handle crises.

According to Robinson, Chou relied on sources of physical energy remarkable in a seventy-year-old man. By being everywhere at once and meeting with group after group long past midnight, he managed to cajole radical groups into treating his bureaucrats relatively gently. As he had all his career, Chou made himself indispensable. He was safe to stay a bit to the right of Mao's center and help slow down the rhetorical orgy of 1966 to 1969 in order to gear up for the diplomatic offensive of 1970 to 1971, the fruits of which we now see everywhere.

A useful companion to Robinson's account is Melvin Gurtov's analysis of the effect of the most lively months of the Cul-

JAY MATHEWS holds a master's degree in East Asian Regional Studies from Harvard University and has contributed to the recent Harvard East Asian Monograph, "The Cultural Revolution in the Provinces." He is a reporter for the *Washington Post.*

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tural Revolution on the Chinese foreign ministry. He reveals an effort, occasionally unsuccessful, by the highest levels of Maoist leadership to keep foreign policy on an even keel during the domestic hubbub.

One very short article in Robinson's collection, by Harry Harding, Jr., might be recommended for everyone who learns about China from the newspapers. American journalists have tended to characterize the Maoists as "revolutionary romantics" who wish to take a "spiritual" rather than "material" approach to China's problems. Harding argues that the Maoists began the Cultural Revolution with as unromantic a concern for the nitty-gritty political situation as any Chicago ward heeler. They did not want to lose their base of power through the ineptitude of a party bureaucracy that "had lost (or had deliberately broken) contact with the masses, and had fractured into a myriad [of] policy factions and personal cliques." The party "was no longer a transmission belt between Mao (the leader) and the masses (his followers)."

In his book, Solomon, who teaches political science at the University of Michigan, explains Mao's concern about the party's decline by examining not only Chinese politics, but the Chinese soul. Despite some uncomfortable Freudian mannerisms (Solomon suggests at one point that Mao is an "anal" leader transforming an "oral" society), he brings to this account solid data from long interviews and psychological tests of ninety-one mainland-born Chinese encountered in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the last decade. The book is one of the most original and cogent treatments of the Cultural Revolution that has been published.

Solomon attempts to interpret the Chinese people's erratic record as revolutionaries. Mao discovered early in his career that he had to do much more than shoot a few landlords to win peasant support for an attack against the Nationalists and the old society. It was like talking to the servants of a rich family. Chinese peasants had been exploited for years, but their relationships with their oppressors were too longstanding, too personal and, Solomon insists, too rooted in ancient patterns of Chinese authority for the peasants to take initiative even when the Communists gave them an opening shot.

We have, as Solomon points out, the odd picture of cadres, moving south with the victorious People's Liberation Army in the late 1940s, having to force the peasants to go through the motions of overthrowing the landlords, screaming at them, waving rifles in their faces, dragging out their property, in order to break down old habits of deference.

From his interview data, Solomon concludes that "individuals reared in the Chinese tradition responded to authority with a strong sense of anxiety. Such a sentiment helped to sustain filial dependence, and suppressed challenges to those in positions of leadership and to the traditions from which they drew authority." Thus to Solomon, the most important thing about Mao, who dates the revolution from his first fight with his father, was the chairman's "strong element of self-assertiveness." After much effort, that self-assertiveness seemed enough to bring about the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek. The hitch came in trying to maintain in the Chinese people that spirit of defiance of authority while at the same time governing them. Mao thought he could do it by creating a canon of revolutionary principles that would win everyone's allegiance and take precedence over human authority. He would be the first to admit that by the mid-1960s the idea had not worked.

By the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Solomon argues, Mao had concluded that the party had slipped back into the pre-Revolution politics of dependence. The party had become a paper-shuffling elite whose word could not be questioned.

Using army political officers as organizers, Mao created the Red Guards to attack the party and end the unhealthy deference to its authority. But as before, there was no way to keep such an outright assault on authority from shaking institutions that had to be preserved, like the army and the foreign policy bureaucracy.

With his efforts a near shambles, Mao returned in the end to a renewed party

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

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structure. His students were given orders to head for the countryside to learn from peasants who had stayed out of the Cultural Revolution. China turned back to the unseen political maneuvering at the top that Mao felt had helped kill Marxism in the Soviet Union. Mao's effort to create "a new Chinese political culture," as Solomon calls it, had ended bound feet, deference to landlords and education only for the few, but it was still less than halfway toward the goal Mao had set for it.

The Free Clinic

LOVE NEEDS CARE. *By David E. Smith and John Luce. Little, Brown. $8.95.*

Reviewed by MICHAEL HALBERSTAM

As Youth Cult continues to collapse all around us, Instant Historians will spring forth to examine this little fragment of Instant History. How wonderfully American it is that we will lavish all sorts of energy and scholarship on a phenomenon that lasted some four or five years, investing it with all the significance of the French Revolution or the Frontier. The late "Youth Quake" was undoubtedly interesting, but it will be hard for serious historians to appreciate how college deans used to sweat when Mark Rudd turned up on their campuses, and students chanted, "One Columbia, two Columbias. . . ."

Ancient history, for Americans. Abbie Hoffman knew that we are all captives of the media, captives, too, of under-employed academics who have to find something or someone "seminal" that they can make all their own. A new theory, an undiscovered leader, something to ride out of obscurity.

Love Needs Care will be an interesting source book for those who examine the youth culture. It is the story of the Haight-Ashbury Free Medical Clinic, told by two young men who were personally involved in its founding and development. It is a strange book—it is part scholarly, but it lacks an index; it is intensely personal, but in four hundred pages almost no one is quoted directly; it is directed to a general audience, but contains great lumps of clinical medical and psychiatric data. As a history, it is lamentably short on dates and confusing in chronology. It lacks the *joie de vivre* of Ray Mungo's *Famous Long Ago* and other youth classics, although the photographs, many by Elaine Mayes, are excellent.

The essential information is all here, however, about how an influx of young people into an already-crowded hippie ghetto produced unprecedented health problems that conventional medical clinics could not or would not deal with. The Free Clinic grew out of this unmet need, and proved the prototype for a dozen or more medical units operating in youth areas across the country.

The authors are refreshingly unsentimental about themselves and their patients. Although they try to make a distinction between several subsets in the youth culture (beatniks, bohemians, hippies, speed freaks, summer hippies), it is clear that the differences faded and melded as time progressed —and time progresses very rapidly in the world of the young. The authors write without irony of how the approach to drugs of many hippies changed significantly "as the summer progressed."

The picture of the youth culture that Smith and Luce present is distressingly similar to that envisioned by the straightest of the straight. In front of us troops a mass of confused, vapid, amoral children, dirty and badly diseased. Their preoccupation is drug-dealing, and to buy drugs they sell their bodies, steal from small shopowners, steal from each other. Even correcting for the selected population that presents itself to a medical clinic, the reader is impressed with the sordid nature of Haight-Ashbury. Remember, this was the generation that was going to lead us all to new levels of humanity in politics and personal relationships . . . . The young have turned out to be

MICHAEL J. HALBERSTAM has written articles on medical care and other subjects for the *New York Times Magazine* and various journals. Dr. Halberstam is a clinical associate in medicine at George Washington University Medical School.

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no better and no worse than their parents, a fact not surprising to most.

The authors write of themselves in a curiously detached way. "Dr. Smith was also unaware of his paternal attitude towards young people. The attitude stemmed in part from their life-style—they were living out his fantasy of the free life." Further on we learn that "Luce saw the symbolic value of Dr. Smith's mission. Although he considered the doctor naïve, he had given up on organized politics . . . ." Some of their associates are described (by name) as "depressed," "withdrawn," "lonely with a limited sense of self-esteem and personal accomplishment." Clearly, false heroics are not the authors' style.

Still, the story of the Haight-Ashbury Clinic has elements of the heroic. For three years a volunteer effort struggled with the medical and social problems of hordes of adolescents and near-adolescents, almost every one of them what used to be called a "problem child." Out of sympathy or curiosity dozens of older doctors and dentists donated their time and money to the clinic. Young people barely out of the street themselves fastened on to the clinic as workers and began to gain new self-respect. The clinic fought skirmishes with the police, the medical establishment, black radicals, the health department, and its own supporters, and somehow managed to keep alive. It should be noted, by the way, that the "free" nature of the clinic has long depended on subsidies from outside the youth or hippie community.

A long four years after they first became involved with Haight-Ashbury, Luce and Smith have changed. They concede the failure of the psychedelic movement, and have personally become more aware of the need for social control, more politically conservative. Even though Dr. Smith has become a drug abuse consultant for the Reader's Digest Foundation, they are not overly enthusiastic about life in these United States. They write that "almost every culture has used toxic chemicals for relief and recreation, but ours relies on them most of all," which makes one wonder if they know anything at all about

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

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eighteenth-century England, the United States before the Harrison Narcotics Act, Pierre Mendès-France, or international health statistics. They also fall back upon the threadbare equation of therapeutic drug-taking (primarily by adults, primarily by prescription) with recreational drugging (primarily by young people, primarily nonprescription). If a speed freak is merely the son of the housewife who takes tranquilizers, then there's nothing at all unusual about today's (vanishing) drug culture, and we had no reason to get excited about it. But, the equation of the two is nonsense —something was happening back in those weird long-ago days of Timothy Leary and LSD, and it wasn't the same thing that happened when Aunt Lil took a drink at the Senior Prom or when Dad had a martini for lunch. We may never learn why back in 1965-69 a large number of bright young people decided to burn out their brains with chemicals. It might have been boredom or good media work or peer pressure or too much TV or Vietnam, but whatever the cause, it has, like the Gold Rush or Prohibition, washed over the country, left its indelible mark on our speech and culture, and begun to recede into the distant past.

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Reviewed by PHILIP M. WEINSTEIN

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PHILIP M. WEINSTEIN, an assistant professor of English at Swarthmore College, taught at Harvard University from 1968 until 1971. His publications include pieces on Shakespeare and Dickens and a full-length study entitled *Henry James and the Requirements of the Imagination.*

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has rigorously evaluated James's *oeuvre* according to the coherence with which it handles "the two obsessive questions in his work: how sound are morality and innocence? how bad are the upper classes?" If these questions seem a little bald, particularly in connection with a master of nuance like James, they indicate both the strain and the success of this study.

The strain comes from Samuels' powerful impulse to set things straight at all costs. Chapter two begins, for instance, with "Henry James castigates evil in order to celebrate good." *Tout court.* And in the preface we are told that, of the forty-nine books on James published since his death, "thirty are interpretations . . . thirteen are biographical, and six are evaluative." Whether or not one agrees with the conclusions reached in the books by Quentin Anderson, Oscar Cargill, D. W. Jefferson, or Naomi Lebowitz—to mention only four of the thirty—one nevertheless cannot shuffle the bulk of Jamesian commentary into a discreet (and implicitly lesser) pile marked "interpretation." Interpretation and evaluation are inextricably mixed in the good work on James. You cannot judge until you have appreciated (as *The Ambassadors* so persuasively shows). Where his book is weakest, Samuels makes the same mistake that, when confronted with unassessed riches, Strether made: he resorts to inadequate categories.

According to Samuels, the struggle between innocence and worldliness becomes *the* struggle in James's work. Those books in which the scales are loaded (usually toward innocence) are flawed; the successful ones expose the latent blindness and tyranny of innocence, along with a tough awareness of the duplicity of worldly society. At its best, this categorical framework articulates the significance of *The Ambassadors;* at its worst, it prefers *The Awkward Age,* in which innocence gets its comeuppance, to the immensely more impressive *Portrait of a Lady.*

If the strain of Samuels' argument is caused by creaking categories, the success of the book lies in the power of those same categories to organize the author's insight into a comprehensive judgment:

> James had to recognize the moral ambiguity of each of his three primary subjects (sex, society, renunciation). More importantly, he had to make ambiguity not a reflection of his own ambivalence but an expression of the subject. This involves coming out from behind what I have called his epistemological relativism. His famous experiments in point of view are partly conditioned by a conviction that all comprehension is inflected by sensibility. But these experiments are also related to a habit of equivocation . . . that suggests a desire *not to decide.* If James was ambivalent, what easier way to operate than through structures that preclude definition. . . . James achieves richness rather than equivocation only when he corrects, through comic criticism of each contestant, his essentially tragic vision of the ultimate defeat of virtue by worldliness.

Equivocation, he claims, is the bugbear that haunts James's work; it impedes proper evaluation. Consequently the fiction is graded on a scale of increasing clarity—from "confusions" to "ambiguities" to "complexities." Not surprisingly he begins with "The Turn of the Screw" and *The Sacred Fount,* works in which "evasion" is paramount. Thence he moves into novels less notoriously confusing—*The American, The Princess Casamassima, The Spoils of Poynton* and *The Wings of the Dove.* Samuels' attack on the *Wings* is unexpected, but—to this reviewer at least—judicious and convincing. Milly Theale *is* an unrealized character, and Samuels locates in her one of James's deepest impulses, what he terms "'the Milly Theale syndrome,'" "James's old tendency to make rhetorical love to surrogate characters."

Several comparisons are original and impressive. Instead of moving conventionally from *Roderick Hudson* or *The Bostonians* to *The Princess Casamassima,* Samuels juxtaposes *The American* with *The Princess,* finding his connection in the alienated heroes: "Like Christopher Newman, Hyacinth Robinson is a social inferior . . . who proves his innate superiority to [the] world by renouncing an act of violence that threatens its existence. . . . The bullet in Hyacinth's chest, like the empty hands of Christopher Newman, is the authentic Jamesian badge of honor."

Other readings are less felicitous; some

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are contradictory (and in Samuels' lexicon that is a particularly damaging charge). For example, "The Turn of the Screw" is considered a failure because it supports mutually incompatible interpretations. But rather than ignore it (or condemn it and let it go at that), Samuels carefully builds his own reading of the governess' character, stressing her fanatic virtue and pride, "her careerism." Later he refers back to James's use of the ghosts' "presumed wickedness to excuse if not advocate an innocence that is really predatory." This seems to me to be having it all three ways: she is guilty, she is innocent, and it's a failed story because you can't know. What such a reading scants is the primacy of perception, James's "conviction that all comprehension is inflected by sensibility." This is not to say that criticism is therefore impossible or that the story is successful. It is to say that James went to pains to make "The Turn of the Screw" (and *The Sacred Fount*) ambiguous; any reading that laboriously dispels (or simply abhors) the ambiguity is inescapably tangential: it has ignored the *donnée*.

Beyond his scanting of the role of perception, Samuels touches on a theme—exploitation—that requires more attention than he gives. Newman in *The American* is seen as "guilty of the Jamesian sin of treating people as things," and Ransom in *The Bostonians* "is seeking to annex Verena Tarrant because he loves her." In both cases Samuels considers this character flaw an unfortunate blurring of the edges of the putative hero. One wishes he had recourse at these moments to his own far-reaching definition of good and evil in James's work: "good . . . is no more than . . . the ability to restrain egoism in our relations with others so that they may fulfill their own souls, just as evil is the exploitation of others for personal ends." In the light of that definition Newman's and Ransom's behavior is not ambiguous: it partakes of the exploitation that is ubiquitous in James's work, an exploitation rooted in the primary vocabularies of economy and amusement that James draws upon in the creation of all character re-

(Continued on page 329)

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

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

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(Continued from page 314)

lationships. *The Golden Bowl* is particularly saturated in such language, and Samuels summarizes: "The Ververs had originally bought Charlotte and the Prince as if they were *objets;* but when Maggie and Adam learn that fine human pieces come high, they reveal the necessary spiritual capital to possess what they had only procured. To purchase her husband, Maggie realizes that she must pay with her father." One looks in vain for a recognition that "possess," "procure," "purchase," and "pay" *remain* sinister verbs for describing human relationships, and that the evil of manipulative exploitation is rooted, not uprooted, in the persistence of this vocabulary.

The second half of the book deals with "complexities," those novels in which the life-affirming, the "robust" James is in control—the tragicomedies. In this category Samuels treats *The Europeans* and *Washington Square* (*The Bostonians* and *Portrait* having been classified among the less successful "ambiguities"); but the masterpieces are *What Maisie Knew* and *The Ambassadors,* both of them odysseys into experience. On *Maisie* he is fresh and persuasive; on *The Ambassadors,* less so. This marvelous novel spills over the confines of Samuels' thesis; what is given playfully is too often taken literally. For example—to take two details with significant ramifications—Samuels fails to see that Waymarsh and Sarah Pocock are not actually having an affair; nor does he acknowledge the crucial sense in which Chad's relationship with Madame de Vionnet, so long as it lasted and despite the technical lie, *was* a virtuous attachment.

Samuels' unrelentingly critical epilogue on *The Golden Bowl* is probably the finest chapter in the book. Here his criteria serve him well to distinguish that novel's unique affirmation of life from its latent plea for regressive innocence: "Though he can applaud Maggie's decision to live up to passion and commend both her means and her mercy, part of James prefers the sexless relationship she had had with Adam: a lost paradise gilded with wealth." Such comments, fusing interpretation with evaluation, are what the book offers at its

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best, and they stand up well beside his own modest conclusion: "I do not know if my qualitative distinctions will turn out to have been the correct ones; I do know that qualitative distinctions must be made." One may quarrel with his "distinctions," but one can only welcome the endeavor.

The Making of a Woman

WOMAN IN SEXIST SOCIETY. *Edited by Vivian Gornick and Barbara Moran. Basic Books. $12.50.*

Reviewed by MARY JANE LUPTON

In our sexist, consumer society, women are products, wrapped at birth in pink ribbon, stamped "For Men Only." Women are viewed as breeders, their creativity and intelligence acceptable only when clearly subordinated to their "natural," that is procreative, function. When, through necessity or choice, women leave their domestic spheres and enter the labor force, their wife-mother roles usually extend to working situations. Secretaries support the egos of their male bosses; stewardesses flatter and feed salesmen; nurses care for the sick; teachers are substitute mothers. Domestic workers, the lowest paid and least protected members of the labor force, scrub the floors and clean the toilets of economically fortunate women, freeing them to "volunteer" their services to help the poor.

Women are indeed an oppressed class. The contributors to Vivian Gornick's and Barbara Moran's anthology would agree that their virtual powerlessness in our society derives from socialization rather than from inherent biological weaknesses. Woman is made, not born.

In answering the question, "Why Are There No Great Women Artists?" Linda Nochlin writes:

MARY JANE LUPTON is an associate professor of English at Morgan State College. Her essays and reviews have appeared in *Literature and Psychology, American Imago, College Language Association Journal* and in *Women: A Journal of Liberation*. She has written a biography of Elizabeth Barrett Browning for the new Feminist Press.

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The fault lies not in our stars, our hormones, our menstrual cycles, or our empty internal spaces, but in our institutions and our education—education understood to include everything that happens to us from the moment we enter, head first, into this world of meaningful symbols, signs, and signals.

We are conditioned into our roles as women. We hear stories about Cinderella and Sleeping Beauty, whose future happiness depends on being rescued by a prince. We are given fashionable dolls to play with and to become. We are told to be passive and polite, so that we fall into what Margaret Adams calls the "Compassion Trap." Educated to view ourselves as potential mothers and wives, we are likely to overlook the possibilities of becoming architects or scholars or scientists.

The patterns of behavior acceptable at home are reinforced by the school system. In an essay entitled "Ambivalence: The Socialization of Women," Judith M. Bardwick and Elizabeth Douvan write:

> Girls are rewarded with high grades in school, especially in the early years of grammar school. What do girls do especially well in? What are they being asked to master? Grammar, spelling, reading, arithmetic—tasks that depend a great deal upon memorization and demand little independence, assertiveness, analysis, innovativeness, creativity. The dependent, passive girl, cued into the affirming responses of teachers, succeeds and is significantly rewarded in school for her "good" behavior and her competent memorizing skills.

These sexist attitudes continue into higher education. Women are told by guidance counselors to go to nursing school or to secretarial school, while boys with equal capabilities are encouraged to become doctors or accountants. Graduate schools often set quotas for their women candidates. And, for those women who do successfully complete the program, they will most likely end up teaching in community colleges rather than in one of the Ivy League schools.

Another institution that reinforces sexual stereotypes is psychiatry. *Woman in Sexist Society* includes essays by Naomi Weisstein, Jessie Bernard and Phyllis Chesler, women whose insights into the ex-

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The Inner War
by Paul A. Lacey
Anne Sexton, James Wright, Robert Bly, Denise Levertov, and William Everson (Brother Antoninus) have been dominant figures in recent American poetry. Lacey analyzes their work in detail, showing how these five have helped turn poetry away from objectivity and towards introspection. Broad literary questions are also posed in this book—What do these poets have to say about the spiritual state of our world? How do they relate form to content? Readers of poetry will welcome Lacey's perceptive comments on these writers and on the poet's task in general. The author is Professor of English at Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana. $7.95 cloth; $4.50 paper.

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ploitative nature of Freudian theory, clinical psychiatry, and marriage are familiar to many readers. According to Phyllis Chesler:

> Both psychotherapy and marriage isolate women from each other; both emphasize individual rather than collective solutions to woman's unhappiness; both are based on a woman's helplessness and dependence on a stronger male authority figure; both may, in fact, be viewed as reenactments of a little girl's relation to her father in a patriarchal society; both control and oppress women similarly—yet, at the same time, are the two safest havens for women in a society that offers them no others.

Having been given very little choice, woman accepts the safe haven of marriage and the home. At home she watches television or reads women's magazines, and she receives constant reinforcement of her role through advertising. She turns on her TV set and sees women mopping floors, polishing furniture, competing for the prize of brightest wash in town, having occasional adventures with a White Knight or a Giant-in-the-Washing-Machine. According to Lucy Komisar, advertising "legitimizes the idealized, stereotyped roles of woman as temptress, wife, mother, and sex object, and portrays women as less intelligent and more dependent than men. It makes women believe that their chief role is to please men and that their fulfillment will be as wives, mothers, and homemakers."

Any woman who has managed somehow to feel superior to other women, who has seen herself as unaffected by the so-called "oppression" that radical feminists keep harping about, will, after reading the 515 pages of *Woman in Sexist Society*, feel differently. Even Irving Howe's fantasied Radcliffe-Professor-Liberated-Feminine-Ideal (see Howe's review of Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* in *Harper's*, December, 1970) will recognize herself among the oppressed. One contributor to the anthology, Roslyn S. Willett, is a woman who has clearly proved herself in a man's world. Ms. Willett describes, nonetheless, how she and other successful women executives have been victims of the male myth that women are irrational, incompetent, difficult to work with. Vivian Gornick recounts one terrible luncheon date with an intelligent

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male who, over coffee, casually remarks: "Of course, you realize that if Women's Liberation wins, civilization will simply be *wrecked.*" All of us have heard comments of this sort; perhaps we have even uttered them. The more subtle discriminatory attitudes against women, as well as the more obvious ones like lower wages and lower status, are exposed in this book.

Woman in Sexist Society contains important essays by some of the most articulate proponents for women's liberation—Kate Millett, Elaine Showalter, Sidney Abbott, Barbara Love, Alix Shulman and twenty-six others. It touches on almost every aspect of the new feminism—the exploitation of women by education, marriage, law, religion; sexism in language and literature; sex-role behavior; black women and women's liberation; women in industry; lesbianism; the history of American feminism; women in other cultures.

Unfortunately, the cost of the anthology makes it somewhat prohibitive for use as a source-book among women in the feminist movement, many of whom are unemployed or underpaid. There are some good, paperback anthologies available, similar in scope to *Woman in Sexist Society,* containing essays by some of the same contributors: *Women's Liberation: Blueprint for the Future,* edited by Sookie Stambler (Ace Books), and *Sisterhood Is Powerful,* edited by Robin Morgan (Vintage), are two examples. The essays in the Morgan and Stambler anthologies are generally shorter than those found in *Woman in Sexist Society,* and they better represent the diversity and range of the movement for women's liberation.

Moran and Gornick, however, have compiled a stimulating, carefully selected collection of essays of the highest order. Much of the material has not previously been published, including an experimental piece by Kate Millett entitled "Prostitution: A Quartet for Female Voices." *Woman in Sexist Society* is a significant contribution to a growing body of feminist writings, writings that expose the nature of a society that keeps women economically, psychologically and sexually dependent on the male of the species.

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The Reader Replies . . . . . .

THE READER REPLIES *carries miscellaneous comments by readers and authors on various articles that have appeared in the magazine. All communications should be addressed to: Editor,* THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR, *1811 Q Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20009. Because of space limitations we cannot guarantee to print all letters received.*
—EDITOR

I wish to congratulate Evelyn Kossoff for the excellent article on professor evaluation published in your Winter issue. It is time that thoughtful scholars look to the fraud that is being perpetrated on the academic community in the name of "teacher evaluation." I have tried in a number of instances to call attention to this matter. However, I have never been able to present the situation as honestly and as emphatically as Evelyn Kossoff did.

I am particularly interested in the comment that the scientific method is itself a human invention. It is even more fragile than that. The scientific method has very vague and questionable epistemological foundations. If one examines the situation very carefully, the validity of the scientific method is seen to be accepted by scientists *as a primary act of faith* which certainly has not been proved and, in all probability, is unprovable. Again, I think all your readers owe you and the author a debt of gratitude for this timely, important and effective article.

CHARLES G. WILBER, Chairman
Department of Zoology
Colorado State University

* * *

Because it is timely, informative, and thought-provoking, I was pleased to see the essay, "Evaluating College Professors by 'Scientific' Methods." And I share Miss Kossoff's displeasure with evaluators collecting "statistical rather than verbal data." But, my God, can you imagine what we would have if the students collected and published verbal data—what college students actually say about their teachers? The language would make Henry Miller blush.

FRED MAHER
Reno, Nevada

* * *

The virtuoso author of many first-class detective stories, Mr. Edmund Crispin, contributed to your Autumn issue a most entertaining review of *A Catalogue of Crime,* which he found "unique and incomparable" but also "idiosyncratic." What a word! as the late A. P. Herbert used to say. But on second thoughts, Hurrah! It must be a book written by some man or men, not a computer. Still, Mr. Crispin didn't mean it kindly-like. He objects to the fact that my collaborator and I seem to prefer the sort of tale that he himself—E. Crispin—has written, rather than others, more violent and fashionable.

Back to the computer! Figures show that Mr. Crispin's masochistic criticism is misplaced. Our (vo)luminous pages show a preponderance of authors (if not books) of the newer breed. We seen our duty and wedunit. And if we do not profess to like *all* the tough and spy stuff, it may be the fault lies in the authors and not in us. Perhaps the later fashion got hackneyed sooner than the earlier, classical genre.

This question aside, Mr. Crispin's charge of idiosyncrasy is only a restatement of what *we* say, over and over again: we offer the reader no bibliography, no comprehensive survey (although ours is so far the widest); we say, "Here is a Catalogue of what we have read in the last fifty years." Mr. Crispin comes along and says: "Why didn't you read everything?"

He goes on and uses the privilege an old friend has of exaggerating his complaints: why didn't we give *all* the alternative titles of books published on both sides of the ocean; *all* the birth-and-death-dates of the authors? Our critic should go on the new pill which is said to cure the disease of not listening. Our introduction says plainly: "We tell what we know, not all there is to know." A man would be an idiot—not an idiosyncratic—to look up all those trifles when he could be reading a book and having the fun of dithering about it.

As for the errors of proofreading or transcription that Mr. C. says he found, a number are cetainly chargeable to us. But here again he is a trifle inflationary. Of the five dates of birth he impugns, two are confirmed by the reference works (one of them English) I have just consulted. Two were, regrettably, transposed. The last, Andrew Garve's, was supplied by his publisher and mine, and its owner, an old friend, has read the book and never once complained that it made him too old or too young.

Finally, Mr. C. growls because "Dermot Morrah was not editor of *The Times.*" We say

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he was *an* editor, and since Mr. Morrah admits in his *Who's Who* entry that he wrote editorials for twenty-nine years for that paper, he rates in common parlance as *an* editor. Let him who is without syncrasy cast the first stone.

JACQUES BARZUN
Columbia University

* * *

When the Hiss case first reached the news media almost twenty-five years ago, I was certain that Chambers was a liar. When the case was finished, I concluded, reluctantly and sorrowfully, that Hiss, or someone very close to him, was guilty.

My early identification with the intellectual Hiss was then almost inevitable, for our history had revealed few traitors among those having access to documents affecting national security. Today, among scientists and intellectuals, the defector is no longer a stranger; and those who have been caught have fared much worse than Alger Hiss.

I object to some of the reasoning in Allen Weinstein's reappraisal of the Hiss case in the Winter, 1971-72, issue of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR.

Chambers testified that he had not at first revealed Hiss's espionage because of compassion (among other reasons). Mr. Weinstein seeks to show that Chambers lied because he lacked compassion for other ex-Communists, referring to incidents with Freeman and Rushmore. The former had befriended Chambers fifteen years earlier and may or may not have received a cold shoulder from Chambers. Rushmore was no friend of Chambers, probably a complete stranger to him. On the other hand, Hiss was an intimate friend, by Chambers' description, and Chambers had been the beneficiary of Hiss's hospitality over a continuous period of time, according to Hiss himself. Clearly, Chambers would be likely to exercise compassion for Hiss when he would be under no duty to do so for the others.

Mr. Weinstein charges Chambers with giving conflicting testimony as to when he severed his connections with the Communist party. Admittedly the exact date would be important to determine the truth of other Chambers testimony about material, possibly vital, elements of the charges against Hiss. However, the entire chain of reasoning is destroyed by Mr. Weinstein's description of the following testimony as "extremely precise":

Q. Now, how long did you stay at Mt. Royal Terrace?

A. *I should think* we stayed there until February or March of 1938. (emphasis supplied)

Such an answer, given more than ten years after the event, is anything but precise. Much of the difficulty in the entire case deals with events which, at the trial, were already many years old. Now, more than twenty years after the trial, such discrepancies become even more difficult to reconcile.

A large part of the Weinstein article deals with the physical evidence in the case, the microfilms and the typewriter, which he describes, rightfully, I think, as "decisive" in the result. I am reminded of the Hauptman conviction in the Lindbergh kidnaping case, which was also secured principally on physical evidence painstakingly put together by government investigators. To suggest that such evidence, in the Hiss case, may have been manufactured, with F.B.I. complicity, strikes me as an unwarranted blanket indictment of all those connected with the prosecution. In the twenty-odd years since the Hiss conviction, which includes several years after his release from prison, not one shred of evidence has been unearthed to prove the last minute charge of the convicted that there was "forgery by typewriter." In the absence of such evidence, the Weinstein innuendo is as good a job of character assassination as any produced by Senator Joseph McCarthy.

Evidently the F.B.I. files on the case have been made available to some, but not all, investigators. I surmise that Mr. Weinstein has not had access to them. Could this explain the smear?

STUART M. MILLER
Valley Stream, New York

MR. WEINSTEIN replies: Readers must decide for themselves whether my analysis of evidence

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in the Hiss case deserves the fearsome maledictions pronounced over it by Stuart M. Miller, most notably whether it constitutes a "smear" and "character assassination" on a grand scale. Miller's overheated letter complains specifically about three points in the article: my explanation for Whittaker Chambers' belated decision to accuse Alger Hiss of espionage, my discussion of the "forgery by typewriter" theory, and my evaluation of the conflicting dates given by Chambers for his final break with the Communist underground. Only a look at the article itself can provide an accurate statement of my arguments on all three points since Miller misquotes or distorts each of them.

Chambers may or may not have felt "compassion" toward Alger Hiss in 1938 at the time the former broke with the Communist party, but such speculations have nothing to do with the reasons the *Time* editor produced the "pumpkin papers" ten years later. Chambers indicated in testimony at two trials and in his memoir *Witness* that he was (quoting my article) "primarily concerned with preventing his own possible indictment." Even on the question of Chambers' earlier feelings of compassion toward Hiss, Miller offers only his own unsupported "chain of reasoning" to counter the several actual cases I presented of Chambers' hatred of his former Party associates.

Much more seriously, Miller's letter suggests that I accused the F.B.I. explicitly of having manufactured the Woodstock typewriter on which government papers that Hiss allegedly stole were retyped. I made no such accusation, of course, nor would any responsible historian unless he had convincing evidence. What actually incurred Miller's displeasure was my attempt to present briefly both prosecution *and* defense arguments concerning the typewriter, in the course of which I referred to the various polemical works dealing with this critical aspect of the Hiss case and stressed the F.B.I.'s uncertain role in the matter. To repeat, the bureau assigned thirty agents *solely* to hunt for the Woodstock. After an unsuccessful but presumably systematic six-month search, the understaffed Hiss defense team somehow located the machine at which point the F.B.I. declined an offer to examine it. Why? Furthermore, in the years that followed, such sources as official HUAC reports, Nixon's memoirs and magazine stories based on "official" F.B.I. records all credited the bureau with finding the machine. Surely the F.B.I's role in the affair deserves a fuller explanation than it has thus far provided. On the other hand, although there exist numerous unexplained "shreds of evidence" (despite Miller's assertion) connected with the Woodstock, "forgery by typewriter" (as my article made clear) has yet to be proven.

Miller simply misquotes me for purposes of his argument on the question of when Chambers broke with the Communist party. I did *not* call "extremely precise" Chambers' claim to have left the Party within a two-month period, February-March, 1938. What I said in fact was that "Chambers *wavered* [my italics] on the breakdate throughout his interrogation by HUAC . . . sometimes stating 1937 and on occasions February or March 1938." I went on to say that "on *other* aspects of the break, he was extremely precise," namely, on such matters as moving his family to a new apartment and severing his Party ties completely on the same day. There exists a considerable body of third-party testimony and documents, including much correspondence between Chambers and his new employer, Oxford University Press, to corroborate the fact that Chambers broke *sometime* in February or March, 1938, when he hid his family and began a new job as a free-lance translator. My article summarizes this evidence, the major implication of which is that *two* sets of "decisive" facts exist in the Hiss case: "The first involves Chambers' break with communism sometime *before* mid-March 1938; the second, a collection of State Department docuemnts allegedly stolen by Hiss but dating through *April* 1, 1938. The discrepancy between these two facts, until satisfactorily resolved, remains the episode's central mystery."

No man who reads in as slapdash a manner as Stuart M. Miller should fling about words such as "smear" and "character assassination." Miller provides a clue to this intemperateness in his letter's opening paragraphs, which expose his residual bitterness toward Alger Hiss. Many anti-Communist liberals at the time of the case felt that Hiss had conned them into accepting his innocence but then betrayed them with his apparent guilt. Such liberals often appealed publicly to Hiss to remove their lingering doubts by *confessing* his guilt; "Come clean, Alger Hiss," one law professor wrote in the *Progressive*. Miller's comments fit this hoary pattern of one-time Hiss supporters still noisily proclaiming "the end of innocence" while nursing even now the shame of gullibility.

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